[risks] Risks Digest 22.86

From: RISKS List Owner (riskoat_private)
Date: Sun Aug 17 2003 - 10:59:31 PDT

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    RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest  Sunday 17 August 2003  Volume 22 : Issue 86
    
       FORUM ON RISKS TO THE PUBLIC IN COMPUTERS AND RELATED SYSTEMS (comp.risks)
       ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy, Peter G. Neumann, moderator
    
    ***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
    This issue is archived at http://www.risks.org as
      http://catless.ncl.ac.uk/Risks/22.86.html
    The current issue can be found at
      http://www.csl.sri.com/users/risko/risks.txt
    
      Contents:
    Of course, it couldn't happen again! (PGN)
    The Road to Vulnerability (Patrick Lincoln)
    "Blackouts and Bush's Buddies" (Lauren Weinstein)
    Internet stays light during blackout (NewsScan)
    Re: Power-grid overload (Declan A Rieb, Edward Reid, Jonathan Kamens)
    msblast and the power failure? (William Ehrich)
    Flaw seen in patch by Microsoft (Monty Solomon)
    Blaster Worm vulnerability (Michael Smith)
    Bug downs Australian pay phones (Fuzzy Gorilla)
    Free Software Foundation hacked (Patrick Lincoln)
    Nasdaq reports incorrect pricing (Fuzzy Gorilla)
    Legit website or nefarious scam? (Matt Anderson)
    easynet.nl is causing serious e-mail disruption (Jim Garrison)
    Re: Another variant on deceptive URLs (John Stockton)
    Re: Identity Crisis and *The Washington Post* (Rob Slade)
    bardcode (Jamie Zawinski)
    Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)
    
    
    
    ----------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2003 09:14:13 PDT
    From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumannat_private>
    Subject: Of course, it couldn't happen again!
    
    There are still a lot of unknowns, several days later.  A current theory on
    the 14 Aug 2003 Northeast blackout attributes what started the cascade
    effect to human failure to respond properly to an alarm denoting the failure
    of transmission lines (including a tree in contact with a power line) near
    Cleveland at 3:06pm -- over an hour before the massive nine-second
    propagation.  According to the front page of *The New York Times*, 17 Aug
    2003, "It is not clear whether the problem with the alarm delayed action by
    the utility, FirstEnergy Corporation, or the consortium that controls the
    regional grid, the Midwest Independent System Operator."
    
    The same article notes that the newly released timeline of the North
    American Electric Reliability Council (investigating the blackout) does not
    answer how a local failure "could have spread catastrophically to other
    regions, overwhelming mechanisms designed to halt such a spread."
    
    Note the similarity with the massive *West* Coast grid blackout on 2 Jul
    1996 in which a tree touched a power line, and the operator who had detected
    an anomaly could not find the phone number required for the manual alert.
    And then of course, there were numerous claims that such a massive outage
    could not happen again -- until the 8-state collapse on 10 Aug 1996!  (See
    RISKS-18.27 to 29 and especially RISKS-22.32, on "why it couldn't happen
    again"!)  Rather than harp on the lessons that need to be learned, let me
    suggest that you read Pat Lincoln's thoughtful piece, which follows.
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 17:09:33 -0700
    From: Patrick Lincoln <lincolnat_private>
    Subject: The Road to Vulnerability (Re: Blackout, RISKS-22.85)
    
    One lesson that can be drawn from incidents like the recent massive power
    outage is that decreasing margins in all our infrastructures place critical
    societal functions at greater and greater risk of significant disruptions
    from rare accidental and malicious acts.  Redefining acceptable levels of
    risks and protections as the world changes is hard work, but need to be
    done.
    
    Cost pressures and tight engineering under benign assumptions lead to thin
    margins.  Optimized engineering leads to most events being of small
    consequence (we've engineered systems to tolerate them), but some rare
    events can cause massive disruption.  It would be 'bad engineering' to
    overdesign a system to tolerate very rare events, if that tolerance costs
    more than the failures it would prevent (in expected value to customer
    terms).  Fragility to extremely rare events can be seen as good business.
    It would be surprising if there weren't rare disruptions (like massive power
    outages) in highly optimized infrastructures.
    
    But the invisible hand of economics and good engineering leave systems
    designed and optimized under assumptions of relatively benign environments
    at great risk if new or unexpected threats arise.
    
    Computer systems change very rapidly, and new threats arise with disturbing
    speed.  The current hardware manufacture, software development, and people
    practices of our cyber infrastructure are obviously subject to the same
    economic motivations as described above.  So they are already (and will
    become even more) fragile to rare or unexpected accidental or malicious
    events.  That's 'good business' paving the road to vulnerabilities.
    
    Post 9/11, we can point out how previously almost unthinkable scenarios are
    more thinkable now, and thus engineered defenses against potential attacks
    are more strongly motivated.  Govt procurement practices, corporate and
    individual liability, government mandates, and other mechanisms could have a
    profound impact on the reliability and cost of cyber infrastructure, but
    also on large-scale economic concerns, so it may be imprudent to act without
    defining the threats.  To define and quantify cyber threats and their
    impact, particularly in combination with coordinated physical and
    psychological attacks and effects, requires deep (read: expensive)
    contemplative research, development, large experimentation, etc.  Once new
    threats and defenses are defined, all the costs associated with deployment
    of those mechanisms can be at least partially quantified, and then
    well-reasoned decisions can be made about appropriate levels of protection
    against various risks.  The pace of technology change and societal reliance
    on these systems amplify the uncertainty, urgency, and magnitude of risk
    here.  It is almost unthinkable that western societies would not put very
    large resources against a problem of this grave potential.
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Thu, 14 Aug 2003 22:26:09 -0700
    From: Lauren Weinstein <laurenat_private>
    Subject: "Blackouts and Bush's Buddies" (Re: Blackout, RISKS-22.85)
    
    Many of the reports on today's blackout have expressed the view that it
    comes as a complete surprise.
    
    The reality of course is that such a blackout was entirely expected by those
    who follow the power industry, as I discuss in the new short audio (mp3)
    Fact Squad Radio feature, "Blackouts and Bush's Buddies."
    
    It's playable via:
         http://www.factsquad.org/radio
    
    Lauren Weinstein, laurenat_private  http://www.pfir.org/lauren
    Moderator, PRIVACY Forum - http://www.vortex.com Tel: +1 (818) 225-2800
    
      [Also, see System's Crash Was Predicted:
        http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A61117-2003Aug15.html
      PGN]
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 09:53:41 -0700
    From: "NewsScan" <newsscanat_private>
    Subject: Internet stays light during blackout
    
    During yesterday's blackout in northeast U.S. states and several major
    Canadian cities, wireless networks and Internet connections allowed people
    to keep communicating.  The chief business officer of Equinix, which
    operates Internet Business Exchange centers that serve more than 90% of the
    world's Internet routes, explains: "We lost all utility power out there, but
    we immediately went to battery power for a few seconds, at which point all
    of our major generators kicked in" to allow normal operations that were
    "totally seamless to customers." Internet customers therefore suffered "no
    disruptions whatsoever" to their Internet service resulting from the
    electrical system failures.  [AP/*San Jose Mercury News*, 15 Aug 2003;
    NewsScan Daily, 15 August 2003]
      http://www.siliconvalley.com/mld/siliconvalley/6540489.htm
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 15:59:26 -0600
    From: "Declan A Rieb" <dariebat_private>
    Subject: Re: Power-grid overload (RISKS-22.85)
    
    Quoting [with permission] a colleague in a hallway conversation:
    
    Review of yesterday's lesson:
    
    Q. What is the ONE critical Infrastructure? [upon which all the others depend]
    A. Electricity
    
    Q. What is its most salient feature?
    A. Nobody knows how it works. [Or perhaps more correctly, how it DOESN'T work.]
    
    Declan A Rieb, <dariebat_private>, 505 845-8515
    Sandia National Laboratories MS1202, Albuquerque NM 87185-1202
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2003 00:04:24 -0400
    From: Edward Reid <edwardat_private>
    Subject: Re: Power-grid overload (RISKS-22.85)
    
    > All this supposedly happened in nine seconds, and yet the cause is still
    > unclear!
    
    The very fact that it happened so fast is one reason that expert speculation
    on the cause has been slow to come. (Political speculation, of course,
    occurred almost as fast as the outage.) Most large outages, including the
    ones in the northeast US in 1965 and 1977, propagated over a period of many
    minutes. They involved overloads which did not immediately trip
    protection. The symptoms were such that the (human) system operators were
    expected to see them and react, and the failure of the operators to shed
    load quickly was a major factor in the extent of the outages.
    
    By contrast, this outage spread so fast that only automatic controls had any
    chance of stopping it once it began. (Whether recognizably dangerous
    conditions existed before the first failure remains to be seen. Analysis of
    contingencies is a major part of online control systems, but choosing the
    proper actions to minimize risk is an extremely complex problem.) In those
    outages decades ago, the system was gradually pulled over the brink. In this
    outage, it was tossed over the edge like a finger flicking a match
    stick. The Niagara area saw a flow change of 3GW, the output of three nukes,
    in under a second.
    
    We're already hearing "we will put changes in place so that this will not
    happen again". But a system operator who has spent eight hours a day for the
    past 25 years keeping a system up -- successfully -- needs more than a few
    seconds to shift mindset and do the almost unthinkable -- shed load -- to
    protect the system, even when the signs are clear.  Problems of this nature
    are so rare that we do not, cannot, trust either the humans or the
    computers. Perhaps the best action would be to provide effective simulators
    so that the operators can spend a few hours a week reminding themselves of
    what a real emergency feels like.  But most likely we will see proposals
    which leave the humans out of the loop.
    
    Of course, certain technical measures would help. So far, the newspaper
    analyses of the outages correctly point out limited transmission capacity as
    a problem. Deeper problems are the anti-regulatory environment, that safety
    doesn't sell, and the failure to invest in conservation.
    
    Building "excess" transmission capacity has no market incentive. Excess
    capacity is essential to safety, but safety doesn't sell. The market calls
    it excess capacity; people call it a safety net. When a critical line fails,
    parallel lines must have "excess" capacity to take over the flow, and this
    safety net must remain intact when lines are out of service for
    maintenance. Safety nets are not cheap.
    
    Conservation is far more cost-effective than new construction at ensuring
    continuous availability of electricity. But this is not a market-savvy
    investment, so until we accept that we need non-market investments in
    conservation, we will continue to waste our most effective resource.
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 11:10:50 -0400
    From: Jonathan Kamens <jikat_private>
    Subject: Re: Power-grid overload (RISKS-22.85)
    
    >  A grid overload just after 4pm EDT knocked out power in NY City, Boston,
    >  Cleveland, Detroit, Toronto, and Ottawa, among many other cities,
    
    For the record, Boston did not lose power.  According to the *Boston
    Herald*, the only cities in Massachusetts that lost power were Pittsfield
    and Springfield.  I don't know first-hand whether that information is
    accurate, but I do know that the greater Boston area, or at least the
    portions of it in which I and my coworkers traveled yesterday, never lost
    power.
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 17:42:51 -0500
    From: William Ehrich <ehrichat_private>
    Subject: msblast and the power failure?
    
    Possible connection? Wild guess? I'm not competent to evaluate this:
      http://www.heise.de/newsticker/data/ju-15.08.03-001/  [in German]
    
      [The cited article is written by Juergen Schmidt, senior editor of heise,
      which publishes c't, which we have quoted in RISKS before.
      (See http://www.heise.de/ct/impress.shtml ; tel +49 511 53 52 300.)
      Basically, this article notes that National Grid is a "reference client"
      of Northern Dynamics, and that OPC uses COM/DCOM, and that this is
      precisely the technology that the Blaster worm trashes.  It does not
      *claim* that OPC was used for any of the SCADA applications that might
      have triggered the propagation, but merely raises the question of whether
      this might have been the case.  The possibility is not too far fetched,
      especially if the common flaw existed in multiple distributed computerized
      control systems.  ADDED NOTE, *The International Herald Tribune* has a
      story this weekend on MS shutting down www.windowsupdate.com saying that
      "Security experts say they have found no evidence that the blackout
      ... was related" to Blaster.  But then so much else is unclear, so who
      knows?  Thanks to Peter Ladkin for providing background on this.  PGN]
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 16:00:00 -0400
    From: "monty solomon" <montyat_private>
    Subject: Flaw seen in patch by Microsoft
    
    A program Microsoft instructed customers to use to fix a hole in its Windows
    software, which is vulnerable to attack by the Blaster/Lovsan worm that
    infected computers this week, may itself be flawed.  A glitch in the
    Microsoft Windows Update patch-management system used to download Windows
    software fixes has tricked some customers into thinking their systems were
    patched to prevent Lovsan, when they really were not, said Russ Cooper,
    moderator of a mailing list with 30,000 subscribers that tracks Microsoft's
    software weaknesses.  ...  [Source: CBS MarketWatch, 15 Aug 2003]
      http://www.chron.com/cs/CDA/ssistory.mpl/business/2049216
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2003 21:44:01 +1000
    From: "Michael Smith" <emmenjayat_private>
    Subject: Blaster Worm vulnerability
    
    I recently received an e-mail from Microsoft, with the title: "Actions
    for the Blaster Worm - Special Edition, Microsoft Australia News and
    Events".
    
    It contained (mostly useful) advice on dealing with the Blaster worm, but
    included this:
    
    > Your computer is not vulnerable to the Blaster worm if
    > either of these conditions apply to you:
    >
    > * If you are using Microsoft Windows 95; Windows 98;
    > Windows 98 Second Edition (SE); or Windows Millennium (Me).
    > * If you downloaded and installed security update MS03-026
    > prior to 11 August 2003, the date the worm was discovered.
    
    The second of these would be valid if we know for sure that the worm was not
    in the wild before it was discovered, but I don't see how we can be
    confident of that.
    
    I would expect the rate of spread to be approximately exponential, until the
    net begins to become saturated.  The worm might have been around for days or
    even weeks before it was formally "discovered".
    
    Michael Smith, Aurema Pty Limited, PO Box 305, Strawberry Hills 2012, Australia
    79 Myrtle Street, Chippendale 2008, Australia  +61 2 9698 2322 www.aurema.com
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 12:59:07 -0400
    From: "Fuzzy Gorilla" <fuzzygorillaat_private>
    Subject: Bug downs Australian pay phones
    
      [Ah, for the good old days of analog phones with dials.]
      [Unfortunately, neither news report gives much in details about the real
      cause of the problem or why only some payphones are having problems.]
    
    In Australia, about half of Telecom's 5000 public payphones were out of
    order due to a software bug, and the situation is slow to improve.  Manual
    reset of each phone may be necessary.
    
    [Sources: Bug Downs Pay Phones, Today In New Zealand News, 10 Aug 2003, IRN,
    and Payphone glitch toll known today, Philip English, 12 Aug 2003, New
    Zealand Herald; PGN-ed]
      http://xtramsn.co.nz/news/0,,3882-2576232,00.html
      http://www.nzherald.co.nz/storydisplay.cfm?storyID=3517597
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Sat, 16 Aug 2003 08:46:13 -0700
    From: Patrick Lincoln <lincolnat_private>
    Subject: Free Software Foundation hacked
    
    GNU Servers Hacked, Linux Software May Be Compromised, *Techweb News*
      http://www.internetwk.com/breakingNews/showArticle.jhtml?articleID=13100280
    
    In mid-March 2003, someone hacked the primary file servers hosted by the GNU
    Project, the group which supports the development of many of the components
    in the Linux operating system, the group acknowledged Wednesday. It warned
    that the attacker may have inserted malicious code into the free software
    available for download, including Linux, and posted a set of hashes that
    users can check against to determine if what they retrieved is clean.  The
    CERT Coordination Center noted in an advisory posted on 13 Aug 2003 that
    "because this system serves as a centralized archive of popular software,
    the insertion of malicious code into the distributed software is a serious
    threat." At the same time, it reported that there isn't any evidence that
    the source code posted on the FTP servers was, in fact, compromised.
    
    The Free Software Foundation (FSF), which oversees the GNU Project, has
    posted a series of checksums, validation numbers generated by the source
    code known not to have been compromised, which users can use to verify what
    they've downloaded.
    
    The attack took place in March, but was only discovered in late July.  It
    used an exploit that was revealed on March 17, for which a patch wasn't
    immediately available. It was during a week's span of vulnerability that the
    servers were compromised, the FSF said in a statement.
    
    A Trojan horse was placed on the system at that time, possibly for password
    collection and to use the machine for additional attacks, according to the
    FSF.
    
      [See also http://zdnet.com.com/2100-1105-5063658.html
      -- which prompted Keith Rhodes to note the following:
        * The bad news: "The project urged those who have downloaded software 
        from the server since March to check that the source code has not been
        tampered with."
        * The good news: You actually have source you can check.
      PGN]
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 13:15:13 -0400
    From: "Fuzzy Gorilla" <fuzzygorillaat_private>
    Subject: Nasdaq reports incorrect pricing
    
    A computer glitch at Nasdaq evidently caused the network to report a false
    and exceedingly low trade price for Rentrak Inc. at the end of trading on 13
    Aug 2003.  For a short time it was reported that common shares in Rentrak
    had closed at 15 cents, down nearly 98 percent from the previous close of
    $6.65. The false price of 15 cents was in the data continuously supplied by
    Nasdaq to communication channels, such as wire services and web portals. A
    short time later the closing price was changed to $6.28, down 5.6 percent
    from the previous day.  [Source: Computer error sends Rentrak's reported
    stock price on roller coaster ride, Robert Goldfield, 13 Aug 2003, American
    City Business Journals Inc.; PGN-ed]
      http://portland.bizjournals.com/portland/stories/2003/08/11/daily33.html
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 16:52:16 -0400
    From: "Anderson, Matt" <mandersonat_private>
    Subject: Legit website or nefarious scam?
    
    I received an e-mail asking be to join something called the American
    Consumer Panel (http://www.americanconsumerpanel.com), and as a "perk" for
    joining, I would be sent an Amazon gift certificate.  On the website, they
    claim to be a service of Forester Research (even links to Forester's site
    and shows a copyright (for what ever that is worth)) yet doing a search on
    Forester finds no mention of them.  Anyways, something besides all of that
    made me suspicious (maybe how the URL got redirected to
    https://netpanel.gmi-mr.com/portals/gpms_cp/5000585/) so I checked out the
    terms and conditions of membership and buried down in the middle of the
    terms was this gem,
    
    "5. Third-Party Accounts
    By participating in the Service, you authorize ACP to access your spending
    and savings in your personal accounts, including but not limited to your
    credit card and bank accounts, using ACP's secure, computerized system, [and
    authorize your third-party account providers to provide us with such
    information.] Where applicable, you also authorize ACP to record your
    Web-surfing behavior. You agree that ACP assumes no responsibility and shall
    incur no liability with respect to the acts, omissions, or determinations of
    any such third-party account providers."
    
    Maybe it's over-reacting on my part, but ignoring the web-surfing
    monitoring, it seems a stretch for a research company to need to access my
    personal credit cards and bank accounts.  Even if this is legitimate (I sent
    an e-mail to Forester and have not received a response), access is a very
    vague term.  If I have access to something, what kind of permissions do I
    have?  Can I remove money or transfer it to another account?  Additionally,
    some banks charge you for 3rd party access so you could get whacked with all
    kinds of bank fees.  Regardless, buried this deep into the terms and
    conditions makes this whole site very suspicious.  Risks seem obvious
    enough...
    
    M@ Anderson  Sr. Enterprise Architect  mandersonat_private
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Sun, 17 Aug 2003 11:37:22 -0500
    From: Jim Garrison <jhgat_private>
    Subject: easynet.nl is causing serious e-mail disruption
    
    easynet.nl runs a SPAM blacklist based solely on source IP address and, as
    far as I can tell, uses a highly indiscriminate process for adding addresses
    that can be summarized as "One accusation and you're convicted" combined
    with "Guilty until proven innocent".  Unfortunately, they are also one of
    the most widely used blacklists, and their popularity is threatening to
    seriously affect the ability to communicate by e-mail.
    
    My hosting provider recently had to change its upstream provider and get new
    IP addresses because easynet had its entire class B netblock on the list to
    "punish" the owner of that netblock for perceived unwillingness or inability
    to police SPAM.
    
    The new addresses come from class A block 69/8, which until fairly recently
    was unallocated.  Somehow, the NEW address for my provider's SMTP server is
    also on easynet's list, so we're back where we started.
    
    Easynet won't communicate with anyone about their decisions, and getting
    removed is nearly impossible.  How long will it take before ISPs using
    easynet realize they're hurting their own subscribers as much as the
    spammers?  This threatens to fragment the Internet into isolated islands
    where large groups of users are unable to communicate with each other.
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 22:00:24 +0100
    From: Dr John Stockton <spamat_private>
    Subject: Re: Another variant on deceptive URLs (Brent, RISKS-22.85)
    
    >I can't be the first to point this out, but: having a character that is
    >visually indistinguishable from the absence of a character is in itself a
    >risk. Perhaps it would be useful for URL-display and similar outputs to use
    >a visible character to indicate spaces, as can be done with word-processors?
    
    The visible character might be misunderstood as representing itself.
    
    Better to use a shading, or colour, to indicate non-character regions, IMHO.
    Typically, text is black on white, for this, use whatever (20% black + 80%
    white) works out as, or similar.  My site's URL would then display as
      http://www.merlyn.demon.co.uk/######...
    where ######... represents light but unmistakable shading.
    
    John Stockton, Surrey, UK.  <URL:http://www.merlyn.demon.co.uk/>
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Sat, 16 Aug 2003 12:36:31 -0800
    From: Rob Slade <rsladeat_private>
    Subject: Re: Identity Crisis and *The Washington Post* (RISKS-22.84)
    
    > *The Washington Post Magazine* Cover Story:
    > Identity Crisis, by Robert O'Harrow Jr.
    > http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A25358-2003Aug6.html
    
    It is rather ironic, in view of the topic, that you cannot get to the story
    without allowing both cookies and JavaScript in your browser.  The site
    itself sets about a dozen cookies on your machine, and there are outside
    sites that set cookies as well: something called surfaid (which I allowed),
    the ubiquitous Doubleclick (which I got away with blocking), and something
    called atdmt.com (which I allowed, out of fear that I wouldn't see the story
    otherwise).
    
    rsladeat_private      sladeat_private      rsladeat_private
    http://victoria.tc.ca/techrev    or    http://sun.soci.niu.edu/~rslade
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: Fri, 15 Aug 2003 19:17:19 -0700
    From: Jamie Zawinski <jwzat_private>
    Subject: bardcode
    
    >   [I somewhat reluctantly fixed a typo above: "bardcode" sounded
    >   appropriately Shakespearean for a library system.  PGN]
    
    Actually, Bardcode is a very cute Web site that presents the entire works of
    Shakespeare in barcode form.
      http://artcontext.net/bardcode/
    It seems to be down at the moment, but the Wayback Machine has it:
    http://web.archive.org/web/20020211011705/http://artcontext.net/bardcode/
    
    ------------------------------
    
    Date: 30 May 2003 (LAST-MODIFIED)
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        http://www.csl.sri.com/illustrative.pdf or .ps for printing
    
    ------------------------------
    
    End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 22.86
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