[ISN] Lapse at Melbourne IT Enabled Panix.com Hijacking

From: InfoSec News (isn@private)
Date: Tue Jan 18 2005 - 23:55:59 PST


http://news.netcraft.com/archives/2005/01/18/lapse_at_melbourne_it_enabled_panixcom_hijacking.html

By richm 
January 18, 2005 

Domain registrar Melbourne IT today acknowledged that it failed to
properly confirm a transfer request for Panix.com, allowing the domain
for the New York ISP to be hijacked for most of the weekend. The Panix
incident has focused attention on recent ICANN rule changes that allow
domains to be transferred more easily, which some registrars warned
would also make it easier to hjack domains.

The hijacking disabled all email and Internet access for thousands of
Panix customers, and persisted despite active efforts by the North
American Network Operators Group (NANOG) to assist Panix in recovering
the domain. The delays were blamed on unresponsiveness by several
providers within the domain management system, but especially
Melbourne IT, which appears to have no readily-accessible support on
weekends. The Panix.com hijacking was not reversed until Melbourne
IT's offices opened in Australia Monday morning (late Sunday in New
York).

"There was an error in the checking process prior to initiating the
transfer, and thus the transfer should never have been initiated,"  
Bruce Tonkin, the chief technology officer of Melbourne IT wrote in a
message to the NANOG mailing list. "The loophole that led to this
error has been closed." Tonkin did not describe the "loophole" but
said the transfer of the domain from Dotster to Melbourne IT was
initiated through an account at a Melbourne IT reseller, which was set
up using stolen credit cards. "That reseller is analysing its logs and
cooperating with law enforcement," he wrote.

Tonkin's explanation solves the mystery of how the hijacking occurred,
but will bring greater scrutiny of new ICANN rules implemented in
November, which allowed transfers to proceed with a customer
confirmation by the "gaining" registrar but without a similar approval
by the "losing" registrar. Networks Solutions and a number of other
registrars locked down all customer domains as a precautionary step,
warning that the changes could lead to hijackings. Domain locking
prevents changes in the registrar, contact information and nameservers
for a domain. Dotster did not automatically lock its domains, but
Panix officials insisted that Panix.com had been locked.

"No notification was received by either our registrar, Dotster, or
us," says Ed Ravin, systems administrator at Panix, told CIO Today.  
"Whoever did this found a way to transfer domains without going
through the normal process, and it's possible that anyone else's
domain could be hijacked the same way."

Once Panix realized what had happened, it contacted .com registry
operator VeriSign and tried to reach the registrars involved. "I spent
*hours* trying to find working contact info for MIT and Dotster,"  
Panix CEO Alex Rosen said. "I didn't find useful 24-hour NOC-type info
anywhere. MIT apparently has no weekend support at all; I finally
located their CEO's cellphone in an investor-relations web page."

Melbourne IT, which sells its domains through Yahoo and many other
hosting firms, defended its claim of 24/7 customer service for
resellers and technical contacts (although not retail customers), but
said it will evaluate whether it can improve. "We are looking at our
processes to ensure that incidents such as occurred with panix.com can
be addressed more quickly within Melbourne IT, and also checking to
ensure that an appropriate number of external people have access to
the right contacts at Melbourne IT to fast track serious issues,"  
Tonkin wrote.

Others called for a broader solution to fraudulent domain transfers.  
"What the panix.com case clearly demonstrates is a lack of an
emergency rollback procedure in the face of a bad transfer," Mark
Jeftovic wrote at CircleID, a portal for discussion of domain and DNS
issues. "Clearly, something went wrong in this case. Despite
panix.com's belief that their registrar locks were set, somehow the
domain was transferred. It matters little why or how it happened. The
point is there is no emergency rollback procedure in place when
something like this happens and there needs to be."

Last week ICANN began seeking feedback on the November rule changes.



_________________________________________
Open Source Vulnerability Database (OSVDB) Everything is Vulnerable - http://www.osvdb.org/



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