ISSalert: ISS Security Advisory: Vulnerability in the BackWeb

From: aleph1at_private
Date: Tue Jan 19 1999 - 10:07:11 PST

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    ISS Security Advisory
    January 18, 1999
    
    Vulnerability in the BackWeb Polite Agent Protocol
    
    
    Synopsis:
    
    Internet Security Systems (ISS) X-Force discovered a vulnerability in the
    BackWeb Technologies (http://www.backweb.com/home.html) BackWeb Polite
    Agent Protocol that allows a user on a local network on which BackWeb
    clients operate to spoof a BackWeb server.  Hardware and software vendors
    often include BackWeb software in their distribution to facilitate remote
    distribution of software updates.
    
    
    Affected versions:
    
    ISS X-Force has confirmed that this vulnerability exists on all versions
    of the BackWeb client using the Polite Agent Protocol for communication
    with BackWeb servers.
    
    
    Fix Information:
    
    Until a suitable security mechanism is made available by the vendor, ISS
    recommends upgrading to BackWeb 5.0, which supports VeriSign digital
    certificates for enhanced security.
    
    
    Description:
    
    The BackWeb Polite Agent Protocol is a UDP-based protocol that BackWeb
    clients use to communicate with BackWeb servers. BackWeb's "anti-spoofing
    mechanism" for delivery of UDP data to the client and server is the
    exchange of a 32-bit integer, randomly generated by the client each time
    it requests data from the server. This integer is appended to each packet
    of a specific piece of BackWeb data (InfoPak). By examining these packets
    in transport, an attacker may send false data to a BackWeb client, acting
    as the real BackWeb server.
    
    
    Exploit Information:
    
    BackWeb uses a sequencing method to maintain packet data integrity. Any
    attacker who can examine a local network can determine the 32-bit integer
    and sequence numbers. A race condition exists where the attacker may
    deliver a false response to the client 'match request,' which is the
    first packet delivered by the client to determine whether or not the
    server should send data to it. If this spoofed response reaches the
    client before the real BackWeb server responds, the attacker may
    continuously write realistic-looking BackWeb packets to the network in
    response to the client request. These packets may direct the client to
    update files on its drive, execute programs, or display messages on the
    client screen. While client security settings may not be changed, other
    client settings such as displayed data may be changed. Depending on the
    client security settings, an attacker may send executable files to be
    executed on the client machine. By default, BackWeb's security settings
    disable automatic execution of downloaded files. BackWeb strongly
    recommends that customers do not enable automatic execution of downloaded
    files when using software prior to version 5.0 unless other security
    mechanisms are implemented separate from the BackWeb system. Customers
    using BackWeb client version 5.0 and above can enable automatic execution
    of files that will only automatically execute a file after verifying that
    the file is digitally signed and that the signing certificate is
    approved.
    
    __________
    
    Copyright (c) 1999 by Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    
    Permission is hereby granted for the redistribution of this alert
    electronically.  It is not to be edited in any way without express
    consent of X-Force.  If you wish to reprint the whole or any part of this
    alert in any other medium excluding electronic medium, please e-mail
    xforceat_private for permission.
    
    Disclaimer:
    
    The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
    information constitutes acceptance for use in an AS IS condition. There
    are NO warranties with regard to this information. In no event shall the
    author be liable for any damages whatsoever arising out of or in
    connection with the use or spread of this information. Any use of this
    information is at the user's own risk.
    
    X-Force PGP Key available at: http://www.iss.net/xforce/sensitive.html,
    as well as on MIT's PGP key server and PGP.com's key server.
    
    X-Force Vulnerability and Threat Database: http://www.iss.net/xforce
    
    Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to: X-Force
    <xforceat_private> of Internet Security Systems, Inc.
    
    
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