Re: tcpd -DPARANOID doesn't work, and never did

From: D. J. Bernstein (djbat_private)
Date: Mon Nov 09 1998 - 17:07:14 PST

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    The subject line is correct exactly as stated. -DPARANOID does not
    improve your computer's security. It has never improved anybody's
    computer security.
    
    System administrators who thought that they were protecting themselves
    with -DPARANOID were actually deceiving themselves. As I said before,
    all of those systems were vulnerable until the vendors fixed the
    hostname lookups in rshd and rlogind.
    
    Wietse Venema writes:
    > First of all, whether or not the attack fails depends on the BIND
    > version being used; for example, the once widely-used BIND 4.8
    > forces the TTL to be at least five minutes, stopping the attack.
    
    No, it does not stop the attack. Let's go back to the videotape:
    
       0:00 Attacker connects to tcpd/rshd. ``Heh, heh, heh.''
       0:01 Local DNS server asks for PTR result.
       0:02 Attacker sends back untrusted.badguy.com, 5-minute TTL.
       0:03 Local DNS server asks for A records.
       0:10 Attacker pours a cup of coffee, laughs at the tcpd code.
       4:55 Attacker connects to tcpd/rshd again.
       4:56 Local DNS server asks for A records.
       5:04 Attacker sends back his IP address. ``That's me!''
       5:05 Local DNS server asks for PTR result. ``I love caches.''
       5:06 Attacker sends back trusted.toast.edu.
       5:07 rshd accepts connection. ``Elementary, my dear Wietse.''
    
    Exercise for the reader: Find two faster solutions.
    
    > Secondly, it depends on what native naming service the system uses.
    > Naming services such as NIS have their own cacheing mechanisms,
    > stopping the attack.
    
    No, they do not stop the attack. You're making a fool of yourself.
    
    > You can immunize BIND against this and other short TTL attacks by
    > patching the source or the executable file so that min_cache_ttl
    > is, for example, 300 seconds. That is sufficient to stop the attack.
    
    No, that does not stop the attack. See above.
    
    > Lastly, I'm responsible only for bugs in my own code.
    
    You told system administrators, wrongly, that you were protecting them.
    You're responsible for that false claim. How many people relaxed after
    installing tcpd -DPARANOID, instead of pestering their vendors for a
    real fix?
    
    You've done enough damage. Admit your mistake and turn off -DPARANOID.
    
    ---Dan
    1000 recipients, 28.8 modem, 10 seconds. http://pobox.com/~djb/qmail/mini.html
    



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