IRIX 6.4 ioconfig(1M) and disk_bandwidth(1M) Vulnerability

From: SGI Security Coordinator (agent99at_private)
Date: Mon Jul 20 1998 - 15:54:05 PDT

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    ______________________________________________________________________________
                    Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
    
            Title:   IRIX 6.4 ioconfig(1M) and disk_bandwidth(1M) Vulnerability
            Number:  19980701-01-P
            Date:    July 20, 1998
    _____________________________________________________________________________
    
    Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
    for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use.   Silicon
    Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
    
    Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
    an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
    express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
    of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose.  In no event shall
    Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
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    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    - ------------------------
    - ---- Issue Specifics ---
    - ------------------------
    
    The IRIX ioconfig(1M) program assigns logical controller numbers to all I/O
    devices on a Silicon Graphics Origin or Onyx2 system.
    
    The IRIX disk_bandwidth(1M) program is used to determine the number of I/O
    operations that can be performed on a given disk device on an Origin or Onyx2
    system.
    
    Both programs are normally only used by IRIX System administrators.
    
    Unfortunately, a vulnerability has been discovered in both ioconfig(1M) and
    disk_bandwidth(1M) programs that can lead to a root compromise of the system.
    
    Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
    following steps for neutralizing the exposure.  It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
    that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.  This
    issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
    
    
    - ---------------
    - ---- Impact ---
    - ---------------
    
    The ioconfig(1M)/disk_bandwidth(1M) programs are installed by default on all
    IRIX 6.4 S2MP Origin and Onyx2 systems.
    
    A local user account on the vulnerable system is required in order to
    exploit the ioconfig(1M)/disk_bandwidth(1M) vulnerability locally and remotely.
    
    This vulnerability has been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups
    and mailing lists.
    
    
    - -----------------
    - ---- Solution ---
    - -----------------
    
    The steps below can be used to remove the vulnerability by restricting
    permissions of the ioconfig(1M)/disk_bandwidth(1M) programs to the root user.
    
    
    
         1) Become the root user on the system.
    
               % /bin/su -
               Password:
               #
    
    
         2) Verify the vulnerable ioconfig(1M)/disk_bandwidth(1M) programs
            are installed. Only IRIX 6.4 S2MP for Origin/Onyx2 is vulnerable.
    
               # uname -R
               6.4 S2MP+OCTANE
    
    
         3) Remove permissions on the vulnerable ioconfig(1M) and
            disk_bandwidth(1M) programs.
    
               # /bin/chmod 500 /sbin/ioconfig
               # /bin/chmod 500 /sbin/disk_bandwidth
    
                               ************
                               *** NOTE ***
                               ************
    
                Removing permissions from the vulnerable programs will
                prevent non-root users from accessing ioconfig(1M) and
                disk_bandwidth(1M).
    
    
         4) Verify the new permissions on the program.
            Note that the program size may be different depending on release.
    
                  # ls -al /sbin/ioconfig /usr/sbin/disk_bandwidth
                  -r-x------    1 root sys   34024 Feb 20 16:53 ioconfig
                  -r-x------    1 root sys   17604 Dec 18  1997 disk_bandwidth
    
    
         5) Return to previous user level.
    
                    # exit
                    %
    
    
    - -------------------------
    - ---- Acknowledgments ---
    - -------------------------
    
    Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the Internet community at large for their
    assistance in this matter.
    
    
    - ------------------------------------------------------------
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