[ISN] RSI.0004.06-17-98.BSDI.RLOGIND

From: mea culpa (jerichoat_private)
Date: Wed Jun 17 1998 - 22:58:53 PDT

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    RSI.0004.06-17-98.BSDI.RLOGIND
    
    
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                       Repent Security Incorporated, RSI
                           [ http://www.repsec.com ]
    
    
    		       *** RSI ALERT ADVISORY ***
     
    
    --- [CREDIT] --------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Mark Zielinski: Research and development, author of advisory.
    
    
    --- [SUMMARY] -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Announced:     June 17, 1998
    Report code:   RSI.0004.06-17-98.BSDI.RLOGIND
    Report title:  BSDI rlogind
    Vulnerability: A buffer overflow exists in rlogind that could allow remote
    	       root access on any server running BSDI with rlogind enabled
    Vendor status: Has been contacted on 6-17-98
    Patch status:  No patch currently available
    Platforms:     BSDI 2.0, 2.1, 3.0, 3.1
    Not affected:  FreeBSD-Current
                   NetBSD-Current
                   OpenBSD 2.3
    Reference:     http://www.repsec.com/advisories.html
    Impact:	       If exploited, an attacker could potentially compromise
    	       root access on your server
    
    
    --- [DETAILS] -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Problem:       A vulnerability exists in all current versions of BSDI
    	       that has the potential to allow an attacker to gain
    	       remote root access on any server running BSDI with 
                   rlogind enabled.
    
    	       Due to insufficient bounds checking, a buffer
    	       overflow can result when rlogind attempts to copy the
    	       connecting hostname into a buffer with a predefined size.
    
    	       While overwriting the buffer, the attacker can manipulate
    	       the stack and execute their own commands, possibly gaining
    	       root access on the server.
    
    	       For more information on this type of attack, point your
    	       web browsers to: http://www.repsec.com/bofs.html.
    
    
    --- [FIX] -----------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Solution:      Disable rlogind until Berkeley Software Design Inc. 
                   can provide a patch.
    
                   1. su to the root account
                   2. kill -9 `ps -aux | grep rlogind | awk '{print $2}'`
                   3. edit /etc/inetd.conf with your favorite editor
                   4. place a # in front of any lines beginning with "login"
    
    
    --- [PATCH] ---------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Solution:      Wait for Berkeley Software Deisgn Inc. to release an 
    	       official patch.
    
    
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
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    Copyright June 1998  RepSec, Inc.
    
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