Update on Cisco IOS 12.0 security bug

From: John Bashinski (jbashat_private)
Date: Tue Dec 22 1998 - 13:39:30 PST

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    This is an update for a message I sent about 5 hours ago.
    
    Changes from the earlier message:
    
      1. We've found more affected versions. In addition to all 12.0 variants,
         11.3AA and 11.3DB are affected. Plain old 11.3 is *not* affected.
         Neither is, 11.3T, or any of the other 11.3 variants we've
         looked at. We now know where the bug was introduced, and it's
         unlikely that that code has made its way into any releases other
         than 11.3AA, 11.3DB, and the 12.0 variants. When our Sydney office
         wakes up, we'll be able to make some final checks.
    
      2. I left out the bug ID in the last message. It's CSCdk77426.
    
      3. The workaround text mentions broadcast addresses.
    
    We still don't have fix dates; it can take some time to get fixes
    through the release process. When we have fix dates, we'll do
    a formal notice.
    
    Amended message follows--
    
    We've had a report of nmap UDP scans crashing Cisco routers running
    Cisco IOS software version 12.0. This was mentioned on BUGTRAQ, which
    has a very wide distribution. It would be very easy to exploit.
    Administrators should be on the lookout for potential exploitation of
    this bug.
    
    We've verified that the problem does exist. We believe that it affects
    all Cisco routers running any variant of 12.0 (including 12.0T, 12.0S,
    etc.). 11.3AA and 11.3DB are also affected. Mainline 11.3 and 11.3T are
    not affected. None of the other 11.3 variants that we've checked are
    affected. Because of where the problem was introduced, we think that
    11.3AA and 11.3DB are almost certainly the only affected 11.3
    variants. We will continue to check other 11.3 variants, and will issue
    another update if any turn up affected.
    
    The problem appears to be caused by packets sent to the router's syslog
    port (UDP port 514). A tested workaround is to use an access list to
    block incoming syslog traffic. You'd do this with something like this:
    
        ! Deny all multicasts to port 514
        access-list 101 deny udp any 224.0.0.0 31.255.255.255 eq 514
        ! Deny old-style broadcasts
        access-list 101 deny udp any host 0.0.0.0 eq 514
        ! Deny network-specific broadcasts (*example*; depends on local netmasks)
        access-list 101 deny udp any 192.31.7.255 eq 514
        ! Deny router's own addresses
        access-list 101 deny udp any host <router-addr-1> eq 514
        access-list 101 deny udp any host <router-addr-2> eq 514
        access-list 101 deny udp any host <router-addr-3> eq 514
        ... etc ...
        access-list 101 permit ip any any
    
        interface <interface-1>
        ip access-group 101 in
    
        interface <interface-2>
        ip access-group 101 in
    
        ... etc ...
    
    The access list needs to block syslog traffic destined for any of the
    router's own IP addresses, or for any broadcast or multicast address on
    which the router may be listening. Don't forget to block all-zeroes
    broadcasts as well as all-ones broadcasts. It should be applied on
    all interfaces running IP, including virtual interfaces and
    subinterfaces (but not loopback interfaces).
    
    This workaround *does* have a performance impact that may be significant
    for some users. The impact isn't usually extreme, but it may make a
    difference on a router that's already heavily loaded. Install it with
    care if you install it.
    
    This bug may cause different router platforms to crash differently.
    Some routers have been observed to reboot and claim that they
    were "restarted by power-on"; you won't necessarily get a stack
    trace from one of these crashes.
    
    Since this is still not completely characterized, and since we do not
    yet have any reports of exploitation, you may choose to hold the
    workaround in reserve and apply it only if you believe you are being
    attacked. We should have a formal notice with full details within the
    next few days. We cannot yet make any estimate of when a fix will be
    available; we should have more information by the time the formal notice
    comes out.
    
    If you find that you are actually attacked with this, please report
    the attack to Cisco at "security-alertat_private".
    
    For more information on Cisco security procedures, see
    
       http://www.cisco.com/warp/customer/791/sec_incident_response.shtml
    
                                            -- J. Bashinski
                                               Cisco Systems
    
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