Important information about IBM-ERS's "ssh" advisory

From: David A. Curry (davyat_private)
Date: Mon Nov 02 1998 - 01:15:28 PST

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    On Friday, Oct. 30th, IBM-ERS sent out a draft advisory to be released on
    Monday, Nov. 2nd that described a buffer overflow condition in Version
    1.2.x "sshd."  This draft was sent to the Forum of Incident Response and
    Security Teams, and also to the "ssh-bugs" list for their comment/review.
    The draft was identified as ERS-SVA-E01-1998:005.1.
    
    Rootshell has unfortunately chosen to include a copy of this draft advisory
    in their recent newsletter, apparently for the purposes of defending itself
    against charges that it was unfairly disparaging "sshd."  Use of IBM-ERS's
    draft advisory in this manner was not approved or authorized by IBM-ERS,
    and does a disservice to all.
    
    Here are the facts about this advisory:
    
    1. IBM-ERS advisory ERS-SVA-E01-1998:005.1 was never issued publicly by
       IBM.
    
    2. In response to a telephone query from Kit Knox of Rootshell, IBM-ERS
       attempted to contact Kit on Friday evening, and was unable to reach
       him.  Specific contact information for IBM-ERS, as well as a brief
       status update, were left on Mr. Knox's voice mail.  Mr. Knox never
       contacted IBM-ERS after that time.
    
    3. IBM has been working closely with Tatu Ylonen, author of "ssh," to make
       sure that the potential vulnerability described in the advisory is not
       exploitable.  Upon further investigation, the problem originally
       described appears to have been influenced by outside factors and does
       not appear to be an exploitable problem in "sshd."
    
    4. IBM-ERS advisory ERS-SVA-E01-1998:005.1 was CANCELLED on the morning
       of Sunday, Nov. 1st, *before* Mr. Knox issued his newsletter.
    
    5. At this time, IBM-ERS has NO KNOWLEDGE of any security vulnerabilities,
       exploitable or otherwise, in the "sshd" program.
    
    We hope that this clarifies IBM's involvement in this situation.
    
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    The information in this document is provided as a service to customers of
    the IBM Emergency Response Service.  Neither International Business Machines
    Corporation, nor any of its employees, makes any warranty, express or implied,
    or assumes any legal liability or responsibility for the accuracy, complete-
    ness, or usefulness of any information, apparatus, product, or process
    contained herein, or represents that its use would not infringe any privately
    owned rights.  Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process,
    or service by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not
    necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or favoring
    by IBM or its subsidiaries.  The views and opinions of authors expressed
    herein do not necessarily state or reflect those of IBM or its subsidiaries,
    and may not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
    
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