IRIX 6.4 diskperf/diskalign Vulnerabilities

From: SGI Security Coordinator (agent99at_private)
Date: Wed May 27 1998 - 15:27:12 PDT

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    DISTRIBUTION RESTRICTIONS - NONE - FOR PUBLIC RELEASE
    
    -----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE-----
    
    ______________________________________________________________________________
                    Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
    
            Title:   IRIX 6.4 diskperf/diskalign Vulnerabilities
            Number:  19980502-01-P3030
            Date:    May 27, 1998
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
    for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use.   Silicon
    Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
    
    Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
    an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
    express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
    of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.  In no event shall
    Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
    of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
    damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
    use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    - ------------------------
    - ---- Issue Specifics ---
    - ------------------------
    
    IRIX 6.4 Patch 2291 and its successors introduced several new tools for
    the Digital Media Community. Two of these new tools introduced are
    diskalign(1) and diskperf(1) which are used to assist in configuring
    IRIX for data streaming applications, like uncompressed digital video,
    to/from an XLV volume set of stripped disks.
    
    Unfortunately, a security hole was discovered that allows diskalign(1) and
    diskperf(1) to create arbitrary root-owned files which can lead to a root
    compromise.
    
    Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
    following steps for neutralizing the exposure.  It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
    that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.  This
    issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
    
    
    - ---------------
    - ---- Impact ---
    - ---------------
    
    The diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) programs are installed by default from the
    January Recommended/Required Patch Set for IRIX 6.4.
    
    Patch 2291 and 2848 are vulnerable to this exploit.
    
    A user account on the vulnerable system is required in order to exploit
    diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) locally and remotely.
    
    This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups
    and mailing lists.
    
    
    - ---------------------------
    - ---- Temporary Solution ---
    - ---------------------------
    
    Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
    there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
    not be possible.
    
    The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by removing
    the setuid permissions of the diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) programs.
    
    
    
         1) Become the root user on the system.
    
               % /bin/su -
               Password:
               #
    
    
         2) Verify the vulnerable diskalign(1)/diskperf(1) programs
            are installed. Only patch 2291 and 2848 are vulnerable.
    
               #  versions -b patchSG0002291 patchSG0002848
               I = Installed, R = Removed
    
                  Name            Date      Description
               I  patchSG0002291  02/02/98  Patch SG0002291: rollup for platform
                                            independent dmedia
    
               I  patchSG0002848  03/04/98  Patch SG0002848: rollup for platform
                                            independent dmedia
    
    
         3) Change the permissions on the vulnerable diskalign(1)/diskperf(1)
            programs.
    
               # /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/diskalign
               # /bin/chmod 500 /usr/sbin/diskperf
    
                               ************
                               *** NOTE ***
                               ************
    
                Removing the permissions from the vulnerable program will
                prevent non-root users from accessing diskalign(1)/diskperf(1).
    
    
         4) Verify the new permissions on the program.
            Note that the program size may be different depending on release.
    
                    # ls -al /usr/sbin/diskalign /usr/sbin/diskperf
                    -r-x------    1 root sys   17756 Mar  4 14:02 diskalign
                    -r-x------    1 root sys   42424 Mar  4 14:02 diskperf
    
    
    
         5) Return to previous user level.
    
                    # exit
                    $
    
    
    
    - -----------------
    - ---- Solution ---
    - -----------------
    
       OS Version     Vulnerable?     Patch #      Other Actions
       ----------     -----------     -------      -------------
    
       IRIX 3.x          no
       IRIX 4.x          no
       IRIX 5.0.x        no
       IRIX 5.1.x        no
       IRIX 5.2          no
       IRIX 5.3          no
       IRIX 6.0.x        no
       IRIX 6.1          no
       IRIX 6.2          no
       IRIX 6.3          no
       IRIX 6.4          yes           3030
    
    
    
    Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
    
    The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
    mirror, ftp.sgi.com.  Security information and patches can be found
    in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectfully.
    
    
    
                     ##### Patch File Checksums ####
    
    The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
    
    
    Filename:                 README.patch.3030
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    05597 34 README.patch.3030
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       21922 34 README.patch.3030
    MD5 checksum:             DD5ABFFEAEAF479FEFF1FE0FB6DD9C0D
    
    Filename:                 patch3030.chksums.only
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    06000 4 patch3030.chksums.only
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       45369 4 patch3030.chksums.only
    MD5 checksum:             7D994C28C59CCF796F6FC5E7C8E44D65
    
    Filename:                 patch3030.pgp.and.chksums
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    39517 11 patch3030.pgp.and.chksums
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       12406 11 patch3030.pgp.and.chksums
    MD5 checksum:             503702949B44D83249E2C27747F3E411
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0003030
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    57797 20 patchSG0003030
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       41233 20 patchSG0003030
    MD5 checksum:             D9CDFB195EB0EF3928AE5752E62817A8
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0003030.desktop_eoe_sw
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    32697 48 patchSG0003030.desktop_eoe_sw
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       25898 48 patchSG0003030.desktop_eoe_sw
    MD5 checksum:             55CB2D9182FE8CE45F240DFFC2D10342
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_man
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    26486 51 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_man
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       26722 51 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_man
    MD5 checksum:             700D287F5A02173EFD68B34E7434AF68
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_src
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    57124 209 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_src
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       35449 209 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_src
    MD5 checksum:             DC07141CDF0A989A3D7CAA8C2BA5FBD6
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_sw
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    40323 4971 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_sw
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       39176 4971 patchSG0003030.dmedia_dev_sw
    MD5 checksum:             B52C5EC6B0822EEFBB11DBEA1589D12A
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_man
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    12852 125 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_man
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       63193 125 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_man
    MD5 checksum:             8909E51934CDCF28058B54FDE17FD1AB
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_sw
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    06229 12946 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_sw
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       28437 12946 patchSG0003030.dmedia_eoe_sw
    MD5 checksum:             7D33CFF002A66B6A1C1A9914F4C01A48
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0003030.eoe_sw
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    65347 227 patchSG0003030.eoe_sw
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       16579 227 patchSG0003030.eoe_sw
    MD5 checksum:             08AC9BE254FAEB7E7880EA32B2FA3D3E
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0003030.idb
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    33473 42 patchSG0003030.idb
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       8655 42 patchSG0003030.idb
    MD5 checksum:             3BFC27BA00AEE38686FA0961240F1F23
    
    Filename:                 patchSG0003030.sysadmdesktop_sw
    Algorithm #1 (sum -r):    16622 27 patchSG0003030.sysadmdesktop_sw
    Algorithm #2 (sum):       52053 27 patchSG0003030.sysadmdesktop_sw
    MD5 checksum:             8837A995D8439365442BF8E95188236D
    
    
    - -------------------------
    - ---- Acknowledgments ---
    - -------------------------
    
    Silicon Graphics wishes to thank AUSCERT for their assistance in this matter.
    
    
    - ------------------------------------------------------------
    - ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
    - ------------------------------------------------------------
    
    If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
    cse-security-alertat_private
    
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