IRIX Vulnerability in ToolTalk RPC Service

From: SGI Security Coordinator (agent99at_private)
Date: Thu Nov 19 1998 - 13:21:41 PST

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    ______________________________________________________________________________
                    Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
    
            Title:  Vulnerability in ToolTalk RPC Service
            Title:  NAI-29, CERT CA-98.11
            Number: 19981101-01-A
            Date:   November 19, 1998
    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
    for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use.   Silicon
    Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
    
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    ______________________________________________________________________________
    
    - -----------------------
    - --- Issue Statement ---
    - -----------------------
    
    Silicon Graphics Inc. acknowledges the publicly reported security
    advisories NAI-29 and CERT CA-98.11* which discuss a vulnerability in
    the ToolTalk rpc.ttdbserverd daemon.
    
          * http://www.cert.org/advisories/CA-98.11.tooltalk.html
    
    For the protection of all our customers, SGI does not disclose, discuss
    or confirm vulnerabilities until a full investigation has occurred and
    any necessary patch(es) or release streams are available for all vulnerable
    and currently supported Unicos and IRIX operating systems.
    
    Until Silicon Graphics has more definitive information to provide, customers
    are encouraged to assume all security vulnerabilities as exploitable and take
    appropriate steps according to local site security policies and requirements.
    
    Steps to disable the rpc.ttdbserverd daemon are found in the Temporary
    Solution section below. However, other third-party programs utilizing this
    service may be impacted in varying degrees if the rpc.ttdbserverd daemon
    is disabled.
    
    Silicon Graphics Inc. has been and will continue to investigate this issue
    but no further information is available for public release at this time.
    
    As further information becomes available, additional advisories will be
    issued via the normal SGI security information distribution methods
    including the wiretap mailing list.
    
    
    - ----------------------------
    - ----- Temporary Solution ---
    - ----------------------------
    
    The steps below can be used to disable the ttdbserverd(8) daemon.
    
          =================
          **** WARNING ****
          =================
    
          Disabling ttdbserverd(8) daemon will impact and/or disable
          applications that use the RPC-based ToolTalk database server.
          One such third-party application is the TriTeal CDE product.
    
    
         1) Become the root user on the system.
    
                  % /bin/su -
                  Password:
                  #
    
    
         2) Verify ttdbserverd(8) daemon is enabled.
    
                  # rpcinfo -p | grep 100083
                  100083    1   tcp   1028  ttdbserverd
    
    
         3) Edit the file /etc/inetd.conf (for IRIX 5.3 and lower,
            edit /usr/etc/inetd.conf).  Place a "#" as the first
            character of the line to comment out and deactivate
            the ttdbserverd daemon.
    
    
                  # vi  /etc/inetd.conf
    
            {Find the following line}
    
                  ttdbserverd/1   stream  rpc/tcp wait root \
                  ?/usr/etc/rpc.ttdbserverd rpc.ttdbserverd
    
            {Place a "#" as the first character of the ttdbserverd line}
    
                  #ttdbserverd/1   stream  rpc/tcp wait root \
                  ?/usr/etc/rpc.ttdbserverd rpc.ttdbserverd
    
    
         4) Force inetd to re-read the configuration file.
    
                  # /etc/killall -HUP inetd
    
    
         5) Kill any existing ttdbserverd(8) process.
    
                  # /etc/killall ttdbserverd
    
    
          6) Return to previous level.
    
                  # exit
                  %
    
    
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