[ISN] RSI.0006.06-25-98.HP-UX.RLPDAEMON

From: mea culpa (jerichot_private)
Date: Mon Jul 06 1998 - 10:17:10 PDT

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    Forwarded From: RSI Advise <adviset_private>
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                       Repent Security Incorporated, RSI
                           [ http://www.repsec.com ]
    		       *** RSI ALERT ADVISORY ***
    --- [CREDIT] --------------------------------------------------------------
    Bathead Brian:	Discovered vulnerability, co-authored advisory
    Mark Zielinski:	Author of advisory
    --- [SUMMARY] -------------------------------------------------------------
    Announced:     June 25, 1998
    Report code:   RSI.0005.06-25-98.HP-UX.RLPDAEMON
    Report title:  HP-UX rlpdaemon
    Vulnerability: Several vulnerabilities have been discovered which could
                   potentially allow remote access to the server
    Vendor status: Vendor notified on 06-28-98
    Patch status:  No patch is currently available
    Platforms:     HP-UX 9.x, 10.x
    Vulnerable:    HP-UX systems running rlpdaemon
    Reference:     http://www.repsec.com/advisories.html
    Impact:        If exploited, an attacker could potentially compromise
                   lp access and create files on the server remotely
    --- [DETAILS] -------------------------------------------------------------
                   #1: The argument in the Unlink Data File section of the
                       control file gets passed to /bin/rm by a system ()
                       call.  This argument should normally be a filename,
                       however, a semi-colon and an arbitrary command can be
                       appended allowing you to execute commands as user lp.
                   #2: When the client passes a file to the rlpdaemon,
                       no sanity checks are performed to ensure the validity
                       of the filename.  This allows for a remote attacker
                       to send any file s/he wants and have it stored in the
                       user lp's home directory.
                   #3: The rlpdaemon will allow remote connections from any
                       source port.  This violates the lpd behavior recommended 
                       in RFC-1179 which explicitly states that only source
                       ports of 721-731 should be allowed to access the
    --- [FIX] -----------------------------------------------------------------
    Solution:      Disable the rlpdaemon and use networked printers.
      1. su to the ROOT account
      2. kill -9 `ps -fu root | grep -i rlpdaemon | awk '{print $2}'`
      3. edit /etc/inetd.conf with your favorite editor
      4. place a # infront of the line reading as follows:
         printer stream tcp nowait root /usr/sbin/rlpdaemon rlpdaemon -i
      5. kill -HUP `ps -fu root | grep -i inetd | awk '{print $2}'`
    --- [PATCH] ---------------------------------------------------------------
    Solution:      Wait for Hewlett-Packard to release an official patch.
    Repent Security Incorporated (RSI)
    13610 N. Scottsdale Rd.
    Suite #10-326
    Scottsdale, AZ 85254
    E-mail: adviset_private
    WWW: http://www.repsec.com
    FTP: ftp://ftp.repsec.com
    Version: 2.6.2
    Copyright June 1998 RepSec, Inc.
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