FW: FW: URGENT!!!! FW: NetApp Filer software versions 5.x: poten

From: Madison, Shannon (shannon.madisonat_private)
Date: Fri Feb 12 1999 - 11:31:11 PST

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    Forwarded per Radek:
    
    -----Original Message-----
    From: Radek Aster
    Sent: Friday, February 12, 1999 11:20 AM
    Subject: Re: FW: URGENT!!!! FW: NetApp Filer software versions 5.x:
    potential har dware killer (fwd)
    
    
    
    IMHO, this is a pile. Jason makes the statement that he can create a file
    (of the appropriate size), fill it will garbage, and download it to disk
    drives which will then become bricks.
    
    Geez. How stupid does he think Seagate is? Don't answer that. :-)
    
    Seriously, the firmware files have checksums embedded in them. As part of
    the update process, the drive will verify the checksum before committing
    the firmware to flash. If the checksum doesn't verify, the update is
    cancelled. No harm, no foul. Pretty SOP with firmware downloads. Heck, one
    could make the same "security" argument with any hardware component with
    downloadable firmware. Why pick on drives?
    
    Granted, he *could* get his hands on unqualified and/or bad firmware and
    download it to the drives .... is this enough to cry "the sky is falling"?
    
    If this is seem as a serious enough "security issue", we can always ship
    *encrypted* files, and decrypt them ourselves before downloading, thereby
    verifying the contents and identity of files we ship.
    
    --Radek
    
    Jason Downs downsjat_private <mailto:downsjat_private> writes:
    
    Jason> 		I was going through the documentation for version 5.2.1
    Jason> (the latest) of the Network Appliance Filer operating system when I
    Jason> stumbled upon this little gem: "Use the disk_fw_update command to
    Jason> update out-of-date firmware on all disks or a specified disk on a
    Jason> filer. Each filer is shipped with a /etc/disk_fw directory that
    Jason> contains the latest firmware revisions."
    
    Jason> 		[...]
    
    Jason> 		"In the /etc/disk_fw directory, the firmware file name is
    Jason> in the form of product_ID.revision.LOD. For example, if the firmware
    Jason> file is for Seagate disks with product ID ST19171FC and the firmware
    Jason> revision is FB37, the file name is ST19171FC.FB37.LOD. The revision
    Jason> in the file name is the number against which the filer compares each
    Jason> disk's existing firmware revision."
    
    Jason> 		[...]
    
    Jason> 		"Before Data ONTAP 5.2, the disk_fw_update command copied
    Jason> firmware files from the /etc directory. In the /etc directory, the
    Jason> name for the firmware file was in the form of product_ID.LOD. The
    Jason> revision number was not included in the file name. Data ONTAP 5.2
    Jason> continues to support firmware files in the /etc directory for
    Jason> backward compatibility. That is, if you obtain a disk firmware file
    Jason> and store it in the /etc directory, you can use the disk_fw_update
    Jason> command to copy that firmware file to disks, unless there is also a
    Jason> firmware file for the same product ID in the /etc/disk_fw directory.
    Jason> The files in the /etc/disk_fw directory take precedence over the
    Jason> files in the /etc directory."
    
    Jason> 		[...]
    
    
    Jason> 		Filer's typically have an "admin host" which can mount and
    Jason> read/write to the filer root directory.  Without it, it's impossible
    Jason> to do any sort of system maintenance on the filer.  If this host is
    Jason> compromised it's obviously bad news for the filer.  But now,
    Jason> apparently new with the 5.x revisions of the filer operating system,
    Jason> a malicious individual can likely destroy the disk drive hardware
    Jason> itself.  It is not known if any sort of sanity check is done on the
    Jason> contents of the firmware files; it's likely there is none,
    Jason> considering the type of code they contain.  Of course, it is trivial
    Jason> to gain command line access to a filer once the admin host is
    Jason> compromised.  They use what amounts to /etc/hosts.equiv for rsh
    Jason> access.  It has always been important to make sure the "admin host"
    Jason> of a filer is secure.  Now it seems Network Appliance has just
    Jason> raised the stakes; not only can you lose your data, but you can also
    Jason> potentially lose hundreds of thousands of dollars worth of hardware.
    
    Jason> 		-- Jason Downs downsjat_private <mailto:downsjat_private>
    



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