Re: ISS Internet Scanner Cannot be relied upon for conclusive

From: Ryan Russell (Ryan.Russellat_private)
Date: Mon Feb 08 1999 - 10:42:48 PST

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    There's a pivotal question with remote security scanners:
    
    Should they go ahead and exercise a hole to see if it's there.
    
    I've got no interest in starting a debate on this subject, but
    it's essentially what the issue is with the router check.
    
    ISS seems to only be willing to try a hole if it's non-disruptive.
    For example, it will test for a rdist hole by attempting to create
    a file in /tmp.
    
    In the abscence of other information (i.e. SNMP access, or logging
    in to do a sho ver) the only way to check for that particular router bug
    is to try it.  As you know, the main result of that bug is crashing the
    router.
    (Presumably, there's a buffer overflow that might let code be pushed
    on, but I don't think that could be done reliably by an automated
    scanner given all the Cisco architectures it might run across.)
    
    So, I assume that ISS is trying to determine vulnerablity without crashing
    your router.  ISS could give the advanced user the option of trying to
    crash the router, and then ping it to infer if it's vulnerable.  That
    option
    could be appropriate in a penetration test.  In an environment where
    one is trying to use the tool to keep on top of patch levels for internal
    systems, you might consider giving the IS scanner a read-only SNMP
    string.  The latter option is certainly not terribly secure, but no less so
    than any other SNMP use.
    
                             Ryan
    



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