[ISN] (MS98-014) RPC Spoofing Denial of Service

From: mea culpa (jerichot_private)
Date: Sun Oct 04 1998 - 20:21:30 PDT

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    Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS98-014)
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    Update available for RPC Spoofing Denial of Service on Windows NT
    
    Originally Posted: September 29, 1998
    Last Revised: September 29, 1998
    
    Summary
    =======
    Microsoft has released a patch that enhances the way that Windows NT
    processes bad Remote Procedure Call (RPC) datagrams. This patch prevents a
    malicious attack in which an attacker sends an RPC datagram to a server and
    spoofs the return address so that the datagram appears to have come from
    another server.  This tricks the two servers into erroneously sending RPC
    error messages to each other.  These error messages could cause a temporary
    loop resulting in high CPU utilization and network bandwidth until the bad
    packets are discarded.
    
    Customers using affected software listed below should evaluate risks to
    their systems posed by this issue, then download and apply this patch as
    appropriate to their configurations.
    
    Issue
    =====
    It is possible for a malicious attacker to send spoofed RPC datagrams to UDP
    destination port 135 so that it appears as if one RPC server sent bad data
    to another RPC server. The second server returns a REJECT packet and the
    first server (the spoofed server) replies with another REJECT packet
    creating a loop that is not broken until a packet is dropped, which could
    take a few minutes. If this spoofed UDP packet is sent to multiple
    computers, a loop could possibly be created, consuming processor resources
    and network bandwidth.
    
    While there have not been any reports of customers being adversely affected
    by these problems, Microsoft is releasing a patch to address any risks posed
    by this issue.
    
    Affected Software Versions
    ==========================
    The following software is affected by this vulnerability:
     - Microsoft (R) Windows NT (R) Workstation version 4.0
     - Microsoft Windows NT Server version 4.0
     - Microsoft Windows NT Server version 4.0, Terminal Server Edition
    
    What Microsoft is Doing
    =======================
    On September 29th Microsoft released a patch that changes the behavior of
    the RPC service so it can better detect spoofed packets and not respond to
    them, preventing an attack of this type from causing any problem.
    
    Microsoft has sent this security bulletin to customers
    subscribing to the Microsoft Product Security Notification
    Service (see http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletin.htm
    for more information about this free customer service).
    
    Microsoft has published the following Knowledge Base (KB) articles on this
    issue:
     - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q193233,
       RPCSS.EXE Consumes 100% CPU due to RPC-spoofing Attack
       http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q193/2/33.asp
    
    (Note: It might take 24 hours for the KB article to be visible in the
    Web-based Knowledge Base. A copy of the article is also available on the FTP
    server in the same directory as the fix.)
    
    What customers should do
    ========================
    Microsoft recommends that customers using affected software listed above
    should evaluate risks to their systems posed by this issue, then download
    and apply this patch as appropriate to their configuration.
    
    Fix for Windows NT 4.0 x86 version -
     - ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/winnt-public/
       fixes/usa/nt40/hotfixes-postSP3/snk-fix/snk-fixi.exe
    
    Fix for Windows NT 4.0 Alpha version -
     - ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/winnt-public/
       fixes/usa/nt40/hotfixes-postSP3/snk-fix/snk-fixa.exe
    
    Fix for Windows NT Server 4.0, Terminal Server Edition - This fix will be
    available shortly. It will be available in the following location:
     - ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/winnt-public/
       fixes/usa/NT40TSE/hotfixes-postSP3/Snk-fix/
    
    (NOTE: The URLs above have been wrapped for readability)
    
    Additional Details
    ==================
    The following are additional notes about this issue:
     - It is relatively easy to detect a malicious attack
       of this kind by using a network analyzer to watch for
       bad RPC packets. Also, during an attack, the RPCSS.EXE
       service will consume a very large amount of CPU cycles
       (during an active, on-going attack, it will consume
       100% of CPU cycles.)
     - Systems that are currently in an error loop (sending
       error messages back and forth) will recover by themselves
       shortly after the attacker has stopped sending spoofed packets.
     - If two systems are currently in an error loop (sending
       error messages back and forth) momentarily disconnecting
       one system from the network will cause an end to that loop,
       since UDP packets are connectionless.
     - These error packets are addressed to UDP port 135 and can
       be filtered at a corporate firewall to protect against
       external attackers.
    
    More Information
    ================
    Please see the following references for more information related to this
    issue.
     - Microsoft Security Bulletin MS98-014, Update available for
       RPC Spoofing Denial of Service on Windows NT, (the Web posted
       version of this bulletin),
       http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms98-014.htm
     - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q193233,
       RPCSS.EXE Consumes 100% CPU due to RPC-spoofing Attack
       http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q193/2/33.asp
    
    (Note: It might take 24 hours for the KB article to be visible in the
    Web-based Knowledge Base. A copy of the article is also available on the FTP
    server in the same directory as the fix.)
    
    Acknowledgements
    ================
    Microsoft wishes to acknowledge the contributions of
    Internet Security Systems, Inc. (http://www.iss.net)
    for reporting this problem to us.
    
    Revisions
    =========
     - September 29, 1998: Bulletin Created
    
    For additional security-related information about Microsoft
    products, please visit http://www.microsoft.com/security
    
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