RSI.0011.11-09-98.AIX.INFOD

From: RSI Advise (adviseat_private)
Date: Thu Nov 19 1998 - 15:50:44 PST

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    RSI.0011.11-12-98.AIX.INFOD
    
    
    
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                       Repent Security Incorporated, RSI
                           [ http://www.repsec.com ]
    
    
                           *** RSI ALERT ADVISORY ***
    
    
    --- [CREDIT] --------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Andrew Green: Discovered the vulnerability
    Mark Zielinski: Author of the advisory
    
    --- [SUMMARY] -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Announced:     November 09, 1998
    Report code:   RSI.0011.11-12-98.AIX.INFOD
    Report title:  AIX infod
    
    Vulnerability: Please see the details section
    Vendor status: AIX contacted on November 12, 1998
    Patch status:  IBM is currently working on several fixes
    
    Platforms:     AIX 3.2.x, 4.1.x, 4.2.x, 4.3.x
    
    Reference:     http://www.repsec.com/advisories.html
    Impact:        If exploited, an attacker could potentially compromise
                   root access locally on your server
    
    --- [DETAILS] -------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Description:   The Info Explorer daemon is a AIX utility which is used
                   to provide documentation for the operating system and
                   associated programs.
    
    Problem:       The info daemon does not perform any validation on information
                   passed to the local socket that it is bound to.  Users on the
                   system can send false information to the daemon and trick
                   it into spawning a connection to the intruders X display.
    
    Details:       By sending a UID and GID of 0, along with a false environment,
                   infod will be forced into spawning a connection with root
                   privileges to the intruder's X display.
    
                   Once the program appears on the screen, they can goto
                   the default options menu and change the printer command
                   line to an alternate binary such as /bin/sh that gives
                   privileges to the account the session was spawned under.
    
    
    --- [FIX] -----------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Solution:      IBM is currently working on the following fixes which will be
                   available soon:
    
                      AIX 3.2.x:  upgrade to version 4
                      AIX 4.1.x:  IX84640
                      AIX 4.2.x:  IX84641
                      AIX 4.3.x:  IX84642
    
                   Until the fixes can be applied, the infod daemon should be disabled.
                   Run the following commands as root:
    
                      # stopsrc -s infod
                      # rmitab infod
                      # chown root.system /usr/lpp/info/bin/infod
                      # chmod 0 /usr/lpp/info/bin/infod
    
    
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    Repent Security Incorporated (RSI)
    13610 N. Scottsdale Rd.
    Suite #10-326
    Scottsdale, AZ 85254
    
    E-Mail: adviseat_private
    FTP: ftp://ftp.repsec.com
    WWW: http://www.repsec.com
    
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
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    Copyright November 1998 RepSec, Inc.
    
    The information in this document is provided as a service to customers
    of RepSec, Inc.  Neither RepSec, Inc., nor any of it's employees, makes
    any warranty, express or implied, or assumes any legal liability or
    responsibility for the accuracy, completeness, or usefulness of any
    information, apparatus, product, or process contained herein, or
    represents that its use would not infringe any privately owned rights.
    Reference herein to any specific commercial products, process, or
    services by trade name, trademark, manufacturer, or otherwise, does not
    necessarily constitute or imply its endorsement, recommendation or
    favoring by RepSec, Inc.  The views and opinions of authors express
    herein do no necessarily state or reflect those of RepSec, Inc., and may
    not be used for advertising or product endorsement purposes.
    
    The material in this alert advisory may be reproduced and distributed,
    without permission, in whole or in part, by other security incident
    response teams (both commercial and non-commercial), provided the above
    copyright is kept intact and due credit is given to RepSec, Inc.
    
    This alert advisory may be reproduced and distributed, without
    permission, in its entirety only, by any person provided such
    reproduction and/or distribution is performed for non-commercial
    purposes and with the intent of increasing the awareness of the Internet
    community.
    
    ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
    
    RepSec, Inc. are trademarks of RepSec, Inc.  All other trademarks are
    property of their respective holders.
    



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