D. J. Bernstein wrote: > Certainly setuid programs require a great deal of care. They've been > involved in many security disasters, though far fewer than (for example) > world-writable directories. The security community would love to see > another portable IPC mechanism offering guaranteed user identification. > (I suggest that kernels add a getpeeruid() system call, showing the real > uid that called connect(), for UNIX-domain sockets and for loopback TCP > sockets.) However, while we're waiting, we need a few setuid programs. What's wrong with the LOCAL_CREDS option on UNIX domain sockets? Cheers, Ben. -- Ben Laurie |Phone: +44 (181) 735 0686| Apache Group member Freelance Consultant |Fax: +44 (181) 735 0689|http://www.apache.org/ and Technical Director|Email: benat_private | A.L. Digital Ltd, |Apache-SSL author http://www.apache-ssl.org/ London, England. |"Apache: TDG" http://www.ora.com/catalog/apache/
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