ACC's 'Tigris' Access Terminal server security vunerability..

From: Robert Thomas (robat_private)
Date: Sat Jan 02 1999 - 05:55:22 PST

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    ACC (link - http://www.acc.com ) have been aware of this flaw for 3 months
    now, so I'm not springing this on them unaware. Just so you know 8-)
    
    OS Versions up to (and including) 10.5.8 are vunerable to a 'lame-arsed
    coding' bug, which lets you display a (slightly censored) dump of the
    configuration, as well as letting you run -any- non-priviledeged command (==
    anything but changing the configuration) including the ability to telnet from
    the machine, ping other machines (bypassing firewalls, perhaps?), and
    basically letting people know what you don't really want them to know.
    
    After having a quick fiddle, I'm (guessing) that the login sequence runs like
    this:
    
    Print the string "Login:"
    Stick the string 'login ' into the input buffer, and wait for user to type
    either 'netman' or 'public', resulting in the command 'login netman' or 'login
    public' being sent to the OS, which will then prompt for a password.  This
    gives you the ability to do the really difficult thing of pushing backspace
    several times, or, hitting ^U (delete to beginning of line) and running any of
    the commands (like, for example, 'show' which will dump the running
    configuration, with any passwords *'ed out) that can be accessed by the
    'public' account.
    
    This includes:
      Dialin Numbers
      RADIUS Authentication/Accounting servers (minus passwords)
      OS Version
      IP Ranges
      BGP/RIP/OSPF filtering information
    
    Another problem that I've found is that the machines have an undocumented
    (that I could find) 'public' account, with a default password of 'public',
    which gives you the same information as you get with the ^U bug. The first
    time I found that out is in the email message sent from XSI (included below)
    
    To give both sides of the story, I hereby present an email message that I
    received from XSI (who are the Australian Distributors for the Tigris Access
    Server) in responce to a vague message from me on the Australian ISP list
    saying that I'd found a bug in the terminal server, and they should contact
    XSI for information on how to fix it.
    
    
    --snip--
    Subject: Re: [Oz-ISP] Supposed Security Flaw
      Date:  Thu, 10 Dec 1998 08:47:20 +0000
      From:  "Nathan Chan" <chanat_private>
        To:  tigris-listat_private
        CC:  robat_private
    
    
    G'Day Guys,
    
    You may have recently seen a article in the Ausie ISP List saying
    that the Tigris has a security flaw.  This isn't the case.
    
    Basically you can press Cntl U at the prompt and then type a command.
    eg show.   However it is NOT a security flaw since if you can get to
    the login prompt of the Tigris  you would get exactly the same thing
    if you logged in as username : Public, password : Public, which would
    a lot easier to work out than pressing Cntl U and anyone can do
    this!!
    
    Simply adding Access entries can easily stop anybody from Telneting
    to your box, and should be done on everyone's box anyway !  No-one
    other than management staff should be able to access the
    Tigris....1st rule of network protection.
    
    If someone can get to you prompt, Cntl U is the LEAST of your
    worries, since they can't do anything still  :)
    
    Anyway, they are fixing this.
    
    Any questions let me know.
    
    Regards
    Nathan
    --snip--
    
    I responded to this pointing out that that would not work if someone dialled
    into the terminal server, and sent source routed data to the terminal server,
    as (AFAIK, and I can find no docco on it either) you cannot explicitly block
    source routed data, and you are going through no firewall to get to the
    device.  No responce as yet (sent on 12th October, 1998).
    
    Now, let me point out, I -like- the box.  Whilst it's harder to configure than
    the Annex/Versalar Bay series of products (which just work 8-), it reliably
    holds 56k connections, seems very stable, and is considerably cheaper than the
    comparable 5399/8000 series from Bay. Apart from a few 'lame-arsed coding'
    bugs, it's a good box, and I've recommended it more than a few times.
    
    I honestly wouldn't be so worried if it didn't show the RADIUS servers, and
    the dialin numbers, as they are usually things you don't want every user to
    know. Whilst this is (obviously) security through obscurity, seeing packets
    wander around your network whilst x-lam3-haxx0r tries to locate your radius
    servers will give you a good tipoff that someone is up to no good, rather than
    just having a radius DoS flood sent to your server(s) without any warning
    because their location was handed to them on a silver platter.
    
    Anyway guys, hope you all have a good new year, and you've got your hourly
    rates set to quadruple for Y2K work!
    
    --Robert Thomas
    RP Internet Services
    "Will Geek for bandwidth. Don't care about food."
    
    [Note: I'm Australian. It's Arse, not Ass. An ass is a donkey 8-)]
    



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