Re: DoS attack: apache (& other) .htaccess Authentication

From: Sevo Stille (sevoat_private)
Date: Thu Jan 15 1998 - 03:53:54 PST

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    janat_private wrote:
    
    > Sorry, if already known (not found anywhere or even heared about):
    >
    > At the beginning of the week (after the release of apache 1.2.5)
    > we discoverd a DoS attack in apache and (eventually) other / all (?)
    > httpd's. Many thanks to Bernard "sendmail" Steiner <bsat_private>,
    > who got the important idea.
    >
    > For apache 1.2.x (and very sure all versions before), the
    > DoS may be exploited if both of the following conditions are true:
    >
    > - the intruder has (at least FTP) write access to (at least)
    >   one HTML directory
    >
    > - per directory access (AccessFileName configuration directive)
    >   is enabled and the filename is known to the intruder
    >   (default is .htaccess)
    
    And (most important):
    
    - AllowOverride has been set up to allow AuthConfig overrides in an
    untrusted users directory.
    
    This is a serious configuration error. AllowOverride can be used to give
    users access to very considerable portions of the server setup. Untrusted
    users should have no (or strictly limited) access to the server
    configuration. Fully enabled .htaccess files can easily be abused to lock
    up or bring down the server or circumvent security restrictions in many
    different ways!
    
    
    > (...)
    > possible fixes:
    >
    > a) workaround
    >
    > Disable .htaccess in srm.conf by commenting out AccessFileName:
    >  (default is NULL in the apache distribution, e.g. disabled)
    >
    > #AccessFileName .htaccess
    
    A more reasonable workaround than disabling access restrictions for all
    users or trying to patch the server against handling unsafe files would be
    not to allow AuthConfig overrides for untrusted users. There should be no
    need to allow users to specify their own password file anyway - the name
    and location provided by the server administration is fully
    sufficient.AllowOverride can and should be set to None or Limit unless you
    have very good reasons to give the user more access to the server
    configuration - AuthConfig can (apart from the described DoS attacks) be
    abused for password probing and all other overrides (Options, FileInfo and
    Indexes) can be abused to publish any document readable by the server
    process.
    
    regards
    Sevo
    
    
    --
    Sevo Stille                                        sevoat_private
    Web Department
    inm numerical magic GmbH    Tel: ++49 (69) 9419630
    Daimlerstrasse 32    Fax: ++49 (69) 94196322
    D 60314 Frankfurt a.M.
    



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