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______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Advisory
Title: Vulnerability in ToolTalk RPC Service
Title: NAI-29, CERT CA-98.11
Number: 19981101-01-PX
Date: February 19, 1999
______________________________________________________________________________
Silicon Graphics provides this information freely to the SGI user community
for its consideration, interpretation, implementation and use. Silicon
Graphics recommends that this information be acted upon as soon as possible.
Silicon Graphics provides the information in this Security Advisory on
an "AS-IS" basis only, and disclaims all warranties with respect thereto,
express, implied or otherwise, including, without limitation, any warranty
of merchantability or fitness for a particular purpose. In no event shall
Silicon Graphics be liable for any loss of profits, loss of business, loss
of data or for any indirect, special, exemplary, incidental or consequential
damages of any kind arising from your use of, failure to use or improper
use of any of the instructions or information in this Security Advisory.
______________________________________________________________________________
- -----------------------
- --- Issue Specifics ---
- -----------------------
The rpc.ttdbserverd(8) service is an RPC based daemon which is called to
service requests for the ToolTalk databases stored on the host.
Unfortunately, a vulnerability in the rpc.ttdbserverd(8) daemon has been
discovered which can lead to a root compromise of the system.
Silicon Graphics Inc. has investigated the issue and recommends the
following steps for neutralizing the exposure. It is HIGHLY RECOMMENDED
that these measures be implemented on ALL vulnerable SGI systems.
This issue has been corrected in future releases of IRIX.
- --------------
- --- Impact ---
- --------------
The rpc.ttdbserverd(8) daemon is installed by default on IRIX. ???
A local user account is not needed to exploit the rpc.ttdbserverd(8) daemon.
The vulnerability can be exploited remotely by using carefully crafted RPC
packets that are sent to the rpc.ttdbserverd(8) daemon.
The exploitable stack overflow vulnerability can lead to a root compromise.
This rpc.ttdbserverd(8) daemon stack overflow vulnerability was reported by
NAI Advisory 29 and CERT Advisory CA-98.11.
This rpc.ttdbserverd(8) daemon vulnerability has been publicly discussed in
Usenet newsgroups and mailing lists.
- --------------------------
- --- Temporary Solution ---
- --------------------------
Although patches are available for this issue, it is realized that
there may be situations where installing the patches immediately may
not be possible.
The steps below can be used to disable the ttdbserverd(8) daemon.
=================
**** WARNING ****
=================
Disabling ttdbserverd(8) daemon will impact and/or disable
applications that use the RPC-based ToolTalk database server.
One such third-party application is the TriTeal CDE product.
1) Become the root user on the system.
% /bin/su -
Password:
#
2) Verify ttdbserverd(8) daemon is enabled.
# rpcinfo -p | grep 100083
100083 1 tcp 1028 ttdbserverd
3) Edit the file /etc/inetd.conf (for IRIX 5.3 and lower,
edit /usr/etc/inetd.conf). Place a "#" as the first
character of the line to comment out and deactivate
the ttdbserverd daemon.
# vi /etc/inetd.conf
{Find the following line}
ttdbserverd/1 stream rpc/tcp wait root \
?/usr/etc/rpc.ttdbserverd rpc.ttdbserverd
{Place a "#" as the first character of the ttdbserverd line}
#ttdbserverd/1 stream rpc/tcp wait root \
?/usr/etc/rpc.ttdbserverd rpc.ttdbserverd
4) Force inetd to re-read the configuration file.
# /etc/killall -HUP inetd
5) Kill any existing ttdbserverd(8) process.
# /etc/killall ttdbserverd
6) Return to previous level.
# exit
%
- ----------------
- --- Solution ---
- ----------------
OS Version Vulnerable? Patch # Other Actions
---------- ----------- ------- -------------
IRIX 3.x unknown Note 1 & 2
IRIX 4.x unknown Note 1 & 2
IRIX 5.0.x-5.2 unknown Note 1 & 2
IRIX 5.3 yes 3510 Note 1 & 2
IRIX 6.0.x unknown Note 1 & 2
IRIX 6.1 unknown Note 1 & 2
IRIX 6.2 yes 3511 Note 2
IRIX 6.3 yes 3511 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.4 yes 3511 Note 2 & 3
IRIX 6.5 yes 3511 Note 2
IRIX 6.5.1 yes 3511 Note 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.2 yes 3511 Note 2 & 4
IRIX 6.5.3 no
NOTES
1) Upgrade to currently supported IRIX operating system.
See http://support.sgi.com/news/irix2.html for more information.
2) See "Temporary Solution" section.
3) This version of the IRIX operating system is in maintenance mode
and patches will no longer be produced when it retires. See
http://support.sgi.com/news/irix1.html for more information.
4) If you have not received an IRIX 6.5.3m CD for IRIX 6.5, contact your
SGI Support Provider or download the IRIX 6.5.3 Maintenance Release
Stream from http://support.sgi.com/ or ftp://support.sgi.com/
Patches are available via anonymous FTP and your service/support provider.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches can be
found in the ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches directories, respectively.
For security and patch management reasons, ftp.sgi.com (mirror of sgigate)
lags behind and does not do a real-time update of ~ftp/security and
~ftp/patches
##### Patch File Checksums ####
The actual patch will be a tar file containing the following files:
Filename: README.patch.3510
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 18621 8 README.patch.3510
Algorithm #2 (sum): 44666 8 README.patch.3510
MD5 checksum: 4B4385225DD2B2EABD7A0C4B60F5009D
Filename: patchSG0003510
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 03265 1 patchSG0003510
Algorithm #2 (sum): 29249 1 patchSG0003510
MD5 checksum: D185F8A457F0BF6B01334861404715B7
Filename: patchSG0003510.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 53417 1 patchSG0003510.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 36974 1 patchSG0003510.idb
MD5 checksum: E4340D6B09805EDB36DC90CF7A4EACE2
Filename: patchSG0003510.sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 36411 344 patchSG0003510.sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 28013 344 patchSG0003510.sw
MD5 checksum: C3F37AF4BCD55BFE2AB14C8235139921
Filename: README.patch.3511
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 37150 8 README.patch.3511
Algorithm #2 (sum): 48409 8 README.patch.3511
MD5 checksum: 582BED4D899C553F5B278348EF519214
Filename: patchSG0003511
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 40672 2 patchSG0003511
Algorithm #2 (sum): 54170 2 patchSG0003511
MD5 checksum: F42EF845B4915F3B76F7CFBCDB946B37
Filename: patchSG0003511.ToolTalk_man
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 10831 6 patchSG0003511.ToolTalk_man
Algorithm #2 (sum): 19356 6 patchSG0003511.ToolTalk_man
MD5 checksum: 0DBCB57A06917234FBA12BE321306801
Filename: patchSG0003511.ToolTalk_sw
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 12043 322 patchSG0003511.ToolTalk_sw
Algorithm #2 (sum): 3866 322 patchSG0003511.ToolTalk_sw
MD5 checksum: AD65C6EDCD13FF99F9D2E6912E8EFE72
Filename: patchSG0003511.idb
Algorithm #1 (sum -r): 55405 1 patchSG0003511.idb
Algorithm #2 (sum): 40096 1 patchSG0003511.idb
MD5 checksum: EF6CD99C919F2207E697F074F6FDF0BD
- ------------------------
- --- Acknowledgments ---
- ------------------------
Silicon Graphics wishes to thank the Network Associates, Inc., CERT
Coordination Center and the users of the Internet Community at large for
their assistance in this matter.
- -----------------------------------------------------------
- --- Silicon Graphics Inc. Security Information/Contacts ---
- -----------------------------------------------------------
If there are questions about this document, email can be sent to
cse-security-alertat_private
------oOo------
Silicon Graphics provides security information and patches for
use by the entire SGI community. This information is freely
available to any person needing the information and is available
via anonymous FTP and the Web.
The primary SGI anonymous FTP site for security information and patches
is sgigate.sgi.com (204.94.209.1). Security information and patches
are located under the directories ~ftp/security and ~ftp/patches,
respectively. The Silicon Graphics Security Headquarters Web page is
accessible at the URL http://www.sgi.com/Support/security/security.html.
For issues with the patches on the FTP sites, email can be sent to
cse-security-alertat_private
For assistance obtaining or working with security patches, please
contact your SGI support provider.
------oOo------
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------oOo------
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------oOo------
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______________________________________________________________________________
This information is provided freely to all interested parties and may
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Graphics is appropriately credited and the document retains and
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