Vulnerability in HP OpenMail

From: David Jones (dejat_private)
Date: Tue Apr 21 1998 - 15:35:29 PDT

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    HP's OpenMail system consists of a server package that installs on an HP9000
    workstation, as well as a client (Omgui).  Other mail systems may also be
    able to interface to it.
    
    In Omgui, if you select "Options->Printer..." from the menu, you will be
    prompted for a printer command.  The default is something like
    "lp -dlaser4si".  This command is simply executed on the server, presumably
    using the system() call.
    
    This means that any mail user can run arbitrary shell commands on the mail
    server.  For example, if I change my printer to:
    
    cat /etc/passwd | /usr/lib/sendmail jones
    
    and print a message, then I will get a copy of the password file.
    
    The good news is that mail users have their own Unix UIDs on the server.
    ("id | /usr/lib/sendmail jones" returns the relevant info.)
    As long as OpenMail stores users' mail folders as user-owned files with
    appropriate permissions, then there should be no way to read other users'
    mail.
    
    The real problem is situations where the sysadmin has denied users regular
    login access to the mail server, possibly by putting "*" in the password
    field.  This is standard practice as a security measure.  If you have done
    this on your OpenMail server, then you may want to check your security
    measures carefully - your users can get the equivalent of shell whether you
    allow it or not.
    



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