ISSalert: ISS Security Advisory - nisd

From: Aleph One (aleph1at_private)
Date: Wed Jun 10 1998 - 07:36:44 PDT

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    Date: Tue, 9 Jun 1998 16:27:42 -0400
    From: X-Force <xforceat_private>
    To: alertat_private
    Subject: ISSalert: ISS Security Advisory - nisd
    
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                            ISS Security Advisory
                                June 10, 1998
    
    
                Remote Buffer Overflow in the rpc.nisd program.
    
    Synopsis:
    
            A stack-based buffer overflow exists in some versions of the
    Solaris 2.x rpc.nisd, which allows attackers to gain root access on
    the vulnerable machine.
    
    Recommended Action:
    
            Disable the rpc.nisd daemon if you are not running NIS+.
    If you are running NIS+, determine if you are vulnerable.  If you
    are vulnerable, contact Sun for a patch.
    
    Determining if you are vulnerable:
    
            On a Solaris machine, issue the following commands to determine if
    you are running rpc.nisd:
    
    solaris% rpcinfo -p localhost | grep 100300
    
            If you see the following output, or something similar, and you
    have not installed a patch then you are vulnerable:
    
        100300    3   udp  32773  nisd
        100300    3   tcp  32771  nisd
    
    Description:
    
            The rpc.nisd program is an ONC RPC agent that implements the
    NIS+ service.  Generally, the data sent to an RPC daemon has explicit
    maximum length, ensuring that it will not overflow buffers of any
    reasonable size.  However, one NIS+ argument: nis_name, has no specific
    maximum length.  In this case the max length defaults to an unsafe value.
    Because NIS+ copies this argument onto fixed length buffers in the stack,
    an attacker can corrupt the stack and cause the daemon to execute arbitrary
    machine code.
    
    Affected Versions:
    
            Solaris 2.3 - 2.6 are vulnerable.
    
    Fix Information:
    
    For Solaris, install one of the following patches:
    
    105401-12:       Solaris 5.6
    105402-12:       Solaris 5.6_x86
    103612-41:       Solaris 5.5.1
    103613-41:       Solaris 5.5.1_x86
    103187-38:       Solaris 5.5
    103188-38:       Solaris 5.5_x86
    101973-35:       Solaris 5.4
    101974-35:       Solaris 5.4_x86
    
    
    Additional Information:
    
            This problem was discovered by Josh Daymont of ISS <jdaymontat_private>
    
    ________
    
    Copyright (c) 1998 by Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    
    Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this Alert
    electronically.  It is not to be edited in any way without express consent
    of X-Force.  If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this
    Alert in any other medium excluding electronic medium, please
    email xforceat_private for permission.
    
    Disclaimer
    
    The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
    information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There
    are NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the
    author be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in connection
    with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this information is
    at the user's own risk.
    
    X-Force PGP Key available at:   http://www.iss.net/xforce/sensitive.html
    as well as on MIT's PGP key server and PGP.com's key server.
    
    X-Force Vulnerability and Threat Database: http://www.iss.net/xforce
    
    Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to:
    X-Force <xforceat_private> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    
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