Re: weaknesses in dns label decoding,

From: Alexandre Oliva (olivaat_private)
Date: Thu Jun 03 1999 - 05:50:10 PDT

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    On Jun  2, 1999, Dag-Erling Smorgrav <desat_private> wrote:
    
    > bobk <bobkat_private> writes:
    >> Imagine what could happen if some program did a strcmp() on the following
    >> name:
    
    >> rs.internic.net\0.xa.net
    
    >> where, of course, \0 is a null
    
    >> Interested readers may ponder what type of programs may be exploited with
    >> this type of attack.
    
    > Any .rhosts consumer. Xhost. Amanda (.amandahosts). Lpd (lpd.allow).
    
    > What did I win?
    
    :-)
    
    Not Amanda.  After reverse mapping the incoming IP address to a
    hostname, it will lookup the IP addresses for the hostname and make
    sure the incoming IP address is one of the IP addresses listed for
    that name, so only DNS spoofing or a lame DNS cache would get Amanda
    in trouble.
    
    It is true that it will also check whether the canonical name obtained
    for the direct mapping is the same that it got in reverse mapping, and
    it uses strncasecmp here, which means it might miss a difference in
    case `\0' is part of the name, but I don't think this is a critical
    check; only the IP checking is.
    
    --
    Alexandre Oliva http://www.dcc.unicamp.br/~oliva IC-Unicamp, Bra[sz]il
    {oliva,Alexandre.Oliva}@dcc.unicamp.br  aoliva@{acm.org,computer.org}
    oliva@{gnu.org,kaffe.org,{egcs,sourceware}.cygnus.com,samba.org}
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