Borderware predictable TCP seq. numbers - Summary of responses

From: Roy Hills (Roy.Hills@NTA-MONITOR.COM)
Date: Mon Sep 14 1998 - 09:21:39 PDT

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    The Borderware Firewall predictable initial TCP sequence numbers issue
    has resulted in quite a few comments and sub-threads both in the list
    and in private Emails to my mailbox.  This message summarises the
    different threads:
    
    1.  Borderware v4 and v5 vulnerable
    
    The reports I've had back from people using the testing tool indicate that
    both version 4 and version 5 of Borderware are vulnerable to this issue.  I've
    not had any reports of earlier versions (was there ever a Borderware v3 or
    earlier?).
    
    2.  Other OS'es vulnerable to this issue
    
    Many people pointed out that HP-UX 9.x and 10.x produce predictable
    sequence numbers by default, although both versions can be easily
    changed to pseudo-random sequences (I wonder why HP don't make
    this the default setting?  Does it have a significant performance hit?).
    
    There has also been lots of comment about NT 4's time-based sequence
    numbers which increment once per millisecond.  The general feeling here
    seems to be that, even though this sequence is harder to predict than the
    "64k" sequence seen on Borderware & HP-UX, it is possible to do so.  I've
    had a few packet-trace examples demonstrating this.
    
    I have also observed the "64k" sequence on old versions of AIX and SCO
    UNIX.  I'm sure that there are plenty of other old OS'es out there which share
    this problem.
    
    Does anyone know if there is a list of the initial TCP sequence number
    patterns exhibited by the major operating systems and TCP/IP stacks?
    
    3.  Certification issues
    
    I've received lots of private Email on the subject of certification, and why
    this issue was not picked up in the ICSA (previously NCSA) tests.  The
    general opinion was that ICSA testing is quite superficial and should be
    seen as a minimum acceptable level rather than a "gold standard".
    
    Another common theme was that certification was no substitute for
    independent testing of the "real world" connection.
    
    Roy Hills
    NTA Monitor Ltd
    --
    Roy Hills                                    Tel:   01634 721855
    NTA Monitor Ltd                              FAX:   01634 721844
    6 Beaufort Court, Medway City Estate,        Email: Roy.Hills@nta-monitor.com
    Rochester, Kent ME2 4FB, UK                  WWW:   http://www.nta-monitor.com/
    



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