Re: Update to ODBC/RDS vulnerabilities

From: rfpat_private
Date: Wed Sep 22 1999 - 18:50:27 PDT

  • Next message: Brock Tellier: "SuSE 6.2 sccw overflow exploit"

    > You did your testing as an administrator on the machine.  Network
    
    No, I specifically did *NOT* do this, to avoid the same goofs that the
    guy who did the latest DCOM posts did.  Not that it was his fault; I
    was just wary of where he went wrong, and tried to avoid that.
    
    I specifically yanked one machine out of the domain and made it into
    another workgroup instead.  I created a local account on that box of user
    'rfp', no special rights (normal user).  I used this to query regedit
    from.  I created the account from scratch to make sure it was clean.
    
    On the servers, on one I added domain account rfp, normal user.  Different
    password than the first so I know I would be prompted for login/password
    when connecting.  On another server which was only in the workgroup, I
    added a local user, same as above.  Normal user rights, no administrative
    stuff.  Again, freshly created accounts to make sure nothing silly was
    going on.
    
    Then I queried from 'remote', non-associated box to these servers.  I
    enter the login/password of rfp.  That's logging in as rfp on one box,
    authenticating as rfp to the second, no administrative mojo to been seen.
    I was able to view the registry, and change that key.  Total 'cross
    mojonation'.
    
    But I see your point on being limited by 'AllowedPaths'.  Has anyone else
    been able to recreate this?  What you say makes sense, so I don't know why
    it would work on mine.  My NT configurations are not custom nor fancy.
    
    > It is also generally a good practice to place router filters in front of
    > your internet-exposed web servers such that they cannot make outbound
    > connections to places where they shouldn't.  People who took such
    > precautions found that things such as the .htr overflow didn't work, and
    > would prevent your UNC path variant from working.  Turning off the
    
    Right.
    
    > Server and Workstation services, as well as unbinding NetBIOS from the
    > external interface would also prevent an attack involving an external
    > UNC path from working.
    
    I said it as an FYI of another approach to he exploit potential.  If your
    box was locked down in the first place none of this would be an issue, no?
    :)  After all, RDS stuff is slightly in the sample-scripts arena--everyone
    should know better.
    
    But they don't.
    
    Cheers,
    .r.f.p.
    



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