On Jun 26, 8:41am, Tim Newsham wrote: } Subject: Re: Vulnerability in 4.4BSD Secure Levels Implementation > > > > - The syslogd daemon can be covertly compromised, so no useful > > information ever gets logged to the protected system logs. But at > > least no-one can modify the useless information. > > Be smart, niall, syslog can only be compromised after the system > has been compromised. Yes, obviously. How many exploits do you know of that generate log entries as a side effect? Do you trust the program that you use to view your logs? Get smart, tim. > > McKusick et al have this to say: > > > > Files marked immutable include those that are frequently the subject > > of attack by intruders (e.g., login and su). The append-only flag > > is typically used for critical system logs. If an intruder breaks > > in, he will be unable to cover his tracks. Although simple in > > concept, these two features improve the security of a system > > dramatically. > > Since the intruder cannot reverse time, he cannot cover his tracks > in the system log. Just as McKusick said! (wow, he must have known > about the time thing too!) I don't see how you think monotomically increasing time source has anything to do with the point I'm making, i.e., that there is no point in "protecting" su or login with the immutable flag with the currentl semantics. > > Why do they advocate protecting login and su if such protection can > > be trivially defeated using the same techniques we demonstrated in > > the attack on inetd? And why do they claim these features improve the > > Because protecting login and su will protect the persistant system. > Yes, the running system may still be compromised. Securelevels does > not address that issue. (perhaps your stance could be summed up > as: "securelevels should protect the running system"?) Well I'd like to think that all security measures should protect the running system, powered down systems tend not to be very vulnerable. > > Propogation of the immutable flag is the logical and correct thing to do. > > I agree that this behaviour is not explicitly documented, however it > > is a reasonable expectation that people hold. Secure levels become a > > farce without it. > > I can see why one might think this is desirable, but it's hardly the only > obvious alternative. What are the other "obvious" alternatives? > I wouldn't call securelevels minus this feature a > "farce" (that is, if securelevels plus this feature isn't considered > a farce as well :) Secure levels minus this feature are only useful for protecting system logs generated during the intrusion. Thats crap. Niall
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 14:00:31 PDT