Group kmem exploitable?

From: Oliver Xymoron (oxymoronat_private)
Date: Tue Feb 23 1999 - 11:37:32 PST

  • Next message: Salvatore Sanfilippo: "Re: Preventing remote OS detection"

    With all the back and forth about whether kmem is writable or not, I think
    it might be worth pointing out that with read access to /dev/mem and
    /dev/kmem, it's certainly possible to snoop passwords. Though technically
    challenging, there's no reason you can't parse the process tables,
    etc. to figure out the exact location of the buffer being used to store a
    password as it's being typed. Despite being an asynchronous procedure and
    basically being a huge race, people type their passwords pretty slowly.
    Finding whether a process has libpam mapped and whether or not it's
    currently in the password entry procedure, etc. doesn't take too long..
    
    Convincing root he needs to type his password is a comparatively small
    exercise in social engineering.
    --
     "Love the dolphins," she advised him. "Write by W.A.S.T.E.."
    



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