Microsoft's Reply regarding EFS

From: Ben Greenbaum (bengat_private)
Date: Wed Jul 28 1999 - 18:42:07 PDT

  • Next message: Microsoft Product Security Response Team: "Windows 2000 Encrypting File System Security"

    This was posted to ntsecurity.net by Thomas S. V. Bartlett III
    <Tbartlettat_private>.
    ____________________________________________
    
    
    
    
    The following was taken from Microsoft's reply regarding our document on
    EFS -
    
    
      ----------------------------
      From: Microsoft Product Security Response Team
      [mailto:secureat_private]
      Sent: Tuesday, July 27, 1999 6:20 PM
      Subject: RE: Windows 2000 Encrypting File System (EFS) Vulnerability
    
    
      The problem with the attack that you outlined is that the user has to
    have left the recovery key on the machine in order for it to be compromised.
    The help files for EFS recommend that the recovery key be exported for just
    this reason. Administrator accounts are sometimes compromised, even if only
    because the admin chose a really weak password; because of the importance
    of the EFS recovery key, it's very important that the private key be
    physically separated from the machine.
    
      In addition, your scenario uses the default recovery policy, which
    specifies the local administrator as the recovery agent. However, in any
    networked configuration, the first thing that should have been done was to change
    the recovery policy to make the domain administrator (or some other
    domain authority) the recovery agent. This is the more likely operational use
    of EFS -- a central domain authority having the ability to recover
    encrypted files that were generated by any domain user. The advantage it would
    have in the specific scenario you described is that the recovery agent's
    private key would once again not be present on the machine.
    
      Finally, we recommend using SYSKEY to strongly protect the SAM and
    other security-relevant information. If this had been done, it would not
    have been possible to compromise the machine by simply deleting the SAM --
    the attacker would have been prompted at boot time for the SYSKEY key, which
    (if good practices have been followed) would not be on the machine. "
    
    
      Secureat_private
    
      ----------------------
    
      Thanks to all those who commented on this situation.
    
      Thomas S. V. Bartlett III
      Network Engineer
      TBartlett_iiiat_private
    
    
    ____________________________________________
    Ben Greenbaum
    SecurityFocus
    www.securityfocus.com
    



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