Malicious code detection and full disclosure

From: Nate Lawson (nateat_private)
Date: Sat Mar 27 1999 - 21:58:17 PST

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    I have been getting a lot of flames and veiled threats from individuals
    and "virus researchers" for posting the code yesterday.  There seems to be
    a lot of misinformation going around so I wanted to clarify the situation.
    These people are all producing the same arguments:
    
    1.  "Posting the source allows someone to know how to write a Macro virus"
    
    Yes, and anyone of the 100,000 or more people who got the virus the other
    day can buy VB and do File->Open and see the source.  Repeat after me:
    "Word macros are INTERPRETED".  All symbol information is present.  No
    decompilation necessary.
    
    2.  "By reformatting the source, you have created a new variant"
    
    What?  Your virus scanner could be thwarted by adding whitespace?  Someone
    has a problem but it isn't me.  Perhaps you'd best learn from the sandbox
    mechanisms of Java or virus scanners like F-PROT.  A virus is not a virus
    because it has the string "By 3le3t3 DudEZ" followed by three tabs.  It is
    a virus because it does things like update Normal.dot.  Repeat after me:
    "Pattern matching alone does not a virus scanner make".  Just as in the
    recent thread about security scanners doing version-checking instead of
    exploiting a hole, the best answer is to use a combination of techniques
    to identify flaws or malicious code and then notify the user of any
    uncertainties in the detection mechanism.
    
    A perfect parallel to this is the Internet worm.  We were reminded of that
    time as we paused the Exchange SMTP service to keep the program from
    spreading.  Also, it was important to quickly analyze the program, making
    sure it did nothing malicious like mailing a person's files to another
    location.  After doing this, I believed the code itself would help others
    do the same if they needed to.  An important note is that the Symantec and
    McAfee web pages describing the virus both left out important information
    (for instance, avertlabs.com neglected to mention the active document and
    Normal.dot file infection).  If I had made any mistakes in my analysis,
    another could have determined this for himself.
    
    A good reference is the paper "With Microscope and Tweezers, An Analysis
    of the Internet Worm" by Mark Eichin and Jon Rochlis.  It can be found at:
    
        http://www.mit.edu:8001/people/eichin/www/virus/main.html
    
    In short, this is the same full disclosure vs. security through obscurity
    debate.  Make your own decision what is appropriate; my mind has been made
    up in regards to this for at least a decade.  Viruses tend to be
    uninventive and boring.  This one was extremely unsophisticated, exploited
    no new holes, and required user carelessness to spread.  I only got
    involved because I had to help fend off the nuisance Friday.  I hope
    everyone found the postings useful and will demand better virus protection
    than string matching from their virus scanner vendor as well as request
    that Microsoft add more virus prevention than "enable macros? yes/no" and
    disallow macros from doing things like sending mail or writing to files
    without notice to the user.
    
    -Nate
    



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