L0pht Advisory: Lotus Note Vulnerability

From: Aleph One (aleph1at_private)
Date: Wed Aug 05 1998 - 08:36:27 PDT

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    http://www.l0pht.com/advisories/nny.txt
    
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                     L0pht Security Advisory
        URL Origin:  http://www.l0pht.com/advisories.html
      Release Date:  July 31, 1998   Application:  Notes 4.6+ Client
     Operating Sys:  Any
          Severity:  Users can overwrite/create system files
            Author:  nny <nnyat_private>
      Patch Status:  Lotus has been made aware of this vulnerabilities
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    I. Description
    
    The L0pht has received reports regarding a vulnerability in some
    implementations of Lotus Domino via the Notes Client. Information about
    this vulnerability has been posted to various public mailing lists and
    newsgroups.
    
    Versions 4.6+ of the Lotus Notes Client appear to be vulnerable; lower
    version may also be vulnerable but at this time are untested.  The
    vulnerability affects companys that use Lotus Notes primarily for
    development purposes or as an Intranet. Also any servers that were
    distributed with the Lotus Notes Client that are not running the HTTPD
    task by default are vulnerable.  Note: This assumes Domino servers have
    been patched due to previous advisory.
    
    Additionally, previous vulnerabilities, such as the one presented by
    mattwat_private (Web users can write to remote server drives and change
    server configuration files), now come into play once more with the
    addition of the vulnerability in the Notes Client. No new vulnerability
    exists in Lotus Domino that run the HTTP task by default.
    
    II. Impact
    
    Remote intruders can potentially retreive: in development databases,
    confidential company records, etc etc. All of the above can be achieved by
    connecting to a vulnerable Notes Client.
    
    IIa. To Test
    
    >From within Lotus Notes 4.6+ Client:
    1. Open any given database
    2. Click Actions -> Preview in Web Browser
    
    This should have launched your designated web browser and connected to
    http://199.99.99.99/database or something similar. Even though you only
    have the Notes Client installed on the machine and not the server, the
    HTTPD task is now running and accepting connections on port 80. Thus
    anyone on the Internet could then do http://199.99.99.99/domcfg.nsf/?open
    or even http://199.99.99.99 (to get a listing of the available
    databases). Subsequently you could open the log and see the database(s)
    the given user was recently accessing or modifying.
    
    >From this point you can search around and basically manipulate documents
    that do a wide variety of things. Domino URL commands (which can be used
    to edit, delete, and manipulate files via the web) can be found in all
    documentation as well as at:
    http://www.notes.net/today.nsf/cbb328e5c12843a9852563dc006721c7/ca5230f9baf39fe
    1852564b5005e8419
    
    Note: Once the Notes Client is closed the HTTPD task is also.
    
    III. Solution
    
    ACLs need to be edited manually by a competent admin to be ensured of
    security.  Take, for example, if domlog.nsf could be read, that alone is
    a security breech.
    
    Workaround
    Setup routing filters to dissallow access to the http port of
    Notes Client only machines.
    
    --------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    The authoritative version of this file is at:
    http://www.l0pht.com/advisories.html
    



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