Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-004)

From: aleph1at_private
Date: Mon Feb 08 1999 - 17:36:41 PST

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    The following is a Security  Bulletin from the Microsoft Product Security
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                        ********************************
    
    Microsoft Security Bulletin (MS99-004)
    --------------------------------------
    
    Patch Available for Authentication Processing Error in Windows NT (r) 4.0
    Service Pack 4
    
    Originally Posted: February 8, 1999
    
    Summary
    =======
    Microsoft has released a patch that eliminates a logic error in Service Pack
    4 for Windows NT 4.0 that could, under certain conditions, allow a user to
    log on interactively and connect to network shares using a blank password.
    The vulnerability primarily, but not exclusively, affects Windows NT servers
    that serve as domain controllers in environments with DOS, Windows 3.1,
    Windows for Workgroups, OS/2 or Macintosh clients. In general, customers who
    have deployed only Windows NT, Windows 95 and Windows 98 client workstations
    are not at risk from this vulnerability.
    
    A fully supported patch is available for this vulnerability, and Microsoft
    recommends that all customers evaluate the risk to their systems and, as
    appropriate, download and install it on affected computers.
    
    Issue
    =====
    The Windows NT Security Account Manager (SAM) database stores the hashed
    password for each user account in two forms: an "NT hash" form that is used
    to authenticate users on Windows NT clients, and an "LM hash" form that is
    used to authenticate users on Windows 95, Windows 98, and downlevel clients
    such as DOS, Windows 3.1, Windows for Workgroups, OS/2 and Macintosh. When a
    user changes his password via a Windows NT, Windows 95 or Windows 98 client,
    both the "NT hash" and "LM hash" forms of the password are updated in the
    SAM. However, when the user changes his password via a downlevel client,
    only the "LM hash" form of the password is stored; a null value is stored in
    the "NT hash" field. This is normal operation.
    
    When a user attempts an interactive logon or a network share connection from
    a Windows NT system, the Windows NT authentication process uses the "NT
    hash" form of the password. If the "NT hash" is null, the "LM hash" of the
    password is used for verification. (Windows 95, Windows 98 and downlevel
    clients always use only the "LM hash" for verification.) The logic error in
    Service Pack 4 incorrectly allows a null "NT hash" value to be used for
    authentication from Windows NT systems. The result is that if a user
    account's password was last changed from a DOS, Windows 3.1, Windows for
    Workgroups, OS/2 or Macintosh client, a user can logon into that account
    from a Windows NT system using a blank password.
    
    By far the most likely machines to be affected by this vulnerability would
    be domain controllers running Windows NT 4.0 SP 4, in networks that contain
    any of the downlevel clients listed above. However, any server or
    workstation running Windows NT 4.0 SP 4 that contains a SAM database with
    active users who communicate from downlevel clients would be vulnerable to
    this problem. For example, a workgroup of Windows NT 4.0 SP 4 systems, one
    of which is accessed by Windows for Workgroups clients, would be affected by
    this vulnerability.
    
    It is worth reiterating the following points:
     - Even on an affected network, a user whose most recent
       password change was performed via Windows NT, Windows 95
       or Windows 98 workstations will have a non-null "NT hash"
       value, and hence will not be at risk.
     - Customers who are affected by the vulnerability need only
       apply the patch to machines that contain SAM databases
       with active user accounts.
     - There is no need for users to update or change their passwords
       after applying the patch. Even in vulnerable systems, the SAM
       database entries are valid; the problem lies in the way SP4
       processes them. The patch corrects the authentication process
       logic in SP4 without changing the SAM database entries in any way.
    
    Affected Software Versions
    ==========================
    The following software versions are affected:
     - Microsoft Windows NT 4.0, Service Pack 4
    
    What Microsoft is Doing
    =======================
    On February 8th, Microsoft released a patch that fixes the problem
    identified above. This patch is available for download from the sites listed
    below.
    
    Microsoft has sent this security bulletin to customers subscribing
    to the Microsoft Product Security Notification Service (see
    http://www.microsoft.com/security/services/bulletin.asp for more
    information about this free customer service).
    
    Microsoft has published the following Knowledge Base (KB) article on this
    issue:
     - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q214840,
       MSV1_0 Incorrectly Allows Network Connections for Specific Accounts
       http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q214/8/40.asp
       (Note: It might take 24 hours from the original posting of this
       bulletin for the KB article to be visible in the Web-based
       Knowledge Base.)
    
    Microsoft has posted the following hot fixes to address this problem.
    Please note that the URLs below have been word-wrapped for readability.
     - Fix for x86 version:
       ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/winnt-public
       /fixes/usa/NT40/hotfixes-postSP4/Msv1-fix/msv-fixi.exe
     - Fix for Alpha version:
       ftp://ftp.microsoft.com/bussys/winnt/winnt-public
       /fixes/usa/NT40/hotfixes-postSP4/Msv1-fix/msv-fixa.exe
    
    What Customers Should Do
    ========================
    The patch for this vulnerability is fully supported, and Microsoft
    recommends that all affected customers apply it. The URLs for the patch are
    provided above in What Microsoft is Doing.
    
    More Information
    ================
    Please see the following references for more information related to this
    issue.
     - Microsoft Security Bulletin MS99-004,
       Patch Available for Authentication Processing
       Error in Windows NT 4.0 Service Pack 4 (the
       Web-posted version of this bulletin),
       http://www.microsoft.com/security/bulletins/ms99-004.asp.
     - Microsoft Knowledge Base (KB) article Q214840,
       MSV1_0 Incorrectly Allows Network Connections for
       Specific Accounts.
       http://support.microsoft.com/support/kb/articles/q214/8/40.asp
       (Note: It might take 24 hours from the original posting
       of this bulletin for the KB article to be visible in the
       Web-based Knowledge Base.)
    
    Acknowledgements
    ================
    Microsoft wishes to acknowledge Harry Johnston, School of Computing and
    Mathematical Sciences, University of Waikato, New Zealand, for discovering
    this vulnerability and reporting it to us.
    
    Obtaining Support on this Issue
    ===============================
    This is a supported patch. If you have problems installing
    this patch or require technical assistance with this patch,
    please contact Microsoft Technical Support. For information
    on contacting Microsoft Technical Support, please see
    http://support.microsoft.com/support/contact/default.asp.
    
    Revisions
    =========
     - February 8, 1999: Bulletin Created
    
    For additional security-related information about Microsoft
    products, please visit http://www.microsoft.com/security
    
    -----------------------------------------------------------
    
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    (c) 1999 Microsoft Corporation. All rights reserved. Terms of Use.
    
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