DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS - NONE - FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
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______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: IRIX eject Buffer Overrun Vulnerability
Title: AUSCERT Advisory AA-97.21 and CERT Advisory CA-97.21
Number: 19970507-02-PX
Date: November 18, 1997
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- -----------------------
- --- Issue Specifics ---
- -----------------------
The eject(1) program is used to eject removable media such as floppy,
CDROM, and tape.
The eject(1) program is setuid root and as part of normal usage accepts
user arguments to operate.
It has been determined that an appropriately crafted set of arguments
could be input to the eject(1) program allowing execution of arbitrary
user commands with root privileges. This resulting buffer overflow
condition is considered a security vulnerability.
Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems. This issue will
be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------
The eject(1) program (/usr/sbin/eject) is installed on all IRIX
systems by default.
A local account is required in order to exploit this vulnerability.
With a local account the vulnerability can be exploited both
locally and remotely.
This vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root
privileges.
This security issue has been publically disclosed and discussed in
several public forums including the BUGTRAQ mailing list. Additionally,
security advisories AUSCERT AA-97.21 and CERT CA-97.21 have been
publically released on the issue.
- --------------------------
- --- Temporary Solution ---
- --------------------------
Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.
The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing
the permissions of the eject program.
1) Become the root user on the system.
% /bin/su -
Password:
#
2) Change the permissions on the eject program.
# /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/eject
************
*** NOTE ***
************
Removing the setuid root permissions from the eject
program will prevent non-root users and applications
from using the eject program.
3) Return to previous level.
# exit
$
- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------
IRIX 3.x unknown not avail Note 1
IRIX 4.x unknown not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 5.3 yes 2228
IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1
IRIX 6.2 yes 2177
IRIX 6.3 yes 2232
IRIX 6.4 yes 2233
NOTES
1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section.
Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found
in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.2177
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 24281 8 README.patch.2177
Algorithm #2 (sum): 27018 8 README.patch.2177
MD5 checksum: 7A3DF720DD7D6B1316E9937050233280
Filename: patchSG0002177
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43678 1 patchSG0002177
Algorithm #2 (sum): 29631 1 patchSG0002177
MD5 checksum: F97FBC0C9E17C9BFFE4ECC03924D8250
Filename: patchSG0002177.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 17436 115 patchSG0002177.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 24229 115 patchSG0002177.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: F01742532D483B02920F2837DB992CCA
Filename: patchSG0002177.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 20506 2 patchSG0002177.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 59240 2 patchSG0002177.idb
MD5 checksum: E52E021C27786A8047B95E0477B3B946
Filename: README.patch.2228
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 56233 7 README.patch.2228
Algorithm #2 (sum): 12603 7 README.patch.2228
MD5 checksum: 30D3A289BD8219F65094F5C6D0906D00
Filename: patchSG0002228
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32199 1 patchSG0002228
Algorithm #2 (sum): 26600 1 patchSG0002228
MD5 checksum: 1D2A2E79B74B0A5BDEE7775C44E766D8
Filename: patchSG0002228.eoe1_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 28849 53 patchSG0002228.eoe1_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 11773 53 patchSG0002228.eoe1_sw
MD5 checksum: DBFBCD02E45A9A9468EBAEB115908B1D
Filename: patchSG0002228.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 04872 1 patchSG0002228.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 34402 1 patchSG0002228.idb
MD5 checksum: E99CCA436F10736924B10F9D9D6A5978
Filename: README.patch.2232
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 30727 12 README.patch.2232
Algorithm #2 (sum): 55743 12 README.patch.2232
MD5 checksum: DD9402D2434B1513A3B9886D70CD9243
Filename: patchSG0002232
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55916 3 patchSG0002232
Algorithm #2 (sum): 20486 3 patchSG0002232
MD5 checksum: FE63680542E429EA91D33AA15EB06537
Filename: patchSG0002232.eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43804 36 patchSG0002232.eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 27383 36 patchSG0002232.eoe_man
MD5 checksum: 6EE21B2D5362295BDC20D5F84BA7DEC4
Filename: patchSG0002232.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 03690 421 patchSG0002232.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 11833 421 patchSG0002232.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: C5AD8C10999347F8FA67871B5B98CB63
Filename: patchSG0002232.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 38374 4 patchSG0002232.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 4337 4 patchSG0002232.idb
MD5 checksum: 0610B31450652A09F343E2B1ED3E939A
Filename: README.patch.2233
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 51881 11 README.patch.2233
Algorithm #2 (sum): 41695 11 README.patch.2233
MD5 checksum: 5D7F90A9AE9F2A483059E6D8D08DF317
Filename: patch2233.pgp.and.chksums
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00000 0 patch2233.pgp.and.chksums
Algorithm #2 (sum): 0 0 patch2233.pgp.and.chksums
MD5 checksum: D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E
Filename: patchSG0002233
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18405 3 patchSG0002233
Algorithm #2 (sum): 23610 3 patchSG0002233
MD5 checksum: 462695A8E5958C4B6A78960F001A2351
Filename: patchSG0002233.eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 43804 36 patchSG0002233.eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 27383 36 patchSG0002233.eoe_man
MD5 checksum: 6EE21B2D5362295BDC20D5F84BA7DEC4
Filename: patchSG0002233.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 24542 347 patchSG0002233.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 6782 347 patchSG0002233.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: B5D1408146E7B71B1F5A8290ABCF5A4F
Filename: patchSG0002233.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 50085 3 patchSG0002233.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 41850 3 patchSG0002233.idb
MD5 checksum: B41E8A31941E47BD46682CFB4641882F
- ------------------------
- --- Acknowledgments ---
- ------------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the worldwide Internet community and the
AUSCERT and CERT Coordination Center organizations for their assistance
in this matter.
- -----------------------------------------------------------
- --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alertat_private
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alertat_private
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
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end
^d
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------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
------oOo------
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
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______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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