http://www.aviationweek.com/aw/generic/story_channel.jsp?channel=defense&id=news/aw112607p2.xml By David A. Fulghum, Robert Wall and Amy Butler Aviation Week & Space Technology Nov 25, 2007 The U.S. was monitoring the electronic emissions coming from Syria during Israels September attack; and-although there was no direct American help in destroying a nuclear-reactor there was some advice provided beforehand, military and aerospace industry officials tell Aviation Week & Space Technology. That surveillance is providing clues about how Israeli aircraft managed to slip past Syrian air defenses to bomb the site at Dayr az-Zawr. The main attack was preceded by an engagement with a single Syrian radar site at Tall al-Abuad near the Turkish border. It was assaulted with what appears to be a combination of electronic attack and precision bombs to enable the Israeli force to enter and exit Syrian airspace. Almost immediately, the entire Syrian radar system went off the air for a period of time that included the raid, say U.S. intelligence analysts. There was no U.S. active engagement other than consulting on potential target vulnerabilities, says a U.S. electronic warfare specialist. Elements of the attack included some brute-force jamming, which is still an important element of attacking air defenses, U.S. analysts say. Also, Syrian air defenses are still centralized and dependent on dedicated HF and VHF communications, which made them vulnerable. The analysts dont believe any part of Syrias electrical grid was shut down. They do contend that network penetration involved both remote air-to-ground electronic attack and penetration through computer-to-computer links. There also were some higher-level, nontactical penetrations, either direct or as diversions and spoofs, of the Syrian command-and-control capability, done through network attack, says an intelligence specialist. These observations provide evidence that a sophisticated network attack and electronic hacking capability is an operational part of the Israel Defense Forces arsenal of digital weapons. Despite being hobbled by the restrictions of secrecy and diplomacy, Israeli military and government officials confirm that network invasion, information warfare and electronic attack are part of Israels defense capabilities. Theyve been embraced operationally by key military units, but their development, use and the techniques employed are still a mystery even to other defense and government organizations. It remains a shadowy world, says an Israeli air force general. Israel is not alone in recent demonstrations of network warfare. Syria and Hezbollah showed some basic expertise during the Lebanon conflict last year. Offensive and defensive network warfare is one of the most interesting new areas, says Pinchas Buchris, director general of the Israeli defense ministry. I can only say were following the [network attack] technology with great care. I doubted this [technology] five years ago. But we did it. Now everything has changed. You need this kind of capability, he says. Youre not being responsible if youre not dealing with it. And, if you can build this kind of capability, the skys the limit [for sophisticated intelligence gathering and clandestine operations]. So far, the most sophisticated example of nonkinetic warfare is the penetration of Syrian air defenses by Israeli aircraft on Sept. 6 to bomb a siteanalyzed as a nascent nuclear facilitywithout being engaged or even detected. Commercial satellite pictures of the target on the Euphrates (about 90 mi. from the Iraq border) taken before and after the raid show that a large building (the suspected reactor building) in the center of the site has disappeared and the ground has been bulldozed flat. The incident is attracting attention because the Syrians have an extensive air defense system that theyve been building for decadessince the [1967] Six-Day War, says an Israeli defense planning official. It may be the largest in the world. That ability of nonstealthy Israeli aircraft to penetrate without interference rests in part on technology, carried on board modified aircraft, that allowed specialists to hack into Syrias networked air defense system, said U.S. military and industry officials in the attacks aftermath. Network raiders can conduct their invasion from an aircraft into a network and then jump from network to network until they are into the targets communications loop. Whether the network is wireless or wired doesnt matter anymore, says a U.S. industry specialist (AW&ST Nov. 5, p. 32; Oct. 8, p. 28; Feb. 19, p. 31). Now development of the technology in Israel is being confirmed. The raid on Syria was a strategic signal, not a threat, says a retired senior military official who flew combat in the region for decades. This [raid] was about what we perceived are their capabilities [for developing weapons of mass destruction] and about deterrence more than creating damage. He contends that Syrian procedures even contributed to the successful bombing raid. Part of the vulnerability of the Syrian facility was that they kept it so secret that there werent enough air defenses assigned to it, the official contends. Israels capabilities are similar to the Suter network-invasion capability that was developed by the U.S. using the EC-130 Compass Call electronic attack aircraft to shoot data streams, laced with sophisticated algorithms, into enemy antennas. The passive, RC-135 Rivet Joint electronic surveillance aircraft then monitored enemy signals to ensure the data streams were having the intended effect on the target sensors. Israel duplicated the capability when it fielded its two new Gulfstream G550 special missions aircraft designs. Both were modified by Israel Aerospace Industries Elta Div. in time for the 2006 Lebanon war. The ground surveillance radar version can provide data streams from large active, electronically scanned array radars, while the intelligence version provided the signals surveillance and analyses. [...] Copyright 2007 Aviation Week, a division of The McGraw-Hill Companies. __________________________________________________________________ Visit InfoSec News http://www.infosecnews.org/
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