[RISKS] Risks Digest 26.76

From: RISKS List Owner <risko_at_private>
Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2012 20:13:39 PDT
RISKS-LIST: Risks-Forum Digest  Sunday 1 April 2012  Volume 26 : Issue 76

Peter G. Neumann, moderator, chmn ACM Committee on Computers and Public Policy

***** See last item for further information, disclaimers, caveats, etc. *****
This issue is archived at <http://www.risks.org> as
The current issue can be found at

French Regulation of Primes? (PGN)
Nogales drone fiasco (PGN)
DHS Cybersecurity Chief criticizes online voting (Pam Fessler)
US Outgunned in Hacker War (Devlin Barrett)
Texting error leads to lockdowns at two schools (Jim Reisert)
Ship's anchor cuts Internet access to six East African countries (Jim Reisert)
Space station control codes on stolen NASA laptop (Jim Reisert)
Second Murdoch hacking scandal (Charles C. Mann)
Police to cruise streets for unsecured Wi-Fi (Lauren Weinstein)
MasterCard, VISA Warn of Processor Breach (Brian Krebs via Monty Solomon)
"Study finds major weaknesses in single-sign-on systems" (Cameron Scott
  via Gene Wirchenko)
Mobile operators seek to 'block' Skype in Sweden (Lauren Weinstein)
The Moral Network (Daniel Berninger via Dave Farber)
Linux 3.3: Finally a little good news for bufferbloat (Robert X Cringely
  via Dewayne Hendricks and Dave Farber)
"Google, Facebook, Twitter warned in privacy report" (Gene Wirchenko)
Massive crackdowns on Internet freedoms in some Arab countries?
  (Lauren Weinstein)
Doug Jones/Barbara Simons, Broken Ballots: Will Your Vote Count? (PGN)
Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)


Date: Sun, 1 Apr 2012 00:11:22 PDT
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann_at_private>
Subject: French Regulation of Primes?

Perhaps realizing that his position as PRIME Minister had some mathematical
implications, and certainly aware of France's history of trying to be able
to monitor all encrypted traffic passing through his country, Prime Minister
François Fillon has apparently decided to become the French Minister of
Primes, decreeing that all primes used in public-key encryption within or
transiting France must be approved by the French Government's newly
established Département de Cryptographie.  Apart from the potential for
increased surveillance, this decree could actually constructively reduce the
likelihood of a prime being used multiple times in different public keys --
a risk recently observed in various certificates that leads to opportunities
for forged certificates and security compromises (RISKS-26.73).


Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2012 14:15:49 PDT
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann_at_private>
Subject: Nogales drone fiasco

An unmanned MQ-9 (Predator B) drone crashed near the airport in Nogales,
Arizona on 25 April 2006.  The recently released final analysis suggests a
combination of events relating to intricacies of the system design,
confusing user interfaces, not-entirely anticipated human/system failure
modes, and long missions requiring multiple users sequentially taking over
control.  This tends to reinforces our long-held thought in RISKS that
attempts to put the blame in one place are often misguided.  In this case,
as in many others discussed here, there were quite a few contributing
factors.  The report (URL below) is long, but very well worth reading
carefully as a parable for RISKS.



Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2012 11:05:52 PDT
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann_at_private>
Subject: DHS Cybersecurity Chief criticizes online voting (Pam Fessler)

Pam Fessler, Online Voting 'Premature,' Warns Government Cybersecurity
Expert, ItsAllPolitics, NPR Blog, 29 Mar 2012

Warnings about the dangers of Internet voting have been growing as the 2012
election nears, and an especially noteworthy one came Thursday from a top
cybersecurity official at the U.S. Department of Homeland Security.  Bruce
McConnell told a group of election officials, academics and advocacy groups
meeting in Santa Fe, N.M., that he believes "it's premature to deploy
Internet voting in real elections at this time."  McConnell said voting
systems are vulnerable and, "when you connect them to the Internet, that
vulnerability increases." He called security around Internet voting
"immature and underresourced."

McConnell's comments echo those of a number of computer scientists who say
there's no way to protect votes cast over the Internet from outside
manipulation.  But right now a growing number of states are allowing
overseas and military voters to return their marked ballots by digital fax
or email, which experts say raises the same threat. It's part of a recent
push to make voting easier for millions of Americans overseas, who often are
prevented from voting because of slow ballot delivery and missed deadlines.

The Federal Voting Assistance Program at the Pentagon and other groups have
been working recently to make it easier for overseas Americans and those in
the military to register to vote online and to download their ballots.

The question is whether it's safe to return the voted ballot online.

Some election officials say it's a trade-off between security and
convenience.  Bob Carey, director of FVAP, told a group of bloggers in
October that there are risks to online voting, but also "inherent security
risks with the current system," such as people not getting their ballots on
time and losing the opportunity to vote.  Carey added that "there's not
going to be any electronic voting system that's ever going to be 100 percent
secure, but also the current paper-based system is not 100 percent reliable

The Pentagon is exploring the possibility of expanding e-voting
opportunities for the military and overseas Americans.

A handful of states are also considering pilot programs that would allow
voters to vote directly online, as West Virginia did in 2010.  The District
of Columbia had to cancel its online voting plans in 2010 after University
of Michigan computer experts were able to infiltrate the system and remotely
change votes.

Some people think online voting is bound to happen, though, once the kinks
are worked out. But as McConnell's comments show, those who worry a lot
about cybersecurity believe that time is a long way away.


Date: Tue, 27 Mar 2012 19:09:42 PDT
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann_at_private>
Subject: US Outgunned in Hacker War (Devlin Barrett)

Devlin Barrett, *Wall Street Journal*, 28 Mar 2012 [PGN-ed]

Shawn Henry, the Federal Bureau of Investigation's top cyber cop offered a
grim appraisal of the nation's efforts to keep computer hackers from
plundering corporate data networks: "We're not winning."  He said that the
current public and private approach to fending off hackers is
``unsustainable.''  Computer criminals are simply too talented and defensive
measures too weak to stop them.  You never get ahead, never become secure,
never have a reasonable expectation of privacy or security,''


Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2012 12:14:25 -0600
From: Jim Reisert AD1C <jjreisert_at_private>
Subject: Texting error leads to lockdowns at two schools

An auto corrected text message, accidentally sent to the wrong number, was
the catalyst to lockdowns Wednesday at West Hall middle and high-schools.

The text, saying "gunman be at west hall today," was received and reported
to police around 11:30 a.m. But after police tracked the number, they
learned the auto correct feature on the new cellphone changed "gunna" to

The message being sent to the wrong number added to the confusion.


[I wonder what would have happened if the student had tried to write
"gonna", the traditional spelling of this non-word.]

Jim Reisert AD1C, <jjreisert@private>, http://www.ad1c.us


Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2012 12:16:32 -0600
From: Jim Reisert AD1C <jjreisert_at_private>
Subject: Ship's anchor cuts Internet access to six East African countries

A ship dropped anchor off Mombasa, Kenya, and cut the Internet to six
African countries earlier this week.


Jim Reisert AD1C, <jjreisert@private>, http://www.ad1c.us


Date: Sun, 25 Mar 2012 13:18:48 -0600
From: Jim Reisert AD1C <jjreisert_at_private>
Subject: Space station control codes on stolen NASA laptop

A laptop stolen from NASA last year contained command codes used to control
the International Space Station, an internal investigation has found.

The laptop, which was not encrypted, was among dozens of mobile devices lost
or stolen in recent years that contained sensitive information, the space
agency's inspector general told Congress today in testimony highlighting
NASA's security challenges.

"The March 2011 theft of an unencrypted NASA notebook computer resulted in
the loss of the algorithms used to command and control the International
Space Station," NASA Inspector General Paul K. Martin said in written
testimony (PDF). Another laptop contained sensitive information on the
NASA's Constellation and Orion programs, as well as Social Security numbers,
he said.


Jim Reisert AD1C, <jjreisert@private>, http://www.ad1c.us


Date: Mon, 26 Mar 2012 23:28:05 +0000 (UTC)
From: "Charles C. Mann" <ccmann_at_private>
Subject: Second Murdoch hacking scandal

"The witnesses allege a software company NDS, owned by News Corp, cracked
the smart card codes of rival company ONdigital. ONdigital, owned by the ITV
companies Granada and Carlton, eventually went under amid a welter of
counterfeiting by pirates, leaving the immensely lucrative pay-TV field
clear for Sky."

Unlike the "phone-hacking" scandal, which mainly involved reporters
listening to answering machines whose owners hadn't bothered to set their
passwords, this (if it pans out) seems to feature actual computer

Charles C. Mann, P.O. Box 66, Amherst, MA, 01004-0066 www.charlesmann.org


Date: Thu, 22 Mar 2012 17:02:30 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren_at_private>
Subject: Police to cruise streets for unsecured Wi-Fi  (NNSquad)

http://j.mp/GIuwRC  (Sydney Morning Herald)

  "Officers in the Hi Tech Crime Investigation Unit on wardriving missions
  will drive the streets of Brisbane with a laptop computer, looking for
  unsecured Wi-Fi networks.  Residents and businesses owners in targeted
  areas will then be mailed information about how to effectively secure
  their connection.  Police will return to the area some time later to check
  whether residents have taken heed of the warning."


Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2012 13:48:16 -0400
From: Monty Solomon <monty_at_private>
Subject: MasterCard, VISA Warn of Processor Breach (Brian Krebs)

Brian Krebs: MasterCard, VISA Warn of Processor Breach, 30 Mar 2012

VISA and MasterCard are alerting banks across the country about a recent
major breach at a U.S.-based credit card processor. Sources in the financial
sector are calling the breach "massive," and say it may involve more than 10
million compromised card numbers.

In separate non-public alerts sent late last week, VISA and MasterCard began
warning banks about specific cards that may have been compromised. The card
associations stated that the breached credit card processor was compromised
between 21 Jan 2012 and 25 Feb 2012. The alerts also said that full Track 1
and Track 2 data was taken - meaning that the information could be used to
counterfeit new cards.

Neither VISA nor MasterCard have said which U.S.-based processor was the
source of the breach. But affected banks are now starting to analyze
transaction data on the compromised cards, in hopes of finding a common
point of purchase. Sources at two different major financial institutions
said the transactions that most of the cards they analyzed seem to have in
common are that they were used in parking garages in and around the New York
City area. ...

New credit card data breach revealed
Avivah Litan, KrebsOnSecurity.com, 30 Mar 2012

Just when we thought the big credit card data breaches were over, at least
for a while (with Alberto Gonzalez put away after his scams at TJX,
Heartland Payments and others) - along comes a new one reported today in
www.Krebsonsecurity.com. See KrebsOnSecurity.com

Visa and MasterCard have already issued warnings on this. I've spoken with
folks in the card business who are seeing signs of this breach
mushroom. Looks like the hackers have started using the stolen card data
more recently. From what I hear, the breach involves a taxi and parking
garage company in the New York City area so if you've paid a NYC cab in the
last few months with your credit or debit card - be sure to check your card
statements for possible fraud. ...



Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 08:33:27 -0700
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew_at_private>
Subject: "Study finds major weaknesses in single-sign-on systems"
  (Cameron Scott)

Cameron Scott, Study finds major weaknesses in single-sign-on systems
Researchers were able to deceive both OpenID and Facebook authentication
IT Business, 27 Mar 2012

selected text:

In one of the flaws the researchers exposed, for example, not all Web sites
confirmed that a verification coming from OpenID included all of the items
the Web site asked to be confirmed, such as the first name, last name and
email address. The researchers were able to access the request, delete one
piece of requested information (the email address, for example) as it went
to OpenID and simply re-insert it in the signed okay from OpenID. In this
way, even a hacker who didn't control the email address linked to the user's
account on the Web site in question could log in, and potentially make
purchases, using that person's account.


Date: Fri, 30 Mar 2012 00:32:11 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren_at_private>
Subject: Mobile operators seek to 'block' Skype in Sweden (NNSquad)

  "Swedish telecom operators want to implement technologies that will block
  mobile phone users in Sweden from making free calls using services like
  Skype and Viber."  (The Local;  http://j.mp/H5Uq1T)


Date: Wed, Mar 28, 2012 at 9:25 AM
From: Daniel Berninger <dan.berninger_at_private>
Subject: The Moral Network (via Dave Farber)

A Moral Network post highlights the public interest implications of
retiring the PSTN in favor of an all-IP network.

Daniel Berninger, Founder, Voice Communication Exchange Committee
e: dan_at_private, tel SD: + w: www.vcxc.org

The Moral Network, Daniel Berninger

The customer exodus makes retirement of the circuit switched PSTN in favor
of an all-IP network inevitable and maybe even imminent. It puts the entire
$2 trillion global voice revenue base in play and restarts the bellhead
versus nethead wars. A nethead victory lap remains out of the question while
voice still accounts for more than twice the revenue of data services.
Preserving the voice value proposition requires achieving PSTN like
reliability, ubiquity, and uniformity in an IP context. This task remains
better suited to the sensibility of bellheads than netheads. The special
status society assigns to voice carries public interest obligations. The
implications of these moral considerations underlie the differences between
bellhead and nethead modes of operation.

Internet voice lacks the interconnection, reliability, and ease of use
necessary to replicate the PSTN revenue model. The aggregate revenue of the
over-the-top VoIP ecosystem (e.g Skype et al) represents less than 1% of the
voice total. The revenue that VoIP players do collect owes mainly to the
bellhead PSTN. The myriad of Internet enabled communication options
destroying the economics of the PSTN demonstrate only the ability of
netheads to erase revenue.

The IP world cannot not replicate the reach of the PSTN as long as the
competitive landscape remains driven by the power politics of network
size. Skype claims more registered users than China Mobile, but as a closed
network end points online at any time represent a tiny fraction of the six
billion phones reachable via the PSTN. The PSTN suffered similar
fragmentation until public interest considerations led governments to impose
interconnection. Even the commercial peering agreements associated with the
Internet got their start via government interconnection mandates during the
commercialization of the Internet backbone in 1995.

Mixing network engineering with morality will seem odd to netheads, but
bellhead experience with public interest obligations goes back 100
years. Theodore Vail's embrace of the moral obligations governing human
communication made AT&T the exception as countries nationalized their
telephone companies. The course of communication in this century turns on
whether or not a Theodore Vail like ethic for IP networks emerges. The track
record suggests hardship for both incumbent telcos and wannabe service
providers of the over-to-top ecosystem to the extent the anarchy persists.

It turns out following a moral compass maximizes enterprise value of
communication networks. This owes to the same reasons citizens prosper in a
moral society and suffer in an amoral one. The application of a moral code
recognizes the service of self-interest sometimes involves maximizing
benefits for the group rather than the individual. This remains true even
given the flawed mechanisms and uneven track record of applying public
interest obligations to the PSTN.

The collective value of the post breakup AT&T increased six fold during the
12 years of Judge Greene's public interest stewardship before the Telecom
Act of 1996. The benefits of deregulation and consolidation leave the Bell
companies trading in the same range today as they did in 1996. The question
of whether the transition to all-IP networks produces a downward spiral or
lifts enterprise value turns on the moral considerations driving
interconnection, universal service, and recognizing the special status of
voice services in society.  Declining demand for plain-old-telephone-service
does not alter the fact voice remains the most efficient means of human
communication and a key input to economic activity.

The revenue stream available to "dumb pipes" for over-the-top services falls
short of the return on capital necessary to justify network
investments. Network operators will continue to rely on bellhead services
for the bulk of revenue in all-IP networks as they did in the case of the
PSTN. Carrier IP provisioning of services makes it easier to provide a
consistent user interface and hide device setup complexity. An all-IP HD
voice service can emerge as a straight line extension of the PSTN managed
federation for standard definition voice. The long odds of finding the next
big thing driving demand for IP network capacity nonetheless makes the
nethead over-the-top essential to the all-IP network ecosystem. The
complementary strengths and weaknesses of bellhead and nethead services
allow both to coexist in an all-IP network.


Date: Mar 26, 2012 6:16 PM
From: "Dewayne Hendricks" <dewayne_at_private>
Subject: Linux 3.3: Finally a little good news for bufferbloat (RXCringely)

Robert X. Cringely, Linux 3.3: Finally a little good news for bufferbloat
25 Mar 2012, via Dave Farber's IP  [Note: Cringely is a pen-name for 
multiple authors, all of whom do not cringe easily.]


While I was out chasing computer history last week, the Linux 3.3 kernel was
released. And a very interesting release it is, though not for its vaunted
re-inclusion of certain Android kernel hacks. I think that modest move is
being overblown in the press.  No, Linux 3.3 appears to be the first OS to
really take a shot at reducing the problem of bufferbloat. It's not the
answer to this scourge, but it will help some, especially since Linux is so
popular for high volume servers.

Bufferbloat, as you'll recall from my 2011 predictions column, is the result
of our misguided attempt to protect streaming applications (now 80 percent
of Internet packets) by putting large memory buffers in modems, routers,
network cards, and applications. These cascading buffers interfere with each
other and with the flow control built into TCP from the very beginning,
ultimately breaking that flow control, making things far worse than they'd
be if all those buffers simply didn't exist.

Bufferbloat was named by Jim Gettys of Bell Labs, who has become our chief
defender against the scourge, attempting to coordinate what's become a
global response to the problem.

Linux 3.3 isn't the total solution to bufferbloat but it's a big step,
particularly for servers.

Prepare for technospeak.

One issue is the very large ring buffers described above.  A typical device
driver has these buffers set at 200-300 packets, a figure derived a decade
ago as a worst case to allow devices to drive Gig-Ethernet flat-out using
small packets. But not all packets are small, and there's the rub.

Because these rings are necessarily expressed in packets, rather than in
bytes, the length of time to transmit the packet can be radically different
and this meant the arbitrary buffers can be up to 20 times larger than they
need to be when sending big packets.  These rings are often constrained to
be powers of two in size, and the size can't easily be changed at runtime
without dropping packets [...]

Dewayne-Net RSS Feed: <http://www.warpspeed.com/wordpress>


Date: Wed, 28 Mar 2012 08:45:02 -0700
From: Gene Wirchenko <genew_at_private>
Subject: "Google, Facebook, Twitter warned in privacy report" (Zack Whittaker)

A UK parliamentary report has booted Google for its attitude towards
court-ordered privacy injunctions, noting that it must comply with UK law or
face a legislative battle.  [Source: Zack Whittaker, ZDNet,  27 Mar 2012]


Date: Thu, 29 Mar 2012 11:48:54 -0700
From: Lauren Weinstein <lauren_at_private>
Subject: Massive crackdowns on Internet freedoms in some Arab countries?

  "A bill on "information-technology crimes" with extraordinarily broad
  wording and harsh punishments is due to come before Iraq's parliament in
  April, once the dignitaries and television cameras at this week's Arab
  League summit in Baghdad have departed.  The bill is one of four proposed
  laws that could severely restrict basic freedoms. (A fifth, on
  journalists, was passed last summer.)  Access Now, a human-rights group
  with a focus on technology, has a report on it out today.  According to an
  English translation from last August, it includes mandatory life sentences
  for using computers or the internet to "compromise" the "unity" of the
  state (Article 3), promote "ideas which are disruptive to public order"
  (Article 4), or engage in "trafficking, promoting or facilitating the
  abuse of drugs" (Article 5), which could include merely blogging about
  them."  [The Economist, http://j.mp/H4W6x7]


Date: Sat, 31 Mar 2012 18:00:15 PDT
From: "Peter G. Neumann" <neumann_at_private>
Subject: Doug Jones/Barbara Simons, Broken Ballots: Will Your Vote Count?

Broken Ballots: Will Your Vote Count?
CSLI Publications, Stanford, California
(Center for the Study of Language and Information, Stanford University)
2012, 447+xiii pp., paperback

In my opinion, this is the most thorough, well researched, and definitive
publication on this subject that has ever been written -- despite the
reality that it was under perpetual gestation for many years, because the
ground under our elections has continually shifted, although often not for
the better.  Proponents of commercial system and Internet voting undoubtedly
will not like it, because it truly documents a reality in which the seams
are unseemly, the depth of risks is pervasive, and the absence of meaningful
accountability is almost unbelievable.  But it is one of the most important
books around for those who believe in democracy.


Date: Mon, 6 Jun 2011 20:01:16 -0900
From: RISKS-request_at_private
Subject: Abridged info on RISKS (comp.risks)

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End of RISKS-FORUM Digest 26.76
Received on Sat Mar 31 2012 - 20:13:39 PDT

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