Re: Dr Solomon's - Possible Hole

From: Toralv Dirro (Toralv.Dirroat_private)
Date: Thu Jun 18 1998 - 09:42:49 PDT

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           In reply, no it would not be an easy task to add commands such
           as those described above!
    
           The installation scripts stored in the MEUPGRD share are only
           used if you are performing a Batch Installation.  The Push On
           and Pull Off installation methods do not use this approach.
           The installation scripts are interpreted by the Update Agent
           that runs on the client machine.  This does indeed run under
           the Local System account.
    
           However, the Update Agent processes this script by interpreting
           its contents.  Thus you can not simply add a command to run an
           executable program in the way that is described above.
    
           Secondly, to prevent unauthorised tampering of installation
           scripts, a checksum is created for each script that is
           generated by the Management Console.  The Update Agent
           validates this checksum before processing the script,
           regardless of the update method.  If the contents of the script
           has been altered, the generated and validated checksums will
           not match and the Update Agent will refuse to process the
           script's contents.
    
           A tampered script may be identified by the administrator
           running the Management Console, as the machine destined to run
           the tampered script will have a red cross next to it (install
           failed), and viewing the Installation Log will show the error
           message "Integrity Failure".  The Update Agent also displays a
           dialog box on the target machine indicating the integrity
           failure before terminating.
    
    
           regards,
           Toralv Dirro
           Dr Solomon's Software Deutschland GmbH
    
           On behalf of Graham Clarke, Dr Solomon's Software Ltd,
    
    
    
    
           Von:  Aleph One <aleph1at_private> AT mailgate am 16.06.98 23:15
                 GDT
    
           An:    BUGTRAQat_private AT mailgate@CCMAIL
           Kopie:  (Blindkopie: Toralv Dirro/TS/DE/DRS)
           Thema: Dr Solomon's - Possible Hole
    
    
           ---------- Forwarded message ----------
           Date: Mon, 15 Jun 1998 22:37:25 +0100
           From: Nemo <mnemonixat_private>
           To: NTBUGTRAQat_private
           Subject: Dr Solomon's - Possible Hole
    
           Dear All,
           I was looking at Dr Solomon's Management Edition Anti-virus for
           NT and believe some of the advise they give could leave a huge
           hole in the security of your network.
    
           Below is a cutting from their technical notes web page:
           http://www.drsolomon.com/products/avtknt/tnotes/Null.html
    
           ###############################################################
    
           Null Session Shares
    
    
           As part of the initial installation of Management Edition the
           repository is created and the following two shares are
           associated with it :
    
           Share Name      Default Location        Purpose
           REPO            C:\NTTKME\DISKS         Contains all Management
            Edition and
           Anti-Virus
           Toolkit                                         components.
           MEUPGRD         C:\NTTKME\DISKS\UPGRADES Holds installation
           scripts for machines
           being updated                                   via Batch
           Installation.
    
           Batch Installations work via the Update Manager service running
           on the Management Server. It sends out a data packet across the
           network to the Management Agent running on the target
           machine(s). This packet indicates the name and location of the
           install script that the Management Agent should run to perform
           an update.
    
           The Management Agent performs the update by running the Update
           Agent. As this is being launched by an NT service, it runs
           under the Local System account, not the currently logged in
           user (if there is one).
    
           The Local System account does not normally have access to
           information across the network via a share. This would normally
           mean that it is unable to access the install scripts in the
           MEUPGRD share.
    
           The solution is to create what is termed a "Null Session
           Share". This is done automatically when Management Edition
           creates the repository. If the user inadvertently deletes and
           re-creates the share they must check that the null session
           share is still active. This is done via REGEDT32.EXE. Check for
           the following key:
    
    
           HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\System\CurrentControlSet\Services\LanmanServ
           er\Parameters
           \NullSessionShares
    
    
           One of the values it should contain is MEUPGRD. The share
           itself should also be set to Full Control for Everyone.
    
           ###############################################################
           #########
    
           The last sentence is the crux of the issue here.
           This null session share is on the server and the "everyone"
           group has full control. This means that anyone can edit the
           files in this share.
    
           Wouldn't it be an easy task to add the following commands :
    
           net user password jsmith /add
           net localgroup administrators jsmith /add
    
           (or equiv)
    
           Because the clients are running the scripts in the MEUPGRD with
            system
           privs the jsmith account will
           be created and added to the local admins group......then the
           attacker has every single NT client on your LAN to play with.
    
           Thoughts? Comments?
    



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