Re: Wiping out setuid programs

From: Neale Banks (nealeat_private)
Date: Mon Jan 11 1999 - 04:19:30 PST

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    On Sat, 9 Jan 1999, D. J. Bernstein wrote:
    
    [big snip]
    > My favorite workaround is to make the binary unreadable; I haven't found
    > any vendors silly enough to allow tracing here. Note that this prohibits
    > root-squashed NFS mounting for root-owned binaries.
    
    You are proposing that some significant security is obtained by making an
    executable file unreadable?
    
    I thought this one was laid to rest last year in the "Dump a mode
    --x--x--x binary on Linux 2.0.x" thread, wherein Martin Mares summarised:
    
    > Semantics of unreadable files is well-defined at file level (i.e.,
    > it's defined you cannot read() them), but not at any other level. No
    > standard guarantees you that contents of such binaries are not
    > accessible in any other way
    
    Regards,
    Neale.
    



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