After doing quite a bit of investigation on the LocalDirector password
loss question, we've been unable to reproduce it and unable to find anything
in the code that would explain it. The reporting customers also can't
reproduce it. We *can*, however, see ways in which a user could lose
the password and not know it. At this point, we think it was very probable
that the reports were caused by user errors.
We'll be fixing the user interface to make it more difficult to lose your
password without knowing it. We'll also be doing some more testing to make
sure the software isn't really broken. At this point, however, we believe
the initial report to have been an error. A formal update to the field
notice is attached to this message.
-- John B
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
Field Notice:
Cisco LocalDirector Enable Password Loss
November 25, 1997, 10:00 AM US/Pacific, Revision 4
- ------------------------------------------------------------
Summary
- -----
At least three customers have reported losing their enable passwords upon
upgrading to version 1.6.3 of Cisco's LocalDirector product. Affected
systems allow users to enter privileged mode without providing the correct
enable password; any string will suffice as a password. This applies only to
the privileged-mode enable password; the Telnet access password does not
appear to be affected. The reported behavior was total loss of the
configured enable password; the systems in question were simply left without
enable passwords.
An earlier version of this notice attributed this to a possible software
malfunction, and suggested that users refrain from upgrading to version
1.6.3, and that they disable Telnet access to their LocalDirectors by
nonadministrative users.
Cisco has conducted an investigation, and now believes that the reported
LocalDirector password losses were most probably caused by user error.
Because a LocalDirector with no enable password set will still ask the user
for a password, and will accept any string, any accidental loss of the
enable password is likely to persist. Cisco will continue investigating this
matter in order to make absolutely certain that the LocalDirector software
does not lose passwords, but recommends that customers stand down from alert
status and proceed cautiously with LocalDirector upgrades.
Cisco will modify the LocalDirector software to make it more difficult for
users to lose their enable passwords without knowing it.
Who Is Affected
- -------------
Although we believe that the reported incidents were probably caused by user
error, such errors are easy to make. All LocalDirector customers should
check to see that their enable passwords are being enforced properly. Use
the enable command to enter privileged mode, and give an invalid password.
If the invalid password is not accepted, you are not affected.
If the invalid password is accepted, make sure you have an enable password
set, using the write terminal command. If your enable password appears as a
string of zeroes followed by the word "encrypted", then you have no enable
password set. If you have a password set, or if you are absolutely sure that
you had a password that had been set and saved to the nonvolatile
configuration, but that password has now disappeared without any
intervention on your part, please contact Cisco Systems immediately via
e-mail to "security-alertat_private"
In the unlikely event that there actually is a software error, that error
probably affects all 1.6.x versions of the LocalDirector software. However,
version 1.6.3 is the only 1.6.x version that has been released to Cisco's
general customer base, and Cisco discourages the use of other 1.6.x versions
because of possible software instability.
Because the LocalDirector code is almost entirely separate from the code
used in other Cisco products, it is nearly impossible that any product other
than the LocalDirector is affected by any software error, although of course
user errors can happen with any product. Classic \cisco IOS, as used on
Cisco routers, shares absolutely no password or configuration management
code with the LocalDirector, and is therefore definitely not affected.
WAN-BU and WBU products, including Catalyst switches and FastPacket
switches, are likewise definitely not affected.
Impact
- ----
If a LocalDirector has no enable password, then any person who can log into
the system via Telnet or over its its console port can reconfigure or shut
down the LocalDirector.
Workarounds
- ---------
Cisco recommends that customers take the following steps. Most of these are
things that should be done regardless of whether or not there's any problem
with the LocalDirector software.
1. Check to make sure that enable passwords are being enforced by all
LocalDirectors. If you find that a LocalDirector is not enforcing its
enable password, changing the password using the enable password
configuration command should reactivate the password. Remember to save
the new password using the write memory command.
Recheck password enforcement after any software upgrade or downgrade.
If you are certain that a formerly working enable password has been
lost by the software, please contact Cisco via e-mail to
security-alertat_private
2. Make sure that you have configured a Telnet access password for your
LocalDirector using the password configuration command. If you're not
sure of the secrecy of your Telnet password, consider changing it. Do
not give untrustworthy persons Telnet access to your LocalDirector.
3. Consider using firewalling devices to block Telnet access from
untrusted hosts, and/or restricting access from remote hosts using the
address-and-mask feature of the LocalDirector telnet configuration
command. If you have a dial-in modem connected to your LocalDirector's
console port, or if you have the console port connected to a network
device that allows remote access, protect the console using the
authentication features of the modem or network device to which it is
connected.
Exploitation and Public Announcements
- -----------------------------------
Cisco has had no reports of malicious exploitation of this vulnerability, if
indeed any vulnerability exists.
This issue was first brought to Cisco's attention by a public announcement
on the bugtraqat_private mailing list on Thursday, November 13, 1997.
There has been some subsequent discussion on that mailing list.
Cisco issued a preliminary notice about this issue on November 16, 1997.
Investigation Details
- -------------------
Cisco's investigation of this issue has included:
* Extensive and repeated attempts by independent groups in customer
support and in software development to reproduce the problem in the
laboratory, using a number of LocalDirectors under a variety of
conditions.
* Telephone and/or e-mail discussion with all the reporting users.
* A review of the system source code by the software development group.
One of the Cisco groups trying to reproduce the problem believed that they
had seen it recur. However, this was during a very early phase of the
laboratory work, just as the test configuration was being set up, and before
detailed experimental records were being kept. Since confusion and error are
very common in such situations, Cisco believes it to be entirely plausible
that the observation was an error, perhaps caused by failure to issue a
write command. Cisco has been otherwise unable to induce a LocalDirector to
lose a password, despite aggressive attempts to do so.
None of the reporting users has been able to reproduce the problem, or to
provide Cisco with an exact account of the conditions under which her
password may have been lost. Each customer observed that a LocalDirector
which was believed formerly to have had an enable password no longer had
such a password, but none could give a detailed sequence of events or
provide enough information to allow the problem to be reproduced.
* In one of the three cases, the password loss had occurred at an
undetermined time, perhaps long in the past, and the user thought that
it was possible that the password loss error scenario below might
apply.
* In the second case, the user was unsure of the sequence of events.
* In the third case, the user's password apparently had not actually been
lost.
The source code review identified no problems. The code in question is
relatively straightforward, and appears to have little potential for hidden
bugs.
Password Loss Scenarios
- ---------------------
We've come up with two scenarios in which a LocalDirector might end up
without an enable password when a user thought that it should have such a
password. The first possibility is that the user confuses the password
command, which sets the password for remote access, with the enable password
command, which sets the password for administrative access. If this
happened, there would be no enable password, but the user might think one
had been set.
The second scenario is particularly plausible in an upgrade. If a user saved
the configuration from a running LocalDirector by saving the output of show
config, and then erased the LocalDirector's configuration memory, upgraded
the software, and pasted the saved configuration back into the system, the
passwords would be lost. This is because show config does not display any
password-related information.
Because a LocalDirector with no enable password set will accept any string,
either of these mistakes might easily go unnoticed for a very long time.
Future Work and Updates
- ---------------------
Cisco will continue working to verify that the LocalDirector password
maintenance software is error free. Updated versions of this notice will be
posted on Cisco's Worldwide Web site if more information becomes available.
Notice will be posted widely if any genuine password loss problem is found.
Cisco will modify the LocalDirector software's password prompting and
checking behavior in the case where a password is not set; the new software
will no longer accept any string as a password in this case. We expect that
this will make it more difficult for a user to lose a password without
knowing it. The change is tentatively scheduled for the first quarter of
1998, but that schedule is subject to change.
Distribution of This Notice
- -------------------------
This notice is being sent to the following Internet mailing lists and
newsgroups:
* ciscoat_private
* comp.dcom.sys.cisco
* bugtraqat_private
* first-teamsat_private (includes CERT/CC)
Updates will be sent to some or all of these, as appropriate.
This notice will be posted in the Field Notices section of Cisco's Worldwide
Web site, CCO, which can be found under Technical Tips in the Service and
Support section. The copy on the Worldwide Web will be updated as
appropriate. The URL is http://www.cisco.com/warp/public/770/ldpass-pub.shtml.
Cisco Security Procedures
- -----------------------
Please report security issues with Cisco products, and/or sensitive security
intrusion emergencies involving Cisco products, to security-alertat_private
Reports may be encrypted using PGP; public RSA and DSS keys for
security-alertat_private are on the public PGP keyservers.
The alias security-alertat_private is used only for reports incoming to
Cisco. Mail sent to security-alertat_private goes only to a very small group
of users within Cisco. Neither outside users nor unauthorized Cisco
employees may subscribe to security-alertat_private We will shortly be
creating a security announcement mailing list for outgoing information. When
that list is created, an announcement will be sent to appropriate Internet
forums.
Revision History
- --------------
Revision 2, 09:00, Preliminary notice
16-NOV-1997
Revision 4, 10:00, Updated notice. Password losses formerly
25-NOV-1997 attributed to software failure now attributed
to user error.
This notice is copyright 1997 by Cisco Systems, Inc. This notice may be
redistributed freely provided that redistributed copies are complete and
unmodified, including all date and version information.
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This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 13:33:34 PDT