Gigi Sullivan wrote:
> > > If you send SIGHUP to xinetd, you get a dump file to /tmp/xinetd.dump, but
> > > this method isn't checked against /tmp, and it happily overwrites anything
> > > in the place of that file. The package has been released in 1997, IMHO this
> > > is too old to have a bug of this kind hidden.
> > >
> > > BTW here's the patch:
> >
> > [stat() before open() patch]
> >
> > 1. This suffers from a race condition (in fact, this is the textbook
> > example of a race condition). You need to fstat() the open()ed file,
> > and check that it's the same file that you just stat()ed.
> >
> > 2. The stat() needs to be an lstat(), to allow for symlinks.
>
> Uhm it shouldn't be enough to do the open() call with O_EXCL flag too ?
Two points:
1. I don't think that this is safe over NFS.
The Linux open(2) manpage says:
O_EXCL When used with O_CREAT, if the file already exists
it is an error and the open will fail. O_EXCL is
broken on NFS file systems, programs which rely on
it for performing locking tasks will contain a race
condition. The solution for performing atomic file
locking using a lockfile is to create a unique file
on the same fs (e.g., incorporating hostname and
pid), use link(2) to make a link to the lockfile
and use stat(2) on the unique file to check if its
link count has increased to 2. Do not use the
return value of the link() call.
2. The current behaviour is to append to an existing file if it
exists, or to create a new file if it doesn't. Adding O_EXCL would
break this behaviour.
I believe that the correct approach (in general) is to lstat() the
file, check that it's suitable (e.g. not a symlink), open() it,
fstat() the descriptor, and compare the device/inode pair with those
from the lstat(), to check that you did actually open the file which
you thought that you were opening.
IMHO, a better approach in this case would be to use a directory which
isn't world-writable e.g. /var/run, /var/log etc.
--
Glynn Clements <glynnat_private>
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 14:23:02 PDT