Re: Majordomo /tmp exploit

From: Steven Pritchard (steveat_private)
Date: Thu Mar 26 1998 - 17:26:37 PST

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    Karl G - NOC Admin said:
    > -=x-ploit=-
    > create a symlink in /tmp to any majordomo file
    > ex: ln -s /usr/lib/majordomo/majordomo /tmp/majordomo.debug
    
    Looking at the latest version of majordomo (1.94.4), it seems the
    problem isn't that bad.  A well-configured majordomo is not
    vulnerable.  (By "well-configured", I mean where the admin has edited
    majordomo.cf to change $TMPDIR to something not world-writable.  If
    you haven't done that yet, do it now.)
    
    I did find one case where majordomo doesn't honor the $TMPFILE
    variable though.  Apply the following patch to fix it:
    
    -- Cut here --
    
    --- majordomo.pl.orig   Wed Aug 27 09:58:53 1997
    +++ majordomo.pl        Thu Mar 26 18:42:29 1998
    @@ -324,7 +324,7 @@
     }
    
     # These are package globals referenced by &setlogfile and &log
    -$log_file = "/tmp/log.$$";
    +$log_file = "$main'TMPDIR/log.$$";
     $log_host = "UNKNOWN";
     $log_program = "UNKNOWN";
     $log_session = "UNKNOWN";
    
    -- end --
    
    Enjoy.
    
    Steve
    --
    steveat_private           | Linux Users of Central Illinois
    (217)698-1694             | Meetings the 4th Tuesday of every month
    Steven Pritchard          | http://www.luci.org/ for more info
    



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