Re: Tracing by uid u after root does setuid(u)

From: Casper Dik (casperat_private)
Date: Wed Jan 13 1999 - 12:55:39 PST

  • Next message: Gene Spafford: "Re: Tracing by uid u after root does setuid(u)"

    >Perhaps the Sun kernel developers aren't aware that it's bad to allow
    >tracing after a program changes uid, but obviously they are aware that
    >it's bad to allow tracing of an unreadable program. In fact, the /proc
    >documentation identifies this as a security measure.
    
    
    This has long been fixed in Solaris.  (I think it was fixed before
    2.6 was released; there's a patch for Solaris 2.5.1 also)
    
    Since the patch, programs that are set-uid, call set*uid or set*gid cannot
    be traced and cannot dump core.  (Which upset yet another batch of
    customers so there's an option in Solaris 7 to make set-uid programs
    dump core if the kernel is so configured)
    
    
    (Oh, and Dan Bernstein wins the useless use of lseek award; dd can seek fine)
    
    Casper
    



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