ISS Security Advisory: Executable Directories in IIS 4.0

From: X-Force (xforceat_private)
Date: Mon Aug 31 1998 - 13:48:16 PDT

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    ISS Security Advisory
    August 31, 1998
    
    Executable Directories in IIS 4.0
    
    Synopsis:
    
    If a non-administrative user can place executable code into a web site
    directory which allows file execution, the user may be able to run
    applications which could compromise the web server.
    
    Recommended Action:
    
    Administrators should verify access permissions on all virtual HTTP server
    directories that are marked executable.  See below for recommended
    permissions.
    
    All security patches that protect against local attacks should be applied
    to HTTP servers due to the possibility of the server executing code
    locally. See http://www.microsoft.com/security for details.
    
    Description:
    
    The following directories are marked executable by default on an install of
    IIS 4.0:
    
    /W3SVC/1/ROOT/msadc
    /W3SVC/1/ROOT/News
    /W3SVC/1/ROOT/Mail
    /W3SVC/1/ROOT/cgi-bin
    /W3SVC/1/ROOT/SCRIPTS
    /W3SVC/1/ROOT/IISADMPWD
    /W3SVC/1/ROOT/_vti_bin
    /W3SVC/1/ROOT/_vti_bin/_vti_adm
    /W3SVC/1/ROOT/_vti_bin/_vti_aut
    
    In a default install, the physical drive mappings will be:
    
    msadc           c:\program files\common\system\msadc
    News            c:\InetPub\News
    Mail            c:\InetPub\Mail
    cgi-bin         c:\InetPub\wwwroot\cgi-bin
    SCRIPTS c:\InetPub\scripts
    IISADMPWD       C:\WINNT\System32\inetsrv\iisadmpwd
    _vti_bin                Not present by default - installed with FrontPage extensions
    
    Access to the physical directories can be obtained through drive sharing,
    remote command shells (e.g., rcmd, telnet, remote.exe), HTTP PUT commands,
    or FrontPage.  None of these methods are available in a default install,
    but are often added by administrators.  The default NTFS permissions are
    overly permissive, and allow change control (RWXD) to the Everyone group by
    default, with the exception of msadc which is full control to Everyone.
    Due to the sensitive nature of these directories, it is recommended that
    NTFS access permissions should be:
    
    Administrators, LocalSystem: Full Control
    Everyone: Special Access(X)
    
    Administrators should closely examine all pathways to access the
    filesystem, and be aware of all web directories that allow file execution.
    In addition, if a user is allowed to administer their own site, they may
    have permission to set a directory to executable. A system administrator
    should permit only allowed file types to be copied onto a production web
    site.
    
    In addition, ISS highly recommends the security settings detailed in
    Chapter 8 of the IIS Resource Kit (Microsoft Press).  We would like to
    thank Michael Howard and Jason Garms of Microsoft for their input.
    
    - --------
    
    Copyright (c) 1998 by Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    
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    Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to:
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