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______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: IRIX BIND DNS Vulnerabilities
Title: CERT CA-98.05
Number: 19980603-02-PX
Date: August 6, 1998
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- ---------------
- ---- Update ---
- ---------------
As part of on going security efforts, Silicon Graphics has replaced
IRIX 5.3 patch 3123 with patch 3268. Patch 3123 invoked the named-xfer
program incorrectly.
The original text from SGI Security Advisory 19980603-01-PX has been
updated to reflect this change.
- ------------------------
- ---- Issue Specifics ---
- ------------------------
The Berkeley Internet Name Domain (BIND) software is an implementation of
the Domain Name System (DNS). DNS provides Internet domain name service
through a server daemon called named(1M).
Unfortunately, several vulnerabilities were discovered in BIND and also
in named(1M) that can disrupt or lead to a root compromise on a named server.
These BIND vulnerabilities were reported in CERT CA-98.05 which can be
found at:
http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.05.bind_problems.html
Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems. This
issue will be corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- ---------------
- ---- Impact ---
- ---------------
The BIND named(1M) daemon is not installed by default on IRIX.
The BIND named(1M) program for IRIX 3.X through IRIX 6.4 has these
vulnerabilities.
A local user account is not need in order to exploit these vulnerabilities.
These vulnerabilities have been publically discussed in Usenet newsgroups
and mailing lists.
- ---------------------------
- ---- Temporary Solution ---
- ---------------------------
Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.
The steps below can be used to remove the root compromise vulnerability by
removing fake-iquery option in named(1M) configuration file. Unfortunately,
named(1M) will still be vulnerable to disruption of service unless the
patches are installed.
1) Verify you have named(1M) installed on this server.
% versions eoe1.sw.named {IRIX 3.X-5.X}
% versions eoe.sw.named {IRIX 6.X}
I eoe.sw.named 05/22/97 Berkeley Internet Name Domain Server
2) Become the root user on the system.
% /bin/su -
Password:
#
3) Edit /etc/named.boot file and find the options line. If the options
line has the "fake-iquery" flag present, the buffer overflow
vulnerability is present and you will want to remove the flag.
If the "fake-iquery" flag is not present, the buffer overflow
vulnerability is temporarily addressed until patches can be
installed.
# vi /etc/named.boot
{Find the "options" block or line, an example is given below}
options forward-only query-log fake-iquery
{Remove the "fake-iquery" entry}
options forward-only query-log
{Save and exit the file}
Refer to man named(1M) for further information.
************
*** NOTE ***
************
Removing the "fake-iquery" entry may prevent old
versions of nslookup(1C) program from working correctly.
4) Restart named(1M) daemon.
# /usr/sbin/named.restart
5) Return to previous user level.
# exit
%
- -----------------
- ---- Solution ---
- -----------------
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- --------- -------------
IRIX 3.x yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3.
IRIX 4.x yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3.
IRIX 5.0.x yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3.
IRIX 5.1.x yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3.
IRIX 5.2 yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3.
IRIX 5.3 yes 3268
IRIX 6.0.x yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3.
IRIX 6.1 yes not avail Note 1, 2, 3.
IRIX 6.2 yes 3117
IRIX 6.3 yes 2740
IRIX 6.4 yes 2741
IRIX 6.5 no
NOTES
1) Upgrade to currently supported IRIX operating system.
2) See "Temporary Solution" section for a workaround.
3) Unsupported "freeware" BIND distributions can be found at
http://www.isc.org/bind.html
Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
The SGI anonymous FTP site is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1) or its
mirror, ftp.sgi.com. Security information and patches can be found
in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectively.
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.2740
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 52811 7 README.patch.2740
Algorithm #2 (sum): 6852 7 README.patch.2740
MD5 checksum: C386BECBE87845EDACEDC59FD331B839
Filename: patchSG0002740
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 47740 1 patchSG0002740
Algorithm #2 (sum): 29219 1 patchSG0002740
MD5 checksum: 0242CB2E892557FD914F2F0AEDC3F025
Filename: patchSG0002740.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 51555 277 patchSG0002740.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 15806 277 patchSG0002740.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 898287766E9B429E38E87D45103DB45E
Filename: patchSG0002740.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45146 1 patchSG0002740.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 34825 1 patchSG0002740.idb
MD5 checksum: C1043EAF2A0A55F35BBB5252C76F4D77
Filename: README.patch.2741
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 32803 7 README.patch.2741
Algorithm #2 (sum): 1238 7 README.patch.2741
MD5 checksum: 1DC3AC5CFCBB9C98CE903903DCD88E7F
Filename: patchSG0002741
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18539 1 patchSG0002741
Algorithm #2 (sum): 30008 1 patchSG0002741
MD5 checksum: CDAB96BBBE3CCFB2E8B93ABB067BDCBC
Filename: patchSG0002741.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 58631 288 patchSG0002741.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 45800 288 patchSG0002741.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 8A9E3015CC9D083303234967E1CA95AE
Filename: patchSG0002741.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 14226 1 patchSG0002741.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 34771 1 patchSG0002741.idb
MD5 checksum: C7154177CF69C7140A2B965D0C97CC08
Filename: README.patch.3117
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 31458 30 README.patch.3117
Algorithm #2 (sum): 20680 30 README.patch.3117
MD5 checksum: AA5C247E1BAD0AE44D4D52C74712FC7F
Filename: patch3117.pgp.and.chksums
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00000 0 patch3117.pgp.and.chksums
Algorithm #2 (sum): 0 0 patch3117.pgp.and.chksums
MD5 checksum: D41D8CD98F00B204E9800998ECF8427E
Filename: patchSG0003117
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 30144 14 patchSG0003117
Algorithm #2 (sum): 28648 14 patchSG0003117
MD5 checksum: 936433D0D84DCFE1ECA5495B43D5A855
Filename: patchSG0003117.eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 60740 74 patchSG0003117.eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 15611 74 patchSG0003117.eoe_man
MD5 checksum: C45B59724AC5F81F5960BE78104A6B9E
Filename: patchSG0003117.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10439 1975 patchSG0003117.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 1394 1975 patchSG0003117.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: B12BCB4F7EB71EFEBE6E1E8F9270AFEB
Filename: patchSG0003117.eoe_sw64
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55729 104 patchSG0003117.eoe_sw64
Algorithm #2 (sum): 46796 104 patchSG0003117.eoe_sw64
MD5 checksum: 35477907C33C9489EE1AC55291979B9D
Filename: patchSG0003117.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40506 15 patchSG0003117.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 62723 15 patchSG0003117.idb
MD5 checksum: 76F6F7CF90D83ED2547C28689B4FA7BE
Filename: patchSG0003117.netman_data_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 56900 15 patchSG0003117.netman_data_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 58999 15 patchSG0003117.netman_data_man
MD5 checksum: 42BEB35E700813967F637E9BB0640385
Filename: patchSG0003117.nfs_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 05186 17 patchSG0003117.nfs_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 21113 17 patchSG0003117.nfs_man
MD5 checksum: F090E7476C01DC64F12F3A094EFAD64B
Filename: patchSG0003117.nfs_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 38617 73 patchSG0003117.nfs_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 63548 73 patchSG0003117.nfs_sw
MD5 checksum: 7AEE5EF7B5C4A8F316EC4CA5A2CCA453
Filename: README.patch.3268
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15632 8 README.patch.3268
Algorithm #2 (sum): 23095 8 README.patch.3268
MD5 checksum: 789D590A01CC41158137B978D0D98B43
Filename: patchSG0003268
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45141 1 patchSG0003268
Algorithm #2 (sum): 30277 1 patchSG0003268
MD5 checksum: F75C5289E316F5BBC63F3537343CF06B
Filename: patchSG0003268.eoe2_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40888 377 patchSG0003268.eoe2_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 15754 377 patchSG0003268.eoe2_sw
MD5 checksum: 9EEF010E145214511D69F1C8BDCF2FBD
Filename: patchSG0003268.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 16394 2 patchSG0003268.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 49878 2 patchSG0003268.idb
MD5 checksum: 561F182CF1F9ACC8A7D35F5598CC63E0
- -------------------------
- ---- Acknowledgments ---
- -------------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the CERT Coordination Center for their
assistance in this matter.
- ------------------------------------------------------------
- ---- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- ------------------------------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alertat_private
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alertat_private
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a free security mailing list service
called wiretap and encourages interested parties to self-subscribe
to receive (via email) all SGI Security Advisories when they are
released. Subscribing to the mailing list can be done via the Web
(http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/wiretap.html) or by sending email
to SGI as outlined below.
% mail wiretap-requestat_private
subscribe wiretap <YourEmailAddress>
end
^d
In the example above, <YourEmailAddress> is the email address that you
wish the mailing list information sent to. The word end must be on a
separate line to indicate the end of the body of the message. The
control-d (^d) is used to indicate to the mail program that you are
finished composing the mail message.
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides a comprehensive customer World Wide Web site.
This site is located at http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
------oOo------
For reporting *NEW* SGI security issues, email can be sent to
security-alertat_private or contact your SGI support provider. A
support contract is not required for submitting a security report.
______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
be redistributed provided that it is not altered in any way, Silicon
Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
includes its valid PGP signature.
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