The original advisory [RSI.0010.10-21-98.IRIX.AUTOFSD] was sent to Silicon
Graphics Inc. on Fri, 2 Oct 1998 17:48:43, and detailed a local vulnerability
against the 'autofsd' daemon.
Further testing has revealed that this issue extends to remote attackers
on the Irix platform as well as the AIX platform.
SGI was contacted again on Wed, 11 Nov 1998 18:57:07 and made aware of the
remote vulnerability. Mention of the remote vulnerability has been made in
SGI's security adivsory [19981005-01-PX] as well as IBM's advisory
[ERS-SVA-E01-1998:004.1].
RSI is releasing the following update to disclose further details on the
attack.
RSI.0010a.11-29-98.IRIX.AUTOFSD
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Repent Security Incorporated, RSI
[ http://www.repsec.com ]
*** RSI ALERT ADVISORY ***
--- [CREDIT] --------------------------------------------------------------
Mark Zielinski : Discovered the vulnerability, author of the advisory
--- [SUMMARY] -------------------------------------------------------------
Announced: October 2, 1998
Report code: RSI.0010a.11-29-98.IRIX.AUTOFSD
Report title: IRIX autofsd
Vulnerability: Please see the details section
Vendor status: SGI contacted on October 2, 1998
Patch status: Information on patches is available
Platforms: AIX 4.3, IRIX 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5, 6.5.1
Update: Previous advisory listed this as a local issue. Further
testing indicates this is remotely vulnerable.
Reference: http://www.repsec.com/advisories.html
Impact: If exploited, an attacker could potentially compromise
root access both locally and remotely on your server
NOTE: IRIX versions 5.3, 6.0, and 6.1 were NOT tested by RSI,
however they could be subject to the same vulnerability.
AIX 4.1.x and 4.2.x are NOT vulnerable.
--- [DETAILS] -------------------------------------------------------------
Description: Autofsd is an RPC server which answers file system mount
and umount requests from the autofs file system. It uses
local files or name service maps to locate file systems to
be mounted.
Problem: Remote users can send requests to the autofsd daemon
and execute arbitrary commands as the superuser.
Since the autofsd daemon runs as root on a fixed UDP port,
it becomes very dangerous. This will allow any hacker
to remotely connect straight to the port without having
to ask the portmapper.
It is a common mistake for system administrators to
disable portmapper but forget about the rpc services
running in the background.
Details: Upon receiving a map argument from a client,
the server will attempt to verify if it is executable
or not. If autofsd determines the map has an executable
flag, the server will append the client's key and attempt
to execute it.
By sending a map name that is executable on the server,
and a key beginning with a semicolon or a newline followed
by a command, unprivileged users can execute arbitrary
commands as the superuser.
The problem occurs when the server appends the key
to the map and attempts to execute it by calling
popen.
Since popen executes the map and key you specify by
invoking a shell, it is possible to force it into executing
commands that were not meant to be executed.
--- [THANKS] --------------------------------------------------------------
RSI would like to thank APK for his input on the remote aspect of this
vulnerability.
--- [FIX] -----------------------------------------------------------------
Solution: SGI and IBM have released the following patches:
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches can be
found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectively.
Filename: README.patch.3250
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 07800 10 README.patch.3250
Algorithm #2 (sum): 1865 10 README.patch.3250
MD5 checksum: DC08AA3C9BE672E23BA7B98511A8AE64
Filename: patchSG0003250
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 29714 4 patchSG0003250
Algorithm #2 (sum): 46399 4 patchSG0003250
MD5 checksum: 7CCCD06F9F9287FABB4C1F089540AB65
Filename: patchSG0003250.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 26654 25 patchSG0003250.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 54236 25 patchSG0003250.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 27672AF486D3789560E33AE368C244A1
Filename: patchSG0003250.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 29537 3 patchSG0003250.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 19316 3 patchSG0003250.idb
MD5 checksum: C8380CE292B058545E101A9C80F0EFC5
Filename: patchSG0003250.nfs_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 15127 26 patchSG0003250.nfs_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 4624 26 patchSG0003250.nfs_man
MD5 checksum: 03DBA9D1E4F287CE4282172355849234
Filename: patchSG0003250.nfs_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 45181 141 patchSG0003250.nfs_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 56554 141 patchSG0003250.nfs_sw
MD5 checksum: C52C4A858EB87C788DB53D6DDC37E9CC
Filename: README.patch.3391
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 63933 11 README.patch.3391
Algorithm #2 (sum): 22537 11 README.patch.3391
MD5 checksum: 768EB3E6B5797DF1D7DB4506FDBCD1F0
Filename: patchSG0003391
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 00828 5 patchSG0003391
Algorithm #2 (sum): 19000 5 patchSG0003391
MD5 checksum: 8BDF1FE22C2E52B93BD3A2D1199F7A0A
Filename: patchSG0003391.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 30886 31 patchSG0003391.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 45572 31 patchSG0003391.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: CAB0A7DDCB89BD2547DA9A8A033A6BF3
Filename: patchSG0003391.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 49029 2 patchSG0003391.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 4863 2 patchSG0003391.idb
MD5 checksum: 58A03CEE1B17FAFCDBFBA27D8C5A5BA9
Filename: patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 54375 6 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 55561 6 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_man
MD5 checksum: C884D4375D6B96502628ABC2253E5CB0
Filename: patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10211 129 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 11471 129 patchSG0003391.onc3_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 27714AED52EF96FAF1691760BF05E5C3
Filename: README.patch.3392
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 31068 12 README.patch.3392
Algorithm #2 (sum): 10078 12 README.patch.3392
MD5 checksum: B120B48BD7DF8D681BC9A27FD01C65D0
Filename: patchSG0003392
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 19916 6 patchSG0003392
Algorithm #2 (sum): 7998 6 patchSG0003392
MD5 checksum: 091E12D3B0EC7462CBFAD9BAA37AC7AE
Filename: patchSG0003392.eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 41641 23 patchSG0003392.eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 61503 23 patchSG0003392.eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 0884FA51E7569BD1BD2B39D324322B87
Filename: patchSG0003392.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 33117 2 patchSG0003392.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 8644 2 patchSG0003392.idb
MD5 checksum: 54918E34BF30280A91F2731E328791AC
Filename: patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 63737 6 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 55562 6 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_man
MD5 checksum: 041653A0488E9B543ACD105CC4F20CF3
Filename: patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 42469 137 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 22631 137 patchSG0003392.onc3_eoe_sw
MD5 checksum: 1F61453E0E31C8117A2AA03C0F2662D6
IBM is working on the following fixes which will be available soon.
AIX 4.1.x: not vulnerable
AIX 4.2.x: not vulnerable
AIX 4.3.x: IX83752
A temporary fix is available via anonymous ftp from:
ftp://aix.software.ibm.com/aix/efixes/security/automountd.tar.Z
Filename sum md5
==================================================================
autofs.ext 26103 117 4afedf8fbe411e8be2588fa8843211ae
automountd 16386 83 eb4c2e1c4cfe609b2ecba0c6a704640c
---------------------------------------------------------------------------
Repent Security Incorporated (RSI)
13610 N. Scottsdale Rd.
Suite #10-326
Scottsdale, AZ 85254
E-Mail: adviseat_private
FTP: ftp://ftp.repsec.com
WWW: http://www.repsec.com
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Copyright December 1998 RepSec, Inc.
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