SCO 5.0.5 /bin/doctor nightmare

From: Brock Tellier (btellierat_private)
Date: Wed Sep 08 1999 - 09:16:55 PDT

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    Greetings,
    
    Sometimes we miss the forest for the trees, security-wise.  It would =
    appear that I was right in my last doctor post "If a hole like this =
    exists, there are undoubtedly countless more lurking within." , though I =
    never would've imagined to this degree.  It would appear that doctor =
    allows any user to have complete control over the system not via an =
    exploit but simply by the nature of the program.  If I didn't know any =
    better, I would guess that doctor was meant to be mode 700 gone =
    strangely awry and ended up suid-root and world executable. =20
    
    The "Command Execution" menu option under "Tools" allows you to run any =
    command you wish with uid/gid 0.  I swear I am not making this up.  It =
    doesn't appear as though doctor does any security checks at all.=20
    
    Lest you think this is a mere misconfiguration on my part, I =
    re-installed a clean version of 5.0.5+skunkware and re-tested.  One has =
    to wonder what is going on in Santa Cruz.
    
    The fix, of course, is to chmod 700 /bin/doctor and not look back.
    
    Brock Tellier
    UNIX Systems Administrator
    Webley Systems
    www.webley.com
    
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    <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Greetings,</FONT></DIV>
    <DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
    <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Sometimes we miss the forest for the =
    trees,=20
    security-wise.&nbsp; It would appear that I was right in my last doctor =
    post "If=20
    a hole like this exists, there are undoubtedly countless more lurking =
    <FONT=20
    face=3DArial size=3D2>within."&nbsp;, though I never would've imagined =
    to this=20
    degree.&nbsp; It would appear that doctor allows any user to have =
    complete=20
    control over the system not via an exploit but simply by the nature of =
    the=20
    program.&nbsp; If I didn't know any better, I would guess =
    that&nbsp;doctor was=20
    meant to be mode 700 gone strangely awry and ended up suid-root and =
    world=20
    executable.&nbsp; </FONT></FONT></DIV>
    <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><FONT face=3DArial =
    size=3D2></FONT></FONT>&nbsp;</DIV>
    <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The =
    "Command Execution"=20
    menu option under "Tools" allows you to run any command you wish with =
    uid/gid=20
    0.&nbsp; I swear I am not making this up.&nbsp; It doesn't appear as =
    though=20
    doctor does any security checks at all.&nbsp;<BR><BR>Lest you think this =
    is a=20
    mere misconfiguration on my part, I re-installed a clean version of=20
    5.0.5+skunkware and re-tested.&nbsp; One has to wonder what is going on =
    in Santa=20
    Cruz.</FONT></FONT></DIV>
    <DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
    <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>The fix, of course, is to chmod 700 =
    /bin/doctor and=20
    not look back.</FONT></DIV>
    <DIV>&nbsp;</DIV>
    <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Brock Tellier</FONT></DIV>
    <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>UNIX Systems Administrator</FONT></DIV>
    <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2>Webley Systems</FONT></DIV>
    <DIV><FONT face=3DArial size=3D2><A=20
    href=3D"http://www.webley.com">www.webley.com</A></FONT></DIV></BODY></HT=
    ML>
    
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