SGI Security Advisory 19971201-01-P1391 - statd(1M) Buffer Overrun

From: SGI Security Coordinator (agent99at_private)
Date: Tue Dec 16 1997 - 17:40:47 PST

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    DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS - NONE - FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
    
    
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    ______________________________________________________________________________
                    Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
    
            Title:   Buffer Overrun Vulnerability in statd(1M) Program
            Title:   AUSCERT AA-97.29 and CERT CA-97.26
            Number:  19971201-01-P1391
            Date:    December 16, 1997
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
    for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use.   Silicon
    Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
    
    Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
    an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
    express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
    of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.  In no event shall
    Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
    of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
    damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
    use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    - -----------------------
    - --- Issue Specifics ---
    - -----------------------
    
    The statd(1M) program is a status monitoring program used to detect
    failures between clients and servers.
    
    Under normal operation, the statd program utilizes rpc routines to
    converse between client and server.  Unfortunately, a buffer overrun
    has been discovered in the statd(1M) program which could allow arbitrary
    commands to be run as the privileged user root.
    
    Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
    following steps for neutralizing the exposure.  It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
    that these measures be implemented on ALL SGI systems.  This issue will
    be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
    
    
    - --------------
    - --- Impact ---
    - --------------
    
    The statd program is installed on all Silicon Graphics IRIX systems
    by default.  However, only the IRIX 5.3 statd program is vulnerable
    to this issue.
    
    With a local account, this vulnerability can be exploited locally and
    remotely.   Depending on network configuration, this vulnerability can
    also be exploited without a local account.
    
    This vulnerability can be utilized to execute commands with root
    privileges.
    
    This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups
    and mailing lists and also reported in  AUSCERT AA-97.29 and CERT
    CA-97.26 security advisories.
    
    
    
    - --------------------------
    - --- Temporary Solution ---
    - --------------------------
    
    Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
    there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
    not be possible.
    
    The steps below can be used to disable the statd program from being
    started at system startup/reboot.
    
    
    
         1) Become the root user on the system.
    
                    % /bin/su -
                    Password:
                    #
    
         2) Chkconfig the lockd program off which will in turn disable
            the statd program.
    
    
                    # chkconfig lockd off
    
    
                               ************
                               *** NOTE ***
                               ************
    
                   Disabling lockd and in turn the statd programs will
                   deactivate NFS stateful locking services.
    
         3) At this point, to ensure proper closure and termination
            of lockd and statd programs, along with restart of NFS,
            a full system reboot is recommended.
    
    
                   # reboot
    
    
         4) After the system has rebooted, ensure that the statd
            program is not running, with the following command.
            No output should be returned from this command.
    
                   % ps -ef | grep rpc.statd
    
    
    
    - ----------------
    - --- Solution ---
    - ----------------
    
    "In this section OS specifics are covered.
    We only really support 5.3 and up with patches.
    In some rare cases we will provide something for 4.x and 5.2
     but that is getting rarer with time.  For those OS releases
    that are not supported, we indicate that there is an upgrade
    path available to the customer.  See some of the examples below.
    Also note the checksum area.  Examples are below"
    
    
    
       OS Version     Vulnerable?     Patch #      Other Actions
       ----------     -----------     -------      -------------
    
       IRIX 3.x          no
       IRIX 4.x          no
       IRIX 5.0.x        yes          not avail    Note 1
       IRIX 5.1.x        yes          not avail    Note 1
       IRIX 5.2          yes          not avail    Note 1
       IRIX 5.3          yes          1391
       IRIX 6.0.x        no
       IRIX 6.1          no
       IRIX 6.2          no
       IRIX 6.3          no
       IRIX 6.4          no
    
    
       NOTES
    
         1) upgrade operating system or see "Temporary Solution" section.
    
    
    
    Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
    
    The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
    mirror, ftp.sgi.com.   Security information and patches can be found
    in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.
    
    
    
                     ##### Patch File Checksums ####
    
    The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
    
    
    
    Filename:                 README.patch.1391
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    05716 12 README.patch.1391
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       13181 12 README.patch.1391
    MD5 checksum:             4B47A26AD798A2B91AFCD77BC8D53197
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0001391
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    39403 4 patchSG0001391
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       53279 4 patchSG0001391
    MD5 checksum:             C0FF368E0196D7DB9BDAC3C6732CCD44
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0001391.eoe1_sw
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    34891 39 patchSG0001391.eoe1_sw
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       9211 39 patchSG0001391.eoe1_sw
    MD5 checksum:             F31D4A11EEE282FA3A1BA7B1F3F02B10
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0001391.idb
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    15146 2 patchSG0001391.idb
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       8184 2 patchSG0001391.idb
    MD5 checksum:             76F14AD66D8B8C4E6782772822023DBA
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0001391.nfs_man
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    60901 8 patchSG0001391.nfs_man
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       1520 8 patchSG0001391.nfs_man
    MD5 checksum:             83F5CE8E5463C45CE19C1B6B4BFFC817
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0001391.nfs_sw
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    40349 147 patchSG0001391.nfs_sw
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       50891 147 patchSG0001391.nfs_sw
    MD5 checksum:             1701AD638C7E3D02A4C3F193DA7F4BBD
    
    
    
    - ------------------------
    - --- Acknowledgments ---
    - ------------------------
    
    Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the AUSCERT and CERT Coordination
    Center organizations for their assistance in this matter.
    
    
    - -----------------------------------------------------------
    - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
    - -----------------------------------------------------------
    
    If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
    cse-security-alertat_private
    
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    ______________________________________________________________________________
      This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
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