Re: NSA key in MSFT Crypto API

From: Matt Blaze (mabat_private)
Date: Fri Sep 03 1999 - 12:48:07 PDT

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    Here's what I said about this on another list:
    
    I must admit that this doesn't make much sense to me.
    
    I was at Crypto, but I must have missed the rump session talk in question
    (and it's entirely possible that the talk occurred anyway - I was out of the
    room for a good deal of that session).  In any case, non-Crypto people should
    remember that the "rump session" consists of entirely entirely unreviewed talks
    each lasting about five minute.  It is *not* a peer-refereed part of the
    Crypto conference, just a place for people to announce new or minor results.
    It is very easy to get a rump session slot, and people say bogus things at
    the rump session all the time.
    
    That said, I don't understand the point.  If the NSA wanted Microsoft to
    quietly compromise the CAPI install mechanism (which is supposed to
    require Microsoft's digital signature on the installed module -
    thereby preventing the installation of non-US crypto and allowing CAPI
    OS's to be exported), it would be *much* easier to do any of the following:
            - Convince MS to tell them the secret key for MS's signature key
            - Get MS to sign an NSA-compromised module.
            - Install some module other than CAPI to compromise the OS (only
              CAPI modules require the signature).
    
    Regardless of the mechanism used, NSA still would still have to
    convince the owner of the computer in question to install the
    compromised module (perhaps by exploiting one of the other bugs in the
    OS, which is admittedly probably easy enough to do).
    
    Finally, assuming that MS has two public CAPI-install keys in windows,
    and someone discovered this, how would they know that one of the corresponding
    secret keys is held by NSA?  From looking at the web page in question,
    it appears that the evidence consists entirely of the fact that one of the
    CAPI keys has an internal symbol name of "_NSAKEY".  Since anyone
    with a debugger and a copy of an MS OS can find this symbol, if this is
    intended as some kind of covert mechanism, it's not very well hidden.
    
    -matt
    



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