Win95/98 SMB Authentication Vulnerability (fwd)

From: tschweikat_private
Date: Mon Jan 18 1999 - 08:30:53 PST

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    Does anyone have information about such bugs/features mentioned below
    regarding IBM LAN-Server? I would appreciate any answer!
    
    regards
    Thomas Schweikle <tschweikat_private>
    
    
    
                              L0pht Security Advisory
    
                           Advisory released Jan. 5, 1999
                 Application: Windows 95/98 Network File Sharing
                  Severity: Sniffed authentications can be used
                           to impersonate network users
    
                             Author: weldat_private
    
                       http://www.l0pht.com/advisories.html
    
    
    
    Overview :
    
      Windows 95/98 network file sharing reuses the cryptographic challenges
      used in SMB challenge/response authentication.  The reuse of the
      challenge enables an attacker, who has captured a legitimate
      network authentication, to replay the authentication and establish
      a connection impersonating a valid user.
    
    Description :
    
      During testing of the L0phtCrack 2.5 SMB packet capture tool to capture
      SMB challenge/response authentication, it became apparent to the
      L0phtCrack development team that Windows 95/98 issues the exact same
      challenge for each authentication for a period of approximately 15
      minutes.  During this time an attacker can connect to a network share
      as the user whose authentication was captured.
    
      The attacker can connect to the Win95/98 share as that user because the
      user name is transmitted in the clear as well as the challenge.
      Although the attacker does not know the user's password and therefore
      cannot generate the encrypted password hash from it, the attacker does
      not have to.  She merely replays the encrypted hash that she captured.
      It will be correct because the challenge hasn't changed and she is
      impersonating that particular user.
    
      Reusing a challenge is a classic cryptographic mistake.  If the
      challenge was simply incremented this attack would not be possible.
    
    Details :
    
      The following captures are in L0phtCrack 2.5 capture format specified
      as:
    
    DOMAIN\username:3:challenge:encrypted LANMAN hash:encrypted NTLM hash
    
      The following 2 captures show an NT machine connecting to another NT
      machine. The challenge is different, as it should be, for each
      authentication.
    
    DOMAIN\user:3:c21ee5e0c1a8ae89:626cc3ec9f8f1849bbd645541477be48bf261b486
    9c36e7a:f9dfdb9ee9d1705a4fd45a0ed5f2c62e0c7a957860a59559
    
    DOMAIN\user:3:ce16b6d32eee2e29:8f96e377f2b9670fa425c4e52ae4ae6ae3e23f693
    d518719:d9a3180ce6e30f8a12d46703847147b70066dbaf9a5b654e
    
      The following 2 captures show an NT machine connecting to a Win98
      machine.  Notice that the same challenge is issued each time.
    
    DOMAIN\user:3:8f2eceae79b55000:43caa3ff5c793d04bbbe2332e8918bf80735b0100
    89dc573:1c592e5dcf78cf658829d0cbe61c0e4c32b5ed7a87f5097e
    
    DOMAIN\user:3:8f2eceae79b55000:43caa3ff5c793d04bbbe2332e8918bf80735b0100
    89dc573:1c592e5dcf78cf658829d0cbe61c0e4c32b5ed7a87f5097e
    
      This capture is another NT machine connecting to the same Win98
      machine used above. Notice this is the same challenge as in the
      previous 2 authentications.
    
    DOMAIN\user:3:8f2eceae79b55000:43caa3ff5c793d04bbbe2332e8918bf80735b0100
    89dc573:1c592e5dcf78cf658829d0cbe61c0e4c32b5ed7a87f5097e
    
      As you can see from the last 3 captures, if the username and challenge
      are the same then the encrypted hashes sent are the same.
    
    Implementation :
    
      An attacker could modify the unix Samba client to alter the way it
      issues encrypted password hashes.  It could be modified to send
      a fixed encrypted password hash as entered by the attacker instead
      of generating it based on a password and the challenge.  In this way
      the attacker could feed the output of an SMB packet capture into
      a modified Samba client to make Win95/98 file share connections from
      her machine.
    
      Once these connections are made, interesting files could be read from
      or written to the Win95/98 machines.  Files that could be written
      include those in the Windows Startup folder which would enable
      programs to install themselves to automatically execute on system
      startup.
    
    Conclusion :
    
      This vulnerability comes at a time when many in the security
      community are waking up to the fact that a Win95/98/NT specific virus
      could spread rapidily by taking advantage of flaws in network
      authentication.  The recent "Remote Explorer" virus did not take
      advantage in flaws in network authentication.  It took advantage
      of poor Domain Administrator practice.
    
      Some day a virus will take advantage of flaws such as the
      aforementioned Win95/98 network impersonation or perhaps the cracking
      of network authentication that L0phtCrack 2.5 performs so
      effortlessly.  Weak network security implementation and weak passwords
      will be the culprits. L0phtCrack is designed to help defeat the
      latter.
    ...
    



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