IRIX 6.3 & 6.4 mailcap vulnerability

From: SGI Security Coordinator (agent99at_private)
Date: Thu Apr 02 1998 - 16:50:07 PST

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    DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS - NONE - FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
    
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    
    ______________________________________________________________________________
                    Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
    
            Title:   IRIX 6.3 & 6.4 mailcap vulnerability
            Number:  19980403-01-PX
            Date:    April 2, 1998
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
    for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use.   Silicon
    Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
    
    Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
    an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
    express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
    of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.  In no event shall
    Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
    of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
    damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
    use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    
    - -----------------------
    - --- Issue Specifics ---
    - -----------------------
    
    The System Manager sysmgr(1M) provides a web-browser-like GUI interface to
    tasks that help you administer an SGI workstation. sysmgr(1M) uses multiple
    tools to manage its GUI interface, two of them being runtask(1M) and
    runexec(1M).
    
    By mimicking the descriptor files of runtask(1M) or runexec(1M), an SGI user
    browsing web pages or reading email can inadvertently download a
    "trojan horse" runtask(1M) or runexec(1M) descriptor file. The "trojan horse"
    descriptor file will execute a local System Manager Task with the privileges
    of the user web browsing and can lead to a local root compromise.
    
    Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
    following steps for neutralizing the exposure.  It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
    that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.  This
    issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
    
    
    - --------------
    - --- Impact ---
    - --------------
    
    All IRIX 6.3/6.4 users that have Mailcap entries for x-sgi-task
    and x-sgi-exec have this vulnerability. On IRIX 6.3/6.4, these vulnerable
    Mailcap entries are installed by default in /usr/local/lib/netscape/mailcap .
    Users can add their own Mailcap entries in their home directories
    ($HOME/.mailcap) and these need to be inspected for the vulnerable x-sgi-task
    and x-sgi-exec entries.
    
    By default, this vulnerability requires an IRIX 6.3/6.4 user to use
    Netscape Navigator to web browse or read email from a malicious site
    and download a "trojan horse" System Manager Task which will execute
    locally with the privileges of the user web browsing. If the user is a
    privileged or root user, the "trojan horse" System Manger Task will execute
    with root privileges and can lead to a root compromise.
    
    
    - --------------------------
    - --- Temporary Solution ---
    - --------------------------
    
    Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
    there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
    not be possible.
    
    
         1) Become the root user on the system.
    
                    % /bin/su -
                    Password:
                    #
    
         2) Edit the default Mailcap file.
    
                    # vi /usr/local/lib/netscape/mailcap
    
         3) Remove the following vulnerable mailcap entries:
    
                    application/x-sgi-task; /usr/sysadm/bin/runtask %s; \
                        description="System Administration Task"
    
                    application/x-sgi-exec; /usr/sysadm/bin/runexec %s; \
                        description="System Administration Executable"
    
         4) Find any additional mailcap files and remove any vulnerable entries.
    
            You will need to run the find(1) command on each system you
            maintain because the command examines files on local disks only.
    
            Note that this is one long command, though we have separated it
            onto three lines using backslashes.
    
                     # find / -local -type f  -name 'mailcap'  -o \
                       -name '.mailcap' -exec egrep 'runexec|runtask' {} \
                       /dev/null \;
    
            This command will find all files on a system that:
                are only in the local file system (/ -local)
                are regular files (-type f)
                have the name "mailcap" (-name 'mailcap') or the name ".mailcap"
    
            Once found, those files will be searched for the string "runexec" or
            "runtask" (-exec egrep 'runexec|runtask' {}) and have their path names
            printed .
    
            The addition of /dev/null as an argument causes grep to list the
            full pathname of any file containing the string, rather than just the
            basename.
    
            Edit the files that have the pathnames printed and remove any
            vulnerable runtask/runexec mailcap entries.
    
          5) Return to previous level.
    
                    # exit
                    $
    
    
    - ----------------
    - --- Solution ---
    - ----------------
    
       OS Version     Vulnerable?     Patch #      Other Actions
       ----------     -----------     -------      -------------
    
       IRIX 3.x          no
       IRIX 4.x          no
       IRIX 5.0.x        no
       IRIX 5.1.x        no
       IRIX 5.2          no
       IRIX 5.3          no
       IRIX 6.0.x        no
       IRIX 6.1          no
       IRIX 6.2          no
       IRIX 6.3          yes           2336
       IRIX 6.4          yes           2339
    
    Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
    
    The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
    mirror, ftp.sgi.com.   Security information and patches can be found
    in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.
    
    
    
                     ##### Patch File Checksums ####
    
    The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
    
    Filename:                 README.patch.2336
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    15417 8 README.patch.2336
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       21104 8 README.patch.2336
    MD5 checksum:             C5FCA39F205EF1C306F28E95C811150C
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0002336
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    64988 2 patchSG0002336
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       38657 2 patchSG0002336
    MD5 checksum:             C38D6B81878377F470D1CC0ED43C8227
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0002336.idb
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    05931 2 patchSG0002336.idb
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       54651 2 patchSG0002336.idb
    MD5 checksum:             0C821C1BC07C08F279288F86E9807C93
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0002336.netscape_gold_sw
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    52912 20 patchSG0002336.netscape_gold_sw
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       51500 20 patchSG0002336.netscape_gold_sw
    MD5 checksum:             88CABDD9E4669CC6303876D77E491E4F
    
    Filename:                 README.patch.2339
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    11695 8 README.patch.2339
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       21823 8 README.patch.2339
    MD5 checksum:             114563D0D67F80E371C71EF3E6262900
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0002339
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    37814 2 patchSG0002339
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       40753 2 patchSG0002339
    MD5 checksum:             E0B519F8ECD83396E29DFE07DF23517E
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0002339.idb
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    59311 2 patchSG0002339.idb
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       54667 2 patchSG0002339.idb
    MD5 checksum:             8E39530FD44C9087F0C07B1F75043764
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0002339.netscape_gold_sw
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    39233 20 patchSG0002339.netscape_gold_sw
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       53498 20 patchSG0002339.netscape_gold_sw
    MD5 checksum:             7FF56E22472B0797499920BAAB8CA9C5
    
    
    - - ------------------------
    - - --- Acknowledgments ---
    - - ------------------------
    
    Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center, and
    AUSCERT for their assistance in this matter.
    
    
    - - -----------------------------------------------------------
    - - --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
    - - -----------------------------------------------------------
    
    If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
    cse-security-alertat_private
    
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    ______________________________________________________________________________
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